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In the last decades, an increasing awareness of instances of 
grave violation of human rights on a massive scale has brought to 
attention the problematic that whether states and the international 
community have an ethical responsibility to react to such cases, and 
(when the conditions require so) to undertake humanitarian military 
interventions. In the immediate post-Cold War environment, this has 
taken place parallel to the shift of focus in the security literature 
from national security towards human security. The varying 
responses to the grave cases of the 1990s such as Somalia, Rwanda, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo reaffirmed the necessity to 
undertake decisive and timely collective action, reminded the 
question of an ethical duty on the part of the international 
community to react to mass atrocities. By December 2001, the 
introduction of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) set 
a new framework to take up this question with the aim of 
transforming the notion of the “right to intervene” into a 
“responsibility to react”. 
With all its controversies humanitarian intervention continues 
to be a part of international political conduct. At the current state of 
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affairs, humanitarian intervention has become politically relevant 
within the context of the RtoP doctrine. In this context, this 
dissertation seeks to assess the role of moral/ethical motives in the 
decisions and/or behaviour of the international community. 
Accordingly, it takes the assumption of humanitarian intervention as 
a moral duty as its subject matter, and puts it into test in relation to 
its newly defined limits and conduct within the RtoP framework.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades, an increasing awareness of instances of 
grave violation of human rights on a massive scale has brought to 
attention the problematic that whether states and the international 
community have an ethical1 responsibility to react to such cases, and 
(when the conditions require so) to undertake humanitarian military 
interventions.2 In the immediate post-Cold War environment, this 
has taken place parallel to the shift of focus in the security literature 
from national security towards human security. As noted by Robert 
Jackson, this in practice means that “instead of states or alliances 
defending their populations against external threats, international 
society is underwriting the national security of states, whether or not 
they convert it into domestic security for their citizens.”3 
The varying responses to the grave cases of the 1990s such as 
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo reaffirmed the 
necessity to undertake decisive and timely collective action while 
                                                
1 For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms moral and ethical will be used 
interchangeably. 
2 For reasons of brevity, hereinafter, humanitarian military intervention will be 
referred to as humanitarian intervention. As this dissertation adopts a narrow 
understanding of humanitarian intervention, it excludes non-military forms of 
action ranging from humanitarian aid (or the activities of non-governmental 
organizations) to the imposition of sanctions. For the working definition of 
humanitarian intervention adopted in this dissertation, see Section 1.1, Part c. 
3 Robert Jackson. “The Security Dilemma in Africa” in The Insecurity Dilemma: 
National Security of Third World States, Brian Job (ed.). (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1992), 93. 
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reminding the question of an ethical duty on the part of the 
international community to react to mass atrocities. By December 
2001, the introduction of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP)4 set a new framework to take up this question with the aim of 
transforming the negatively perceived notion of the “right to 
intervene” into a “responsibility to react”. 
In 2005, the World Summit Outcome Document constituted a 
cornerstone for the international recognition and embracement of the 
“responsibility to protect”. Following its unanimous adoption as a 
principle by the Member States of the General Assembly, the 
question of how to implement RtoP was placed in the agenda of the 
United Nations (UN) by 2009. While the most recent debates on 
humanitarian intervention (within the confines of the issue of RtoP’s 
implementation) have been taking place under the auspices of the 
UN, and especially the General Assembly, in the meanwhile, the 
international community’s commitment for upholding its 
responsibility has been put to test by several cases of grave crimes 
against humanity. 
As Taylor Seybolt puts it: 
Once considered an aberration in international affairs, 
humanitarian military intervention is now a compelling 
                                                
4 Hereinafter the abbreviation “RtoP” will be used to represent the concept of the 
responsibility to protect introduced by the Report of the ICISS published in 2001 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The 
Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty. (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001)), 
and later embraced by the UN from 2005 on. 
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foreign policy issue. It is on the front line of debates 
about when to use military force; it presents a 
fundamental challenge to state sovereignty; it radically 
influences the way humanitarian aid organisations and 
military organisations work; and it is a matter of life or 
death for thousands upon thousands of people.5 
In this vein, the mixed components of humanitarian intervention 
make it a legal, moral and political dilemma. In the contemporary 
international system, humanitarian intervention is not a legally 
established international norm, yet it is being practiced unilaterally 
or collectively by states as well as international and/or regional 
organisations since mass violations of human rights continue to take 
place in different parts of the world.  
Hence, its lawfulness in question, humanitarian intervention 
as a moral duty can be depicted as a double-edged sword: it is 
questioned not only when it is practiced but also when it is not. As 
Nicholas Wheeler notes: “‘Doing something’ to rescue non-citizens 
facing the extreme is likely to provoke the charge of interference in 
the internal affairs of another state, while ‘doing nothing’ can lead to 
accusations of moral indifference.”6 From a political point of view, on 
the one hand, action by states (especially when it is unilateral or not 
authorised by the Security Council) is likely to receive negative 
criticisms on the basis of the genuine motives of the actors involved. 
                                                
5 Taylor Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: the conditions for success 
and failure (Norfolk: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1. 
6 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1. 
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Since the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been abused at 
times by states in attempts to justify acts of self-interest, there is 
considerable suspicion towards humanitarian interventions 
undertaken without Security Council authorisation. Among all the 
matters, what lies at the core of the humanitarian intervention 
debate is a clash between taking the necessary extreme measures to 
safeguard fundamental rights of the masses and upholding basic 
principles of international law (such as state sovereignty, non-
intervention and non-use of force), which are key elements for 
sustaining international peace and security. On the other hand, 
when there is inaction (as in the case of Rwanda), the international 
community is criticised for being indifferent. This can be accepted as 
an implication of the existence of a sense of a moral duty to react and 
an expectation from the international community to this end.  
With all its controversies humanitarian intervention continues 
to be a part of the international political conduct. At the current state 
of affairs, humanitarian intervention has become politically relevant 
within the context of the RtoP doctrine, (and it continues to be 
discussed/challenged as a notion by the Members of the General 
Assembly in the debates which followed the July 21, 2009 Report of 
the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of RtoP). As this 
dissertation seeks to assess the role of moral/ethical motives in the 
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decisions and/or behaviour of the international community,7 it takes 
the assumption of humanitarian intervention as a moral duty as its 
subject matter, and puts it into test in relation to its newly defined 
limits and conduct within the RtoP framework.8 Such limitation 
enables the researcher to analyse an extensive doctrine (which has 
historically been highly controversial) within a unanimously accepted 
framework. In this vein, as can be observed from the literature review 
which is in order, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is 
discussed in the light of the most recent developments and in an up-
to-date context, which has not yet been explored in depth. 
1.1. Literature Review 
Albeit the debate on humanitarian intervention is not new, it 
has been flourishing since the early years of the Cold War as a result 
of the increasing importance placed on the international protection of 
human rights. Humanitarian intervention has been studied from 
legal, political and ethical aspects mainly in international politics and 
international law literatures. A review of the relevant literature9 
                                                
7 It should be noted that this dissertation rather than making assessments about 
individual state practices mainly focuses on the collective behaviour of states 
within the international community in terms of assuming and upholding their 
responsibility to react. Put simply, the international community is taken as the 
main actor. For the theoretical conceptualisation of the term, see section 2.1. 
8 Accordingly, the general approach of states towards humanitarian interventions 
is questioned on the basis of the recent debates on the implementation of RtoP 
under the auspices of the UN. 
9 The review under this section, in general, is limited to international politics 
literature. The ethical discussions regarding humanitarian interventions are taken 
into consideration within the scope of this literature. 
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reveals that the debate has generally revolved around the issues of 
the legitimacy and legality of so-called humanitarian interventions on 
the basis of the investigation of cases as well as an assessment of 
their efficacy and/or success. 
a. Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention 
The discussions focusing on the ethics of humanitarian 
intervention within international politics literature have generally 
taken place around ethical considerations like human suffering10 and 
“just causes” for undertaking humanitarian interventions as well as 
appropriate ways to carry out such acts and achieving successful 
results, which are argued to constitute a legitimate basis or a 
justification for undertaking action through use of force. Accordingly, 
scholars have applied the just war criteria such as the availability of 
a legitimate authority, right purpose, just cause and debito modo.11 
For instance, Lang classifies “studies of ethics of humanitarian 
intervention” in two as normative and descriptive. The former 
“provides the tools for evaluating the practices and outcomes that 
constitute humanitarian intervention.”12 Therefore, it is rather 
prescriptive than descriptive, and it focuses on how people ought to 
                                                
10 The notion of human suffering is studied in Chapter 2, under the section on 
moral considerations. 
11 These criteria are studied in detail in Chapter 4 on the Responsibility to Protect 
as a part of the suggested decision-making criteria of the ICISS. 
12 Anthony F. Lang Jr. “Introduction: Humanitarian Intervention—Definitions and 
Debates” in Just Intervention. Anthony F. Lang Jr. (ed.) (USA: Georgetown 
University Press, 2003), 2. 
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act as in the case of just war theory. On the other hand, the latter 
“explains the particular moral beliefs and ideas that guide decisions 
to intervene.”13 In these empirical studies a major part of the analysis 
is based on case studies and/or the historical evolution of the 
doctrine. 
b. Theoretical Approaches to Humanitarian Intervention 
As in descriptive ethics, a similar basis is valid for studies 
primarily focusing on the political as well as theoretical aspects of 
humanitarian interventions. Although a fundamentally theoretical 
study of humanitarian interventions is not very common in 
international politics/relations literature, there are some examples 
like those of Nicholas Wheeler14 and Martha Finnemore.15 For 
instance, Nicholas Wheeler studies “the extent to which 
humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate practice in 
international society”16 from a theoretical point of view through the 
analytical lens of the English School. Challenging the classical 
approaches to humanitarian intervention, Martha Finnemore with 
her constructivist approach introduces the notion of change into the 
                                                
13 Lang 2003, 2. 
14 See Nicholas Wheeler. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
15 See Martha Finnemore. “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 153-85. A revised 
version of this chapter is available in Martha Finnemore’s The Purpose of 
Intervention, 2003, 52-84. 
16 Wheeler 2000, 1. 
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literature. Tracing the roots of the humanitarian intervention 
doctrine in the earlier centuries, Finnemore posits that throughout 
the history of the states system, there has been a change in the 
patterns of military intervention, and that this change does not 
necessarily result from a change in patterns of technology or material 
capabilities as traditional approaches put forth. Finnemore 
underlines that “what has changed is […] not the fact of intervention 
but its form and meaning.”17  
Both Wheeler and Finnemore rely on case studies in their 
analyses. Likewise, for many other scholars and/or analysts, a 
common tool of research is case studies. Through these, researches 
seek to answer questions such as why is there inaction in certain 
cases while there is intervention in others; is there an emerging norm 
of humanitarian intervention; how can humanitarian interventions 
be legitimate, etc. Most case study accounts in the literature cover 
cases up to early 2000s, and widely covered situations are those in 
Northern Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and 
Darfur. An example of a novel work based on an analysis of specific 
cases is Taylor Seybolt’s “Humanitarian Military Intervention,” where 
                                                
17 Finnemore 2003, 3. According to Finnemore, the three main factors that have 
changed are the following: the understanding of who is human and who can claim 
humanitarian intervention, the manner of intervention (e.g. unilateral and 
multilateral), and finally, military objectives and what the understanding of 
“success” comprises of (Finnemore 2003, 53). 
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Seybolt studies conditions18 for success and failure of humanitarian 
interventions. Furthermore, the discussion of cases has also been 
relevant for the studies focusing on the issue of legality/legitimacy of 
humanitarian interventions.19 
c. Issues of Legality and Legitimacy 
The question of legitimacy and/or legality of humanitarian 
interventions was first taken up by scholars of international law. 
Unlike in any other studied aspect of humanitarian intervention, 
legal scholars seem to be in consensus on the point that 
humanitarian intervention is not (yet) a legal norm in the 
contemporary system. Where they disagree is its legitimacy and 
whether it should be established as an international legal norm or 
not.20 In this regard, there is the restrictionist and counter-
restrictionist divide in the international law literature arguing against 
or for the legalisation of humanitarian interventions.21 Given such 
fragmentation, in the absence of an absolute recognition or refusal of 
a duty or right to intervene, legitimacy of this sort of use of force has 
become a prominent part of the debates in international politics 
literature too. 
                                                
18 There are also examples of works that study (military) criteria for humanitarian 
interventions, see for instance Michael O’Hanlon. Saving Lives with Force: Military 
Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 
1997). 
19 For instance, a widely debated case has been the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
20 Some of the common focuses in these discussions are the role of the Security 
Council in legitimisation of a case as well as the NATO operation on Kosovo. 
21 This divide is considered in a detailed manner in Chapter 2, under Section 2.2. 
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The evolution of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
plays a fundamental role in understanding the nature and legitimacy 
of this act. In this regard, some scholars study the legitimization of 
humanitarian interventions through the evolution of the doctrine. 
For instance, Francis Kofi Abiew in his book entitled “the Evolution of 
the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention,” “attempts 
to demonstrate a legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention 
through an examination of the evolution of the principle and its 
practice [and he] argues that state sovereignty is not incompatible 
with humanitarian intervention.”22 As it can be inferred from Abiew’s 
argument, whenever humanitarian intervention is in question, also is 
state sovereignty since outside intervention constitutes a breach of 
the sanctity of national sovereignty.23 
d. Human Security and RtoP 
Humanitarian intervention debates have also been taking place 
alongside a discussion on the changing notion of state sovereignty as 
a result of the shift in the security literature towards human 
security. King and Murray find that economic development and 
                                                
22 Abiew 1998, 5. 
23 For examples of works focusing on the relationship between sovereignty and 
humanitarian interventions, see Chopra, Jarat, and Thomas G. Weiss. “Sovereignty 
Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention” Ethics and 
International Affairs 6 (1992): 95-117; see Duke, Simon. “The State and Human 
Rights: Sovereignty versus Humanitarian Intervention” International Relations 12 
(1994): 25-48; see Heriberto, Cairo. “The Duty of the Benevolent Master: From 
Sovereignty to Suzerainty and the Biopolitics of Intervention” Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political 31(3) (2006): 285-311; see Kuznetsova, Ekaterina. “Limit Sovereignty 
if the State Abuses It” International Affairs: A Russian Journal 5 (2004): 94-105. 
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military security, which they label as “the two dominant strands of 
foreign policy,” became interwoven in the 1990s, and one of the main 
outcomes of this was the shift in focus towards the emerging concept 
of human security.24 As Pınar Bilgin observes, the “end of the Cold 
War provoked a long overdue interest in rethinking commonly held 
assumptions as well as practices concerning security.”25 Therefore, in 
the 1990s, academic debates moved beyond the traditional 
conceptions of security to include also individual and societal 
dimensions.26 Certain developments of the Cold War-era surfaced in 
the 1990s. These  
included (a) growing disparities in economic 
opportunities both within and between states; (b) 
increasing hardships faced by peoples in the developing 
world who found themselves on the margins of a 
globalizing world economy; (c) diminishing 
nonrenewable resources leading families and groups to 
become refugees; (d) rising anti-foreigner feelings and 
violence in reaction to migration pressures from the 
developing to the developed world; and (e) proliferating 
intrastate conflicts increasing public interest in, and 
pressure for, humanitarian intervention.27 
These developments led to practitioners’ growing interest in human 
security. As an overall impact, especially of intrastate conflicts, at the 
                                                
24 Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray. “Rethinking Human Security” Political 
Science Quarterly 116(4) (2001-02): 585. 
25 Pinar Bilgin. “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security” International 
Studies Review 5 (2003): 207. 
26 Some examples are Barry Buzan’s People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (1991); Georg Sorensen’s 
Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal 
Problem (1996); Keith Krause and Michael Williams’s Critical Security Studies: 
Concepts and Cases (1998). 
27 Bilgin 2003: 207. 
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beginning of 2000s scholars started asking the question whether or 
not states have a “responsibility to protect” populations from mass 
atrocities. 
With the Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that was published in 
December 2001, a new topic of debate was added to the international 
politics literature. RtoP was started to be discussed as a new norm 
shifting the terms of the debate from a “right to intervene” to a 
“responsibility to protect.” One of the pioneers of the responsibility to 
protect doctrine, Gareth Evans, asserts that “[w]hat we have seen 
over the last five years is the emergence, almost in real time, of a new 
international norm, one that may ultimately become a new rule of 
customary international law, of really quite fundamental ethical 
importance and novelty in the international system.”28  
In this regard, some parts of the growing literature on this 
subject matter focus on the question whether or not RtoP is evolving 
into an international norm. An example of such a study is Carsten 
Stahn’s article entitled “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm,”29 in which Stahn draws attention to the 
uncertainties of the doctrine as well as the existing problems for RtoP 
                                                
28 Gareth Evans. From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 
Keynote Address to Symposium on Humanitarian Intervention, University of 
Wisconsin, Madison, 31 March 2006 retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
home/index.cfm?id=4060&l=1 (accessed October 28, 2007). 
29 Carsten Stahn. “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal 
Norm?” The American Journal of International Law 101(1) (Jan. 2007): 990-1020. 
  13 
to become a legal norm. The prevalent idea in the literature at the 
current state of affairs is that although the RtoP notion is evolving 
very rapidly, it is not yet clear enough to be an international legal 
norm. In a similar vein, for instance, on the basis of several reports 
published (especially by the UN) up to 2007, Susan Breau30 analyses 
the process of evolution as well as the implementation of RtoP.  
Alongside these discussions, scholars like Alex J. Bellamy31 
question the nature of the doctrine, and ask whether RtoP is the new 
“Trojan Horse” of powerful states. In line with this, RtoP is discussed 
also within the confines of liberal peace theory32 since there is the 
prevailing suspicion hanging in air that whether RtoP is an 
imperialistic imposition of Western states or not. These discussions 
took a new turn after the World Summit Outcome Document and 
various other aspects of RtoP started to be addressed. 
In this context, inspired by the latest efforts within the UN 
regarding the embracement of the RtoP doctrine, this dissertation 
aims to make a contribution to the growing literature on RtoP 
alongside the mammoth collection of works on humanitarian 
intervention as explained in the following section. 
                                                
30 Susan C. Breau. “The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping” 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 11(3) (2006): 429-64. 
31 Alex J. Bellamy. “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur 
and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq” Ethics & International Affairs 19(2) 
(Summer 2005): 31-53. 
32 See for instance, David Chandler. “The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the 
‘Liberal Peace’” International Peacekeeping 11(1) (2004): 59-81. 
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1.2. Contributions of the Dissertation 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has long been a 
topic of debate due its ethical, legal and political aspects. So far, the 
issues of legitimacy and legality of humanitarian interventions have 
mainly been studied in international law and politics literatures on 
the basis of the basic assumption that states pursue their national 
interests. In the meanwhile, public debates (especially those 
regarding the cases that found wide coverage in media throughout 
the world) have drawn attention to the (claimed) moral considerations 
of states. Although a discussion of evolving norms of humanitarian 
intervention as well as the responsibility to protect were added to the 
literature, certain prominent research questions regarding the two 
notions and their interrelation have been omitted. 
Accordingly, this dissertation attempts to fill a gap in the 
literature by: 
(1) determining what the approach of states towards the notion of 
humanitarian intervention currently is based on an analysis of the 
recent debates regarding the implementation of the responsibility to 
protect within the UN framework; 
(2) questioning to what extent the notion of moral responsibility 
plays a role in the international community’s responses to cases of 
humanitarian catastrophe; 
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(3) identifying factors (such as capacity and capability issues) other 
than national interest which may constrain states in taking action 
based on moral motives. 
Given the complex nature of the notion of humanitarian 
intervention, different from other studies in the literature, while 
seeking answers to these questions this research merges the legal, 
political and ethical aspects of humanitarian intervention within a 
single study for the purpose of revealing the significant 
interconnection between these three areas, and how they affect 
and/or mutually construct each other.  
Finally, while bringing together the relevant parts of the 
extensive literature on humanitarian intervention and the growing 
literature on different aspects of RtoP, this dissertation aims at 
making a contribution to the corpus of scholarly works also (1) by 
exploring and analysing the recent debates in the UN General 
Assembly regarding the implementation of RtoP and the implication 
of these on the notion of humanitarian intervention; and (2) by 
studying RtoP situations/cases in the aftermath of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document and then evaluating them in relation to 
the conduct of humanitarian intervention. In this vein, this 
dissertation compares theory with practice, and develops its analysis 
under five main headings as explained in the next section. 
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1.3. Structure 
This dissertation starts off with the presentation of the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 2 in order to lay down the limits of 
the dissertation and to outline the way the researcher has 
approached the research question. To this end, first the main actor of 
the research is presented and conceptualised. Then, prior to 
explaining how the dissertation is operationalised, the theoretical 
tools utilised in the research are described. 
In Chapter 3, a conceptual and legal framework outlining the 
fundamental characteristics of the subject matter is provided. 
Accordingly, following a brief definitional study of humanitarian 
intervention, the notion of RtoP is introduced and analysed in 
relation to humanitarian intervention. This is followed by an overview 
of the normative roots of the two doctrines in order to identify 
common points of departure. Finally, the legal framework is 
introduced on the basis of a discussion on the existence of a right to 
intervene on the basis of fundamental principles of international law 
as well as possible legal grounds for practicing humanitarian 
interventions and RtoP.  
Building on this basis, in Chapter 4, a historical overview of 
the chosen Cold War-era and 1990s cases, provides a milieu of 
comparison of theory with practice, and prepares the discussion for 
the adoption of the RtoP at the international level. After the brief 
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study of main documents on the development of the RtoP within the 
framework of the UN, the chapter is concluded with a discussion on 
the nature of RtoP as a norm. 
Chapter 5 studies the theoretical aspects of the main drives for 
undertaking action based on a grouping under four main headings: 
(1) human security, (2) international norms, (3) moral considerations, 
(4) and national interests. 
Following from these theoretical discussions, Chapter 6 briefly 
studies eleven cases of RtoP concern for the purpose of comparing 
theory with practice. These case studies constitute the test of the 
assertions of this dissertation. This is followed by the Conclusion 
where the overall account of the implications of state practices 
regarding RtoP and humanitarian intervention as well as the main 
argument of the dissertation are presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The most fundamental challenge to the doctrine —or, as 
scholars like Gareth Evans suggest, the evolving norm— of the 
“responsibility to protect” stems from the traditional approaches to 
the notions of national interest and security. In contrast to an 
understanding of taking action on grounds of national interest, the 
“responsibility to protect” takes states as moral agents.33 Based on 
such understanding, in rejection of a (neo)realist assumption that 
states are amoral units, this dissertation builds its research around 
the question of whether or not moral concerns influence the 
decisions and/or behaviour of the international community, 
specifically in cases of gross violations of human rights. In this vein, 
it sets the framework of its research within the limits of the conduct 
of humanitarian interventions in fulfilment of the responsibility to 
react. 
Like most social phenomena, humanitarian intervention has a 
complex nature, in which various actors (from various levels of 
analysis), numerous understandings inherent in state behaviour, 
and multiple drives influencing action are in interaction with each 
other. This dissertation, not being a theoretical study per se, adopts 
a holistic approach towards its problem statement, and to this end it 
                                                
33 Chandler 2007: 62. 
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benefits from a combination of different theories in its analysis. In 
general terms, it utilises the tools of constructivism in order to 
simplify complex social phenomena. In terms of determining the 
main actor and the level of analysis, the dissertation benefits from 
the approaches of the English School and takes up on Hedley Bull’s 
definition of the international society. In the meanwhile, it assumes a 
counter-restrictionist legal standing—specifically the international 
community approach.34 
In this context, this chapter provides an overview of the 
theoretical framework of the dissertation. To this end, first the 
definition of international community adopted for the purposes of 
this research is introduced. Second, a brief explanation of the 
specific tools of constructivism which are utilised in the dissertation 
is put forth. This is followed by the description of Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s “norm life cycle” model, which is to be implemented in the 
analyses of Section 4.3 of the dissertation. Finally, the general 
methodology of the dissertation with emphasis on the 
operationalisation of the case studies is presented to the readers. 
                                                
34 Although it recognises its basic principles and rules of conduct (as adopted 
within the context of RtoP by the ICISS), this dissertation does not utilise just war 
theory as its theoretical framework. As Mary Kaldor posits, “[i]n a globalized era, 
where global social contract is in the process of being debated, just war theory no 
longer applies since our concern is with the defence of individuals rather than 
states” (Kaldor 2008, 15). 
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2.1. Conceptualising the International Community 
It is important to identify what the term international 
community within the context of this research means. Hedley Bull 
suggests that “when a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions”, international society comes into existence.35 What Bull 
describes in here is rather an imperfect society of states (where self-
interest driven behaviour is not out of question or abidance by norms 
is not always for granted, etc.). This is why we are not talking about a 
world society, but an international community with potential to 
improve. 
In this vein, with the notions of humanitarian intervention and 
RtoP at its core, this dissertation defines the UN as an/the 
international community and establishes it as its focus in terms of 
the main actor. So, for the purposes of this research the notion of 
international community is defined as the Member States of the UN, 
in other words, the community of states and their activities as an 
international body within the UN framework, specifically in the 
Security Council, and above all, the General Assembly. Building up 
on such conceptualisation of the main actor, the dissertation in 
                                                
35 Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: 
Macmillan, 1977), 13. 
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general benefits from the tools of constructivism in terms of 
explicating complex phenomena. 
2.2. Utilising the Tools of Constructivism 
In developing its main argument this dissertation adopts 
certain assumptions and understandings of the constructivist 
framework. In this regard, mutual construction, intersubjectivity, 
and the acceptance of (the possibility of) social change are embraced 
as core features in this dissertation. Adopting a contra-(neo)realist 
point of view, states are not assumed to be amoral units.  
Accordingly, this dissertation recognises that it is theoretically 
important to distinguish between elements of the logic of 
appropriateness and the logic of consequences in state behaviour. 
Following Mervyn Frost’s assertion, this research takes it as a given 
that “[t]he social practices within which we are constituted as actors 
have ethical components embedded within them.”36 Thus, “[e]thical 
conduct is not [considered] an ‘add-on’ to normal non-ethical or 
amoral conduct,”37 but a part of it. 
Furthermore, the rights and duties of states, as well as the 
objectives, costs and benefits of the actions are considered as 
                                                
36 Frost in Ethics and Foreign Policy, 2001, 35. 
37 Frost in Ethics and Foreign Policy, 2001, 36. 
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mutually constructed as are agents and structures.38 This opens up 
the possibility of change in understandings and behaviour.  
In line with this, interests and behaviour are not taken 
exogenous to the social context.  
Neorealists and neoliberals share generally similar 
assumptions about agents: states are the dominant 
actors in the system, and they define security in ‘self-
interested’ terms. Neorealists and neoliberals may 
disagree about the extent to which states are motivated 
by relative versus absolute gains, but both groups take 
the self-interested state as the starting point for 
theory.39 
In this vein, while asserting that moral considerations matter, this 
dissertation does not suggest that self-interested motives are not 
exempt from the scene. Nonetheless, self-interest is interpreted in a 
more inclusive manner than a mere struggle for power. 
“Constructivists argue that understanding how non-material 
structures condition actors’ identities is important because identities 
inform interests and, in turn, actions. […] In Alexander Wendt’s 
words, ‘Identities are the basis of interests.”40 
This dissertation does not take it as its default assumption the 
rationalist assertion that powerful states adopt norms because it 
serves their interests, and that “[w]hen an individual or a state seeks 
                                                
38 Finnemore 2003, 53. 
39 Alexander Wendt. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: the social construction of 
power politics” International Organisation 46(2) (Spring 1992): 392. 
40 Christian Reus-Smith. “Constructivism” in Theories of International Relations (3rd 
ed.), Burchill, Linklater, Devetak, Donnelly, Paterson, Reus-Smith and True (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 197. 
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to justify its behaviour, they will usually appeal41 to established 
norms of legitimate conduct.”42 Nevertheless, such appeal suggests 
“that institutionalised norms and ideas work as rationalisations only 
because they already have moral force in a given social context.”43 
Moreover, this dissertation recognises that it is theoretically 
important to distinguish between elements of the logic of 
appropriateness and the logic of consequences in state behaviour. 
Following Mervyn Frost’s assertion, this research takes it as a given 
that “[t]he social practices within which we are constituted as actors 
have ethical components embedded within them.”44 Thus, “[e]thical 
conduct is not [considered] an ‘add-on’ to normal non-ethical or 
amoral conduct,”45 but a part of it. 
In addition to the general constructivist approach taken up in 
the conduct of research, while studying the development of RtoP as 
an international norm and determining what kind of a norm this 
currently is evaluated Finnemore and Sikkink’s “norm life cycle” 
model is adopted. 
                                                
41 One example is the case of US’s intervention in Iraq where the US sought 
legitimacy for its conduct through the UN. 
42 Reus-Smith, 198. 
43 Reus-Smith, 198. 
44 Frost in Ethics and Foreign Policy, 2001, 35. 
45 Frost in Ethics and Foreign Policy, 2001, 36. 
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2.3. The “Norm Life Cycle” Model 
This dissertation does not address the problematic of how and 
why norms are developed. It rather accepts the constructivist 
assumption that the international community becomes/is 
constrained by the norms it establishes. In this vein, within the 
framework of RtoP the case of humanitarian intervention it taken as 
a moral norm and applied as a test case for understanding the role of 
moral considerations in the conducts of the international community.  
In this context, only for the purposes of Chapter 4, and only in 
a supplementary way, while making the argument that RtoP is a 
moral norm, this dissertation benefits from the norm “life cycle” 
scheme as presented by Finnemore and Sikkink, which can be 
basically summarised as follows: There are the three stages of “norm 
emergence,” “norm cascade,” and “internalization” (as shown in 
Figure 1).  
 
Norm   “Norm Internalization 
emergence 
 
  cascade” 
 
 
Stage 1 Tipping 
point 
Stage 2 Stage 3 
 
Figure 1. Norm life cycle46 
 
At the first stage of the cycle, norm entrepreneurs as the human 
agents constitute the key actors of persuasion for the adoption of a 
                                                
46 The figure is taken from Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896. 
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norm.47 It is through these entrepreneurs that the norm comes into 
being and is introduced to the international community of states. 
Nevertheless, in “most cases, for an emergent norm to reach a 
threshold and move toward the second stage, it must become 
institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and 
organisations.”48 Throughout these processes organisational 
platforms play a complementary role in the promotion of the new 
norms.49 
It is a “tipping point” that sets the border line between the first 
two stages. For a norm to be considered to have reached this point, it 
must be adopted by “a critical mass of relevant state actors.”50 What 
is meant by “the critical mass” can be problematic. Nevertheless in 
the case of RtoP’s adoption it is not. Since the World Summit 
Outcome document was adopted unanimously, that is to say by all 
the Member States without any objectors, we are able to talk about 
all the relevant state actors rather “a critical mass”. Stage 2: “norm 
cascade” comes after this threshold. This is the level where the 
general embracement of a norm takes place.51 Socialisation is the key 
mechanism of the norm cascade, and is carried out by norm leaders 
                                                
47 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896. 
48 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 900. 
49 Finnemore and Sikkink also note that “[o]ne prominent feature of modern 
organizations in particular is their use of expertise and information to change the 
behaviour of other actors” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 899). 
50 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895. 
51 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895. 
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seeking to persuade others to adhere to the new norm.52 “[A]t the 
extreme of a norm cascade, norms may become so widely accepted 
that they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic.”53 
This brief overview sums up the “norm life cycle” scheme that is used 
in the assessment of RtoP as a moral norm. 
2.4. Operationalisation 
A two-fold approach is followed in this research. The 
dissertation first seeks to “explain” the notion of humanitarian 
intervention and to locate it in the international political system in 
relation to the RtoP doctrine. To this end, the dissertation studies the 
conceptual, normative, historical and legal framework of 
humanitarian intervention and RtoP to outline how these two 
doctrines work in theory. Second, in its attempt to “understand” the 
role of moral motives in state action in undertaking humanitarian 
interventions within the context of the RtoP norm, it explores the 
drives for action and considers examples from different 
situations/cases.  
The former analysis is fundamentally based on the study of the 
secondary sources in the literature as far as the conceptual 
framework (where political, normative and moral motives are 
                                                
52 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902. 
53 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904. 
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analysed) is concerned. In the case of the legal framework as well as 
the parts devoted to the study of RtoP, the analysis is based not only 
on secondary sources —that is the narratives or commentaries of 
legal scholars— but also on primary ones such as the Charter of the 
UN, resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly, 
judgements of international courts, the Report of the ICISS on the 
“responsibility to protect” as well as interviews with practitioners and 
legal scholars. In this regard, a substantial part of this study is based 
rather on qualitative research than a quantitative one. The data 
and/or information used in the exemplification of different cases is 
comprised of collections from different databases such as that of the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect crisis 
database, the Global Responsibility to Protect database, the 
International Crisis Group database, and the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database. This data is 
accompanied by notes from the interviews conducted with 
practitioners, analysts and scholars from different parts of the world 
as well as the information available in secondary sources. Moreover, 
official documents, public statements, minutes of General Assembly 
meetings, Security Council resolutions, and other reports relevant to 
the focus of this dissertation are consulted as primary sources. 
At the ideational level, especially after early 1990s, the 
international community has started to take international protection 
  28 
of human rights as a higher value than national interest and state 
sovereignty. Nonetheless, it is a question whether or not such 
understanding has become so influential that it can influence state 
behaviour on a large scale, and a purely conceptual analysis falls 
short in explaining different drives. The verification, therefore, lies in 
the observation of state practices. Such approach also allows for 
comparing and contrasting theory with practice.54 
In this regard, looking at different cases helps the researcher to 
understand the nature of the interventions as well as the changing 
contexts and conditions. Throughout the dissertation there are 
concise references55 to cases/situations from 1960s to 2010 since 
they help to reveal not only what the legal status of humanitarian 
intervention has lately been but also the political constraints that 
continue to persist within the dynamics of the international 
community. Furthermore, in the detailed analysis of specific cases, 
the focus will be on the situations that emerged or has escalated in 
the years following the international community’s unanimous 
adoption of the “responsibility to protect” in the 2005 World Summit 
                                                
54 As Lang suggests “an intervention can only be understood in the context of 
motives, means, and ends, moral evaluations of intervention must address not only 
the initial decision to intervene but also the entire process of an intervention. In 
other words, understanding and evaluating requires historical descriptions of 
contexts, decisions, and outcomes” (Lang in Just Intervention 2003, 4). 
55 An exhaustive analysis of situations that arose especially in the 1990s as well as 
prior to the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document is omitted for 
limitation purposes. The reasoning behind this is that these cases have already 
been widely explored in the literature, and do not have a special significance in 
determining the relationship between humanitarian interventions and RtoP in 
terms of the implementation as they date back to the period before the adoption of 
the RtoP doctrine. 
  29 
Outcome Document. The reason for such limitation is (1) to observe 
whether or not the international community has been abiding by its 
responsibility to protect as the Member States of the General 
Assembly have undersigned to in 2005, and if yes, to what extent; (2) 
to determine the implications of these regarding the conduct of 
humanitarian interventions. Such analysis of cases also serves to fill 
a gap in the literature since there is a lack of focus on these current 
cases. 
In determining which cases to study, two leading organisations 
in the promotion and the implementation of RtoP are prioritised as 
reference points and later presented as the basis of the comparison 
of interpretation of cases as RtoP ones.56 The first is the “Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect”57 and the second is the 
“International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.”58 As part of 
                                                
56 It should be noted the research conducted is not dependent solely on the 
information acquired from the databases of the said two organisations. Various 
other databases (as listed in the previous pages) have been used as references. But 
for reasons of brevity and in order to highlight that interpretation of cases may vary 
even between two cooperating organisations, only two selected institutions are 
brought to forefront in comparisons. 
57 “The Global Centre's mission is to help transform the principle of the 
responsibility to protect into a cause for action in the face of mass atrocities. 
Founded by leading figures in government and academia, as well as by 
International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam International, Refugees 
International, and WFM-Institute for Global Policy, the Centre recognizes that this 
emerging norm needs to be broadly explained, clarified, defended from wilful 
misunderstanding, and fleshed out to serve as the basis for practical action” 
(http://globalr2p.org/whoweare/index.php (accessed September 22, 2010)). 
58 “The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) was 
founded on 28 January 2009 by representatives of eight regional and international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Coalition brings together NGOs from 
all regions of the world to strengthen normative consensus for RtoP, further the 
understanding of the norm, push for strengthened capacities to prevent and halt 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and mobilize 
NGOs to push for action to save lives in RtoP country-specific situations” 
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the case selection criteria, the use of coercive measures is not sought 
as a qualifier. As the main concern of analysis is to assess the extent 
of RtoP’s implementation since 2005, reference is made to situations 
where either international actors made a call for the implementation 
of RtoP (due to their belief that gross violations of human rights have 
been taking place in a country), or a state has invoked the 
“responsibility to protect” as a justification for undertaking the 
intervention. In this vein, misapplications of RtoP, ongoing situations 
requiring continuous monitoring under the framework of paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, cases 
requiring action under Pillar 3 of the norm, and successful 
implementation(s) of RtoP realised at the preventive stage are 
included within the focus of Chapter 6. 
Aside from the criteria adopted for case selection, in general 
terms, concerning the overall assessments of this research a case is 
considered to qualify as a humanitarian intervention if the following 
elements are present: 
(1) The intervention has to adopt coercive measures with or without 
the authorisation of the Security Council under Chapter VII; 
(2) The population that is the target of the mass atrocities has to be 
different than the nationals of the intervening state(s). States 
intervening for the purpose of protecting their own nationals 
                                                                                                                                     
(http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition (accessed Sept. 
22, 2010). 
  31 
living in another country will be assumed to act upon the 
principle of self-defence; 
(3) The interveners, although they may have other interests involved, 
ought to have a driving humanitarian objective for undertaking 
such forceful action. 
Aside from these physical elements that are considered as a must, 
one can also include an ethical component which dictates that the 
intervention ought to be taken only if it has true potential to produce 
a positive humanitarian outcome. Nevertheless, as the main focus of 
the dissertation is the moral motives in the decision-making, in the 
final evaluation of the cases of Chapter 6, the outcomes of the 
interventions undertaken will not be investigated.  
In the light of the proposed criteria, an analysis of the cases 
provides a test for the theoretical assertions/observations of this 
dissertation. Following from these, in counter point to a 
classical/standard realist depiction of amoral states, this dissertation 
argues that the international community assumes a moral 
responsibility to react to mass atrocities. Nevertheless, both 
individual states and the international community are limited with 
their capacities and/or capabilities to intervene. Furthermore, the 
political structure of the main organs of the UN imposes a constraint 
on the decisions of the international community, leading to failure in 
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terms of undertaking the responsibility to protect. Thus, they do not 
always act upon the dictates of the moral considerations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROAD TO RtoP IN THEORY 
This chapter provides a conceptual and legal background for 
the analysis of humanitarian intervention within the framework of 
RtoP. To this end, it starts off with the definition of the notion of 
humanitarian intervention, and then introduces the R2P framework. 
Under section 3.2, it explores how and to what extend the two 
doctrines are related. After laying out the conceptual elements, it 
traces the normative and philosophical roots of humanitarian 
interventions and the responsibility to protect in order to understand 
the inherent ethical motives as well as the underlying logic for 
undertaking these acts. Thirdly, it places both doctrines within the 
context of international law with two objectives in mind: (1) 
questioning whether or not there exists a right to intervene, and (2) 
providing a basis to assess the permissive and restrictive influences 
of legal factors on the conduct of humanitarian interventions and 
upholding the responsibility to protect.  
3.1. Defining Humanitarian Intervention 
Although humanitarian intervention is one single 
phenomenon, there are numerous definitions of it with nuances or 
key divergences, and how it is defined matters as this definition 
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determines the scope of the term as well as what one specifically 
looks at. For this reason, first the etymological roots of the term are 
investigated, and then, contemporary meanings of the concept 
followed by differing definitions by scholars from the disciplines of 
international law and politics as well as the working definition are 
presented. 
a. Etymological Roots 
It is possible to trace etymological roots of the phrase 
“humanitarian intervention” by dividing the term into its individual 
elements of “humanitarian” and “intervention”: 
Humanitarian “n. 1819, one who affirms the humanity of Christ XIX 
(Moore); one devoted to humane action or the welfare of the human 
race c. 1830”59 it is structured from the English word humanity with 
the addition of the suffix “-arian”. “The meaning of one devoted to 
human welfare, a philanthropist, is first recorded in 1844 and was 
originally disparaging, connoting one who goes to excess in humane 
principles.”60  
Intervention “n. About 1425 intervencioun intercession, especially by 
prayer; borrowed, perhaps through Middle French intervention, or 
directly from Late Latin interventiōnem (nominative interventiō) an 
                                                
59 C.T. Onions, G.W. S. Friedrichsen, and R.W. Burchfield (eds.), The Oxford 
Dictionary of English Etymology (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 451.  
60 Robert K. Barnhart (ed.). The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology (New 
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 364. 
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interposing, giving security, from Latin interven-, stem of intervenīre;” 
and is formed by the use of the suffix “–tion.”61 
Over the centuries, the meanings of both words have 
undergone changes. Contemporarily, “humanitarian” stands for “(a 
person who is) involved in or connected with improving people’s lives 
and reducing suffering,”62 and “intervention” is defined as the act of 
intervening where to intervene means “to intentionally become 
involved in a difficult situation in order to improve it or prevent it 
from getting worse.”63 Moreover, Otte by tracing the roots of the word 
“intervention” back to Latin identifies what is in the nature of 
intervention. There are three meanings that come to surface: “(1) to 
step between, to appear; (2) to confront, to interrupt, to hinder, to 
disrupt; and (3) to interfere to either hinder or to arbitrate.” 
Accordingly, Otte argues that “these three groups taken together” 
establish the “finite and temporary character of intervention, [since 
it] is interference by one state in the affairs of another state, thereby 
temporarily interrupting the normal pattern of bilateral relations 
between these two.”64 
As a term, “humanitarian intervention” has its place within the 
literatures of international relations and international law. Since 
                                                
61 Barnhart 1995, 539. 
62 Paul Procter (ed.). Cambridge International Dictionary of English (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2005), 625. 
63 Procter (ed.) 2005, 670. 
64 Thomas G. Otte, in Andrew M. Dorman, and Thomas G. Otte (eds.). Military 
Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention (Great Britain: 
Dartmouth, 1995), 5. 
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there is lack of a commonly accepted definition of the concept, 
nuances continue to exist. In this regard, prior to the presentation of 
the working definition for this dissertation, the next section focuses 
on different definitions of the term in order to reveal its several 
aspects. 
b. Definitions of Humanitarian Intervention 
It is possible to make a distinction between the classical and 
contemporary understandings of humanitarian intervention in 
definitional terms. In its classical sense, “humanitarian intervention 
may be seen in any use of armed force by a state for the purpose of 
protecting the life and liberty of its own nationals or those of third 
states threatened abroad, although this type of intervention is mostly 
discussed as an aspect of self-defence.”65  
On the one hand, contemporarily humanitarian intervention 
can be defined as a “doctrine under which one or more states may 
take military action inside the territory of another state in order to 
protect those who are experiencing serious human rights 
persecution, up to and including attempts at genocide.”66 On the 
other hand, in a limited manner, Finnemore defines humanitarian 
intervention as the positioning of military units within the territory of 
                                                
65 Peter Macalister-Smith (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (The 
Netherlands: Elsevier Science B.V., 1995), 926. 
66 David Robertson. A Dictionary of Human Rights, 2nd edition. (London: Europa 
Publications, 2004), 119. 
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a third state in order to safeguard foreign nationals not from natural 
but manmade disasters.67 Brownlie comes up with an alternative 
definition, which is complementary to the former two. He defines the 
act of humanitarian intervention not only as the use of but also as 
the threat to use military force. Secondly, he includes alongside 
states “a belligerent community or international organisation” as 
actors that can undertake an intervention “with the objective to 
protect human rights.”68 
The emphasis in all three conceptualisations of humanitarian 
intervention is the same: the purpose of intervention. In this regard, 
humanitarian intervention, in its modern understanding, remains 
different from other sorts of military interventions, or from crude use 
of force, not simply because it is claimed to be pursued due to 
motives more than a mere drive of self-interest but mainly because it 
puts stress on the notion of intervening militarily for the purpose of 
protecting individuals who are not the nationals of the interveners 
from atrocities against humanity or inhuman treatment on a massive 
scale. 
Therefore, humanitarian intervention can be differentiated 
from other types of military interventions or aggression due to its 
purpose and content. By itself, the “word ‘intervention’ describes the 
                                                
67 Martha Finnemore. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of 
Force (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 53. 
68 Ian Brownlie. “Humanitarian Intervention” in John Norton Moore (ed.) Law and 
Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
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exercise of public authority by one state in the territory of another.”69 
It is considered to be a measure short of war, comprising use or 
threat of use of force over a state. Accordingly, intervention “may 
involve a desire to change or to preserve the existing distribution of 
power. The term [...] covers a vast array of very different sorts of 
political action.”70 Nonetheless, in the case of humanitarian 
intervention the objective of the interveners is (or ought to be) to stop 
the atrocities within a state, and “to protect fundamental human 
rights in [such] extreme circumstances.” Therefore, this act neither is 
“meant directly to protect or promote civil and political rights”71 nor 
aims the creation of a new state. Although humanitarian intervention 
limits or challenges the notion of state sovereignty as the interveners 
—be it a state, a group of states, an international or a regional 
organisation— end up interfering in the domestic matters of a state 
during their intervention, it cannot be evaluated in the same manner 
with aggression, occupation, invasion, or war, since the interveners 
do not take over the state or annex it to their territory. 
Even though the terms humanitarian intervention and 
humanitarian aid are sometimes used interchangeably, these are two 
different concepts. The latter is, in character, not in conflict with the 
notion of state sovereignty as its deployment is based on the consent 
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of the host state. On the contrary, humanitarian intervention72 can 
be undertaken with or (most commonly) without the consent of the 
host state as it is a forcible action.73 It is also important to note that 
humanitarian intervention is not necessarily a synonym for 
peacemaking or peacekeeping, which are essentially conducted by 
UN-authorised missions. Peacemaking, as defined by the UN, “is 
action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such 
peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”74 In this regard, the main purposes are to achieve 
peace between the conflicting and/or warring parties, and to stop the 
aggression of any sort. Thus, it is a measure adopted against acts of 
aggression not limited to mass violations of human rights. Moreover, 
unlike in humanitarian intervention, it does not involve use of force.  
On the other hand, in the case of peacekeeping, it is usual that 
military personnel are involved in the process, but they may be 
armed or not.75 
The standard definition of peacekeeping refers to a 
United Nations presence76 in the field (normally 
                                                
72 As Hurst Hannum notes, the problematic issue about humanitarian intervention 
is how to balance sovereignty and human rights of the population (Hurst Hannum, 
interview by author, Boston, MA, March 06, 2009). 
73 Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2002, 145-7. 
74 “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping,” 
A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html, 
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75 “Mission Statement of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,” 
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involving civilian and military personnel) that, with the 
consent of the conflicting parties, implements or 
monitors arrangements relating to the control of 
conflicts and their resolution, or ensures the safe 
delivery of humanitarian relief. It is a technique initiated 
by the United Nations as a means for maintaining 
international peace and security.77 
Peacekeeping is different from humanitarian intervention not only 
because it necessitates state consent, but also because it, in 
principle, does not involve implementation of coercive measures78 
unless the security of the peacekeepers is clearly threatened in a way 
to lead to self-defence. Additionally, it is larger in scope compared to 
humanitarian intervention, since it “is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of 
peace.”79 In sum, although there may be an overlap of purpose due to 
the humanitarian outcomes of peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
humanitarian intervention, the three concepts cannot be used 
interchangeably. 
c. Working Definition 
For the purposes of this dissertation, humanitarian 
intervention is defined as follows:  the use of forcible/military means 
“across state borders” by a state, a group of states, or an 
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international and/or regional organisation80 in order to prevent or 
halt “widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human 
rights of individuals other than [… the intervener(s)’s] own citizens,”81 
with or without the consent of the target state that becomes subject 
to the use of force in its territory as a result of the intervention. 
In the light of this definition, humanitarian intervention is 
taken also as an act of coercive protection82 through use of force due 
to extreme circumstances concerning fundamental human rights. 
This sort of an intervention, when undertaken without state consent 
is the most problematic and/or controversial as it results in a breach 
of state sovereignty. Moreover, acts that historically and legally fall 
under self-defence, which may be observed in the protection of 
nationals in a third state, are not evaluated as humanitarian 
interventions in the analyses of this dissertation. Based on this 
conceptualisation, the relationship between the doctrines of 
humanitarian intervention and RtoP as well as a legal analysis of the 
so-called right to intervene is explored. 
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3.2. Responsibility vs. Right? 
Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect are 
two doctrines both tackling the problem of grave violations of human 
rights. In general terms, the responsibility to protect as a conceptual 
whole is beyond a doctrine simply attempting to regulate/govern the 
act of humanitarian intervention. To begin with, RtoP is not only 
about halting mass atrocities, but it also aims to prevent them from 
happening, whereas humanitarian intervention addresses the issue 
upon or after occurrence. The objective of prevention is reflected in 
RtoP’s reconceptualisation of the understanding of state sovereignty, 
which is a primary point of departure for the responsibility to protect 
understanding from that of humanitarian intervention. 
As will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections of this 
chapter, some legal scholars argue that there exists a “right to 
intervene”. The ICISS makes a case for RtoP starting off from this 
assumption, and shifts the terms of the debate by introducing a 
“responsibility to protect” rather than a “right to intervene”.83 
Accordingly, it raises the criticism that humanitarian intervention as 
a right focuses, above all, on the “claims, rights and prerogatives” of 
the intervening state(s) rather than the needs of those who are the 
subjects of the atrocities, i.e. “the potential beneficiaries” of the 
intervention. Secondly, the emphasis placed on intervention 
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eventually omits the necessity “for either prior preventive effort or 
subsequent follow-up assistance.” Finally, “the familiar language 
does effectively operate to trump sovereignty with intervention at the 
outset of the debate: it loads the dice in favour of intervention before 
the argument has even begun.”84 
Bearing these three criticisms of a “right to intervene” in mind, 
through its proposed change of mentality with the imposition of new 
terminology,85 the ICISS first brings to the attention of the 
international community those in need of support, i.e. the subjects of 
human suffering, rather than the rights of the intervener(s). 
Moreover, it places the responsibility first and foremost with the state 
itself. It is only if the state fails or omits to abide by its duties 
towards its citizens, or if it is the state itself that is the wrongdoer, 
then the responsibility lies with the international community to take 
appropriate action.  
Accordingly, the Report of the ICISS establishes the central 
theme of RtoP as follows: sovereign states are responsible towards 
their citizens for their protection “from avoidable catastrophe —from 
mass murder and rape, from starvation— but that when they are 
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85 “The relationship of new normative claims to existing norms may also influence 
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unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the 
broader community of states.”86 Such line of reasoning is reflected in 
the two basic principles of the Report: 
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the 
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies 
with the state itself. 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a 
result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state 
failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable 
to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.87 
On this basis, the ICISS first attempts to transform national 
sovereignty from a principle which traditionally implies that states 
are “untouchable” in their internal affairs into one that holds states 
responsible for the protection of their peoples from grave violations of 
human rights. As Robertson suggests, the notion of national 
sovereignty generally implies the absence of “legal measures by which 
anyone could prevent a government doing whatever it liked to its own 
citizens, or certainly […] measures which involved direct force within 
the borders of the offending state.”88 Secondly, Paragraph B hints at 
the growing notion of an international responsibility concerning 
humanitarian cases as well as the need to take action at the 
international level. 
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Finally, with regard to the third criticism, as a part of its 
general approach towards handling mass atrocities, RtoP offers an 
alternative to the traditional understanding of humanitarian 
interventions by providing “conceptual, normative and operational 
linkages between assistance, intervention and reconstruction.”89 That 
is to say, the operationalization of RtoP takes place through the three 
stages of the responsibilities to (1) prevent, (2) react, and (3) 
rebuild.90 Among these three, the Commission prioritises the 
responsibility to prevent as it considers this aspect to be the most 
important one.91 Hence, the prevalent idea is to adopt successful 
preventive measures so that situations do not grow into 
severe/extreme cases requiring the implementation of coercive 
measures. On the other hand, the responsibility to rebuild can be 
defined as a complementary stage since it is to follow a military 
intervention undertaken as a means of the responsibility to react. 
With this aspect the ICISS brings to the fore a “commitment to 
helping to build a durable peace, and promoting good governance 
and sustainable development.”92 
Of the three operational stages of RtoP, humanitarian 
intervention falls only under the responsibility to react, and is 
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considered as a last resort to be employed in extreme situations. This 
second aspect, different from the other two, includes the use of 
coercive measures ranging from imposition of sanctions up to the use 
of force.93 Given the possibility for the adoption of military means, 
which in other words can be termed as humanitarian (military) 
intervention, the responsibility to react stands out as the most 
problematic aspect of RtoP in terms of the implementation. 
In the light of this, it can be concluded that the responsibility 
to protect is a doctrine that encloses humanitarian intervention 
within its components. Nevertheless, as James Pattison draws 
attention to, humanitarian intervention in the meantime can be 
interpreted to be broader than RtoP, since it “can be undertaken in 
response to a variety of humanitarian crises and does not require 
Security Council authorization.”94 As will be observed in the analysis 
of the documents adopted by the UN regarding RtoP,95 there are 
limits to what can be addressed as an RtoP case. There is no such 
restraint on humanitarian interventions.96 Thus, in the absence of a 
restraining document or specific criteria imposing limitations on the 
doctrine, humanitarian intervention can be interpreted to be broader 
                                                
93 The Commission also underlines: “the responsibility to protect means that 
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than RtoP.97 For better comprehension of the restrictive nature of 
RtoP, and in order to determine the application of the humanitarian 
intervention doctrine within the RtoP framework, a detailed reference 
to the responsibility to react is required. 
In general terms, the ICISS in its Report embraces the principle 
of non-intervention. Nonetheless, it identifies certain exceptions, and 
asks the question where to “draw the line in determining when 
military intervention is, prima facie, defensible?”98 As far as forceful 
action is concerned, the Report focuses on acts taken for 
humanitarian and protective ends against a state without the 
consent of that state.99 
Nevertheless, utilisation of forceful measures is not prioritised 
as a means of reacting: “As a matter of first principles, in the case of 
reaction just as with prevention, less intrusive and coercive measures 
should always be considered before more coercive and intrusive ones 
are applied.”100 In this regard, the responsibility to react also covers 
the imposition of sanctions on states as a preferred first reaction. 
Hence, humanitarian intervention is to be considered “in extreme 
cases,”101 in other words, either when there is a failure or an inability 
to prevent mass scale of atrocities and/or when the sanctions 
implemented fail to stop them. 
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The ICISS acknowledges that military intervention “directly 
interferes with the capacity of a domestic authority to operate on its 
own territory. It effectively displaces the domestic authority and aims 
(at least in the short-term) to address directly the particular problem 
or threat that has arisen.”102 Given this intrusive nature, and the fact 
that “humanitarian considerations have been invoked to justify 
intervention, it is obvious that the doctrine gives room for abuse.”103 
For this reason, the Commission attempts at establishing a strict 
decision-making criteria104 for undertaking humanitarian 
interventions under the following headings: (1) right authority, (2) 
just cause, (3) right intention, (4) last resort, (5) proportional means, 
and (6) reasonable prospects.105 
Right authority asks “whose right is it to determine, in any 
particular case, whether a military intervention for human protection 
purposes should go ahead?”106 According to the ICISS, the UN 
undoubtedly is the fundamental international “institution for 
building, consolidating and using the authority of the international 
community,”107 and the Security Council in this regard is the 
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principal organ for the authorisation of and legitimation of an 
intervention.108 
Nevertheless, history reveals that due to political reasons and 
through the employment of the veto right by one or more of the five 
permanent members, the Security Council has and may become 
inoperable in dealing with a case. Under such circumstances, for the 
adoption of a decision the General Assembly is considered as an 
alternative to refer the matter to, through a “meeting in an 
Emergency Special Session under the established ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
procedures” to employ forceful intervention.109 The Commission 
considers also collective intervention by a regional or sub-regional 
organisation “within its defining boundaries” as a third option.110 
Point 4.19 of the Report determines two main criteria of just 
cause, and considers the satisfaction of one of these two enough to 
assert that there is a just cause to intervene. These are to stop 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with 
genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of 
deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to 
act, or a failed state situation; or 
B. large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, 
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of 
terror or rape.111 
What do these mean? The Commission includes within the 
conditions (1) the acts that fall under the framework of the Genocide 
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Convention involving “large scale threatened or actual loss of life;” (2) 
“the threat or occurrence of large scale loss of life, whether the 
product of genocidal intent or not, and whether or not involving state 
action;” (3) various sorts of ethnic cleansing;112 (4) “crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws of war, as defined in the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols and elsewhere, which involve 
large scale killing or ethnic cleansing;” (5) “situations of state collapse 
and the resultant exposure of the population to mass starvation 
and/or civil war;” (6) cases of natural and environmental disasters, 
“where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or 
call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or 
threatened.”113 
The third criterion, i.e. right intention, is concerned with the 
aims of the intervention. Accordingly, stopping the atrocities and 
ending human suffering have to be the main objectives. In this vein, 
objectives such as changing the state’s regime, assisting self-
determination, or occupation114 cannot be accepted as justifiable 
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causes.115 Moreover, the ICISS suggests certain subcomponents to 
ensure right intention: The first is the collective or multilateral 
character of the intervention undertaken, which in other words 
suggests that unilateral interventions are not encouraged. The 
second is the consideration of “whether, and to what extent, the 
intervention is actually supported by the people for whose benefit the 
intervention is intended.”116 In this regard, the positive response of 
those who have been suffering from the mass violations of human 
rights is sought for the assurance of the right intention. “Another is 
to look to whether, and to what extent, the opinion of other countries 
in the region has been taken into account and is supportive.”117 This 
suggests that it is important to consider the views of and to obtain 
the support of the neighbouring countries for the intervention since it 
indicates their consent for the act undertaken. 
The last resort criterion reflects the general attitude of the 
Commission throughout the Report. In this vein, the Report states 
that military intervention must be the last remedy118 to be adopted 
due to the exhaustion of diplomatic and peaceful means and as a 
result of the failure to successfully implement the responsibility to 
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prevent.119 The Commission necessitates the employment of 
proportional means in course of the intervention. Particularly, 
[t]he scale, duration and intensity of the planned 
military intervention should be the minimum necessary 
to secure the humanitarian objective in question. The 
means have to be commensurate with the ends, and in 
line with the magnitude of the original provocation. The 
effect on the political system of the country targeted 
should be limited, again, to what is strictly necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the intervention.120 
In light of these conditions, it can be argued that the Commission, in 
an awareness of the notion of double effect, attempts at minimising 
the negative effects of the military action by enforcing limits on the 
means adopted and goals pursued throughout the intervention. 
 A similar consideration is valid also for the final criterion of the 
need for reasonable prospects to undertake the intervention. As 
indicated in Chapter 2, human suffering can be approached in two 
ways. In the case of RtoP, human suffering may occur first as a 
result of the atrocities conducted against masses —which is 
considered as a moral requirement for taking action—, and second 
due to the negative outcomes that may arise from the collateral 
damage caused or the intervention’s failure to succeed. Thus, as the 
Commission posits, without reasonable chance for success, one 
cannot justify resorting to military action. Accordingly, the outcome 
of the intervention needs to be positive in comparison to the pre-
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intervention situation, or what it would have been like in case of 
inaction.121 
All in all, the “just cause threshold” of the ICISS imposes 
limitations on the conduct of humanitarian interventions within the 
framework of the responsibility to react in an attempt to prevent 
arbitrary or wrongful invocation/implementation of the RtoP 
doctrine. The proposed criteria alongside the general tenets of RtoP 
have their roots in the writings of the philosophers of earlier 
centuries. In this vein, an overview of the normative roots helps the 
researcher in tracing the similarities and shared components 
between the two doctrines. 
3.3. Normative Roots 
Certain features of just war principles, specifically to jus ad 
bellum, hint at just causes for undertaking interventions in the name 
of humanity. In this regard, earlier works in Christian political 
theology constitute a starting point for analysis, and an introductory 
example is the writings of St. Augustine (354-430).  
St. Augustine believes that “[f]or every man even in the act of 
waging war is in quest of peace, but no one is in quest of war when 
he makes peace.”122 The similarity between the just war 
understanding of St. Augustine and contemporary humanitarian 
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interventions lies in the fact that the latter as a coercive act 
undertaken through use of force as a means to re-establish the 
order123 and human rights within a country, which also results in the 
reestablishment of (domestic and/or international) peace although 
this is not an explicitly pronounced objective. In the waging of just 
wars, St. Augustine differentiates between the wise man and the 
other, and asserts that it is the injustice done by the other that 
necessitates the undertaking of a just war: 
The wise man, they say, will wage just wars. As if he 
would not all the more, if he remembers his humanity, 
deplore his being compelled to engage in just wars; for if 
they were not just, he would not have to wage them, and 
so a wise man would have no wars. For it is the 
injustice of the opposing side that imposes on the wise 
man the necessity of waging just wars.124 
Consideration of war as a necessity under certain circumstances 
emanates from the injustice or the wrong done. As a just war arises 
from injustice, in ideationally parallel terms, the need to undertake a 
humanitarian intervention in the contemporary world arises from an 
unjust act of the man, that is the gross and systematic violations of 
human rights committed.  
In this vein, the basis of the idea of a legitimate intervention 
against unjust acts can be based on the writings of St. Augustine. As 
for the idea of responsibility, the roots can be traced back to Thomas 
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Aquinas who talks about the existence of a notion of responsibility all 
over the Christian Republic. Aquinas (1225-1274) while defining the 
system of Respublica Christiana claims responsible “every prince […] 
for the welfare of the total Respublica as well as his own specifically 
defined territory.” He accordingly posits that a prince “may be called 
upon to resist aggression or unjust treatment of subjects any place in 
the Respublica Christiana.”125 Though in a limited manner, what 
Aquinas put forth is parallel to the idea of a “responsibility to 
react”126 of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. In the 
responsibility to react, the responsibility pertains to the international 
community where it has to display a collective response to grave 
violations of human rights whereas in the responsibility of Aquinas 
the community concerned is limited to the Christian Republic and the 
primary responsibility is that of the princes. 
This also stands for a moral duty to maintain common good in 
response to unjust treatment. Following St. Augustine’s line of 
thinking, Thomas Aquinas adds that “[t]rue religion looks upon as 
peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of 
aggrandisement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of 
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punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”127 One similarity 
between the ancient and contemporary theories in terms of 
undertaking just wars concerns the “securing of peace.” As 
proponents of humanitarian intervention and/or interveners argue, 
humanitarian interventions serve to “secure peace”, which can be 
peace within a country as well as international peace and security. 
Nevertheless, what is meant by the “good” may vary depending on the 
interpretation of the theorist/analyst/philosopher. In general terms, 
can be a social order (whether religious, moral, economic or political, 
etc.) or as in the case of humanitarian interventions and RtoP 
something concrete (since it is the lives of human beings and the 
protection of their fundamental rights that is the main concern). 
Thus, from the spectacle of RtoP, Aquinas’s proposition of a 
responsibility of the rulers to “uplift the good” if necessary through 
military means provides a basis of a more restricted interpretation of 
the notion (rather than its interpretation as a general social order), 
that is in terms of confining it to ensuring human rights as 
established by international law, and stopping mass atrocities 
against humanity. 
Its theological roots providing the moral basis, just war notion 
has been elaborated within the natural law tradition. Although some 
legal scholars consider humanitarian intervention as a “relatively 
                                                
127 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 40, 1. 
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new doctrine,” it is possible to trace its legal roots back to 
philosophers of law like Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), Francisco 
Suàrez (1548-1617) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).128 Similar lines 
of thought are apparent in the arguments of Gentili and Suàrez since 
both of them make reference to the responsibility towards the human 
race in cases of inhuman treatment against people that occur in 
another sovereign’s land.129 For example, Gentili “raise[s] the notion 
of sovereign accountability, noting that there must be some 
mechanism to remind the sovereign of his/her duty towards his 
people and hold him in restraint, ‘unless we wish to make sovereigns 
exempt from the law and bound by no statutes and no 
precedents.’”130 This understanding is, for instance, prevalent in the 
responsibility to protect doctrine where sovereignty is understood as 
the responsibility of the sovereign state towards its citizens.131 
Hersch Lauterpacht posits that Grotius132 made “the first 
authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention 
–the principle that exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when 
outrage upon humanity begins.”133 Grotius maintains that there may 
                                                
128 Theodor Meron. “Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez” 
American Journal of International Law 85(1) (January 1991): 115. 
129 Cited in Meron 1991: 115. 
130 Gentili quoted in Simon Chesterman. Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14. 
131 The norm of the responsibility to protect will be explored in detail in the 
forthcoming chapter. 
132 Hugo Grotius’s De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (1625) is an example of the works where 
Grotius makes reference to the notion of humanitarian intervention. 
133 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law.” British 
Yearbook of International Law. 23 (1946) 1, 46. 
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be a just cause for undertaking war on behalf of the subjects of 
another ruler, in order to protect them from wrong at his hands.134 
[I]f the wrong is obvious, in case some Busiris, Phalaris, 
or Thracian Diomede should inflict upon his subjects 
such treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting, the 
exercise of their right vested in human society is not 
precluded.135 
It is therefore up to another state/sovereign to take the necessary 
measures “to help the persecuted” since the subjects themselves are 
incapable of taking action.136  
Based on historical examples Grotius acknowledges that the 
claim of “taking up arms” to this end is prone to be used as a cover 
for an act of invasion of others’ territories. Nevertheless, he adds that 
the abuse or misuse of a right does not necessitate the annulment of 
that right.137 In his De jure praedae, Grotius argues that “the 
protection of infidels from injury (even from injury by Christians) is 
never unjust”.138 As can be inferred from Grotius’s statement, his 
main emphasis is the justness of an act rather than its lawfulness, 
and although an act can be just, this does not mean that it is also 
lawful.139 In this vein, Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) following a similar 
                                                
134 Grotius quoted in Meron 1991: 111. (Original reference: Hugo Grotius. De Jure 
Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, Book II, Chapter XXV, pt. VIII(1) (Carnegie ed., F. Kelsey 
trans. 1925) (1625)). 
135 Quoted in Chesterman 2001, 15. 
136 Meron 1991: 11, and Chesterman 2001, 15. 
137 Hugo Grotius. Savas ve Baris Hukuku (De Iure Belli Ac Pacis): Secmeler. 
Translated by Seha L. Meray. (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1967), 171. 
138 Quoted in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (eds.). Humanitarian Intervention 
(New York: New York University Press, 2006), 15. 
139 Here, it is important to make a distinction between the notions of lawful and 
just. Although both suggest an ethical content, lawful stands for “according to or 
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line of thought, in an attempt to establish a just principle for 
undertaking action asserts: “we cannot lawfully undertake the 
defence of another’s subjects, for any other reason than they 
themselves can rightfully advance, for taking up arms to protect 
themselves against the barbarous savagery of their superiors.”140 
With this argument, Pufendorf brings in lawfulness of the act 
alongside its justness. 
Similar lines of reasoning for justification of intervention in the 
name of humanity in the domestic affairs of another state followed in 
the later centuries. An example from the eighteenth century is the 
arguments of Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767), who posited that 
if the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his 
people legitimate reason to resist him, if tyranny 
becomes so unbearable as to cause the Nation to rise, 
any foreign power is entitled to help an oppressed 
people that has requested its assistance.141 
In the light of the referred assertions, it is possible to argue that 
although not named essentially as humanitarian intervention in the 
then times, philosophers of law have articulated just reasons for 
undertaking action in order to stop atrocities against humanity. 
                                                                                                                                     
acceptable to the law”, whereas just means “fair and/or morally correct” 
(Cambridge International Dictionary of English 2005, 774, 801). 
140 Quoted in Chesterman 2001, 15. 
141 Emmerich de Vattel quoted in Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne. “The Customary 
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity 
under the U.N. Charter.” California Western International Law Journal. (1973-1974), 
Vol. 4: 215. (Original source Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Ch. IV, 
paragraph 55, Pradier-Fodéré, ed., 1863). 
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Moreover, it can be observed that they have provided moral 
arguments based on ethical constraints rather than legal ones. 
In a similar way, some of the contemporary scholars from 
strands of liberal internationalism142 develop their arguments on 
moral aspects while talking about a duty to intervene. Their 
inspiration is the cosmopolitan arguments of Immanuel Kant, a 
philosopher who argues for the authority of moral law over that of 
the sovereign state. Kant notes: 
For Hugo Groius, Pufendorf, Vattel and the rest (sorry 
comforters as they are) are still dutifully quoted in 
justification in of military aggression, although their 
philosophically or diplomatically formulated codes do 
not and cannot have the slightest legal force, since 
states as such are not subject to a common external 
constraint. Yet there is no instance of a state ever 
having been moved to desist from its purpose by 
arguments supported by the testimonies of such notable 
men. This homage which every state pays (in words at 
least) to the concept of right proves that man possesses 
a greater moral capacity, still dormant at present, to 
overcome eventually the evil principle within him (for he 
cannot deny it exists), and hope that others will do 
likewise. Otherwise the word right would never be used 
by states which intend to make war on one another.143 
Such idea of moral capacity provides a basis for the universality of 
human rights. Accordingly, Kant posits: 
The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying 
degrees into a universal community, and it has 
developed to the point where a violation of rights in one 
part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a 
cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and 
                                                
142  Ann-Marie Slaughter is an example of a liberal internationalist scholars. 
143 H.S. Reiss (ed.) “Perpetual Peace” in Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 103. 
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overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the 
unwritten code of political and international right, 
transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only 
under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are 
continually advancing towards a perpetual peace.144 
Immanuel Kant, while establishing that a cosmopolitan right 
and a moral capacity exists, does not make authoritative statements 
regarding intervention in the internal affairs of states on grounds of 
humanity, but lays the possible grounds for such understanding. 
Nevertheless, a nineteenth century international lawyer Henry 
Wheaton presents a detailed discussion of the “right to intervene” 
where he arrives at the conclusion that “[n]oninterference is the 
general rule, to which cases of justifiable interference form 
exceptions limited by the necessity of each particular case.”145 In this 
vein, by suggesting that it is unlikely to have a definitive 
statement/judgement about the absoluteness of non-interference, 
Wheaton, on the basis of historical examples, argues for the 
possibility of recognition of legitimacy for unilateral practices on the 
basis of a right to intervene as an exception to the general rule of 
non-intervention.146 
An intellectual of the same century, John Stuart Mill, presents 
his thoughts regarding the issue of non-intervention on a more 
                                                
144 Reiss (ed.) 2000, 107-8. 
145 Tonny Brems Knudsen. “The History of Humanitarian Intervention. The Rule or 
the Exception?” Paper for the 50th ISA Annual Convention, New York, February 15-
18, 2009: 7. 
146 Knudsen 2009: 7. 
  62 
general background. In his short essay entitled “A Few Words on 
Non-Intervention” Mill asserts:  
There seems to be no little need that the whole doctrine 
of noninterference with foreign nations should be 
reconsidered, if it can be said to have as yet been 
considered as a really moral question at all. […] To go to 
war for an idea, if the war is aggressive, not defensive, is 
as criminal as to go to war for territory of revenue; for it 
is as little justifiable to force our ideas on other people, 
as to compel them to submit to our will in any other 
respect.  But there assuredly are cases in which it is 
allowable to go to war, without having been ourselves 
attacked, or threatened with attack; and it is very 
important that nations should make up their minds in 
time, as to what these cases are. There are few 
questions which more require to be taken in hand by 
ethical and political philosophers, with a view to 
establish some rule or criterion whereby the 
justifiableness of intervening in the affairs of other 
countries, and (what is sometimes fully as questionable) 
the justifiableness of refraining from any intervention, 
may be brought to a definite and rational test. Whoever 
attempts this, will be led to recognise more than one 
fundamental distinction, not yet by any means familiar 
to the public mind, and in general quite lost sight of by 
those who write in strains of indignant morality on the 
subject.147 
While raising the controversial issue of interference in the 
domestic affairs of states, Mill raises the question on what grounds 
an intervention, (for instance in case of a civil war or in terms of 
providing assistance for the people of another country in struggling 
for liberty), can be justified. He also mentions intervention on the 
basis of the imposition “on a country any particular government or 
institutions, either as being best for the country itself, or as 
                                                
147 John Stuart Mill. “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” Foreign Policy Perspectives 
8 (1859): 4. 
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necessary for the security of its neighbours.”148 The traces of Mill’s 
rationalisation can be found in the contemporary understanding of 
“failed states”. Furthermore, a resemblance with the principles 
emanating from the UN Charter can be seen in Mill’s question since 
he raises the issue of the security of neighbours. On the basis of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, threats to or breaches of international 
peace and security may create situations where non-interference is 
no longer prioritised and states may intervene for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. In this respect, threats to or 
breaches of regional security, as is valid in contemporary cases, may 
provide legitimate grounds to intervene in the domestic matters of 
states.  
Mill asserts that the principle of non-intervention prevails in 
the case where a “government which needs foreign support to enforce 
obedience from its own citizens” as he considers intervention of this 
sort as a support for despotism. Nevertheless, in case “of protracted 
civil war” which is considered “injurious to the permanent welfare of 
the country”, Mill talks about the possibility of an intervention that 
receives “general approval, that is [to say] legitimacy may be 
considered to have passed into a maxim of what is called 
international law.”149 
                                                
148 Mill 1859: 5. 
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In the absence of a delineation between the understandings of 
humanitarian war and humanitarian intervention in its 
contemporary sense, the end of the nineteenth century has been 
marked by raising humanitarian concerns, and leading to the 
conclusion of Geneva Conventions in the meantime. Following the 
natural law tradition, in the following century some scholars argued 
for a right of humanitarian intervention. Writing during the pre-
Charter period, Edwin Bouchard observes that 
where a state under exceptional circumstances 
disregards certain rights of its own citizens over whom 
presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other States 
of the family of nations are authorized by international 
law to intervene on grounds of humanity’.150 
It should be noted that the invocation of “humanity” for undertaking 
action is also likely to constitute a point of criticism. For instance, 
Carl Schmitt argues against wars waged in the name of humanity as 
he suggests that  
humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no 
enemy, at least not on this planet. […] When a state 
fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is 
not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a 
particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept 
against its military opponent. At the expense of its 
opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the 
same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, 
and civilization in order to claim these as one’s own and 
to deny the same to the enemy. The concept of 
                                                
150 Duke 1994: 33. 
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humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument 
of imperialist expansion.151 
Nonetheless, differing from the just causes that have been put forth 
by philosophers of law in the earlier centuries, Bouchard touches 
upon the lawfulness of coercive action undertaken for humanitarian 
purposes. He further maintains that 
when these “human rights” are habitually violated, one or 
more States may intervene in the name of the society of 
nations and may take such measures as to substitute at 
least temporarily, if not permanently, its own sovereignty for 
that of the state thus controlled.152 
Bouchard’s assertions, which are based on the conditions of the pre-
Charter period, reflect only one faction of the legal positions 
regarding humanitarian intervention, and these lie at the far end of 
the counter-restrictionist side of the spectrum. 
Malcolm N. Shaw argues that in the nineteenth century there 
is an acceptance, at least in appearance, of “a right of humanitarian 
intervention, although its range and extent were unclear.”153 
Likewise, Ulrich Beyerlin indicates an acceptance of “the idea of 
lawful humanitarian intervention” while emphasizing the doctrinal 
confusion concerning “the legal foundation and the extent of that 
                                                
151 Carl Schmitt. The Concept of the Political. (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 54. 
152 Duke 1994: 33. 
153 Malcolm N. Shaw. International Law. Fifth Edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 252. 
  66 
institution.”154 Nonetheless, neither prior to World War I nor in its 
aftermath, there is any substantial evidence (e.g. consistent and 
accepted state practice) to suggest that humanitarian intervention 
was a soundly established principle of customary international 
law.155  
Olivier Corten posits that basing the conduct of humanitarian 
intervention on an existent “right to intervene” places the doctrine 
and related discussions  
within the legal sphere and not in the realms of ethics 
or politics. […] The term ‘right’ also denotes the idea of 
an autonomous legal basis: a ‘right’ of humanitarian 
intervention, it can be surmised, would justify a military 
action independently of the classical foundations for 
such justification such as the host State’s consent, 
Security Council authorisation, or even self-defence.”156 
In this regard, the argument for the existence of a right to intervene 
(allowing unilateral humanitarian interventions) is highly contested 
in the post-Charter period, and the assessment of the validity of such 
argument requires a deeper analysis of the international legal 
framework, which is in order. 
                                                
154 Ulrich Beyerlin. “Humanitarian Intervention” in Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, Rudolf Bernhardt, (ed.) vol. II, 926-36, Amsterdam: North-
Holland, (1992), 927. 
155 Beyerlin in Bernhardt 1992, 927. 
156 Olivier Corten. The Law Against War: The Prohibition of Use of Force in 
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3.4. The Realm of International Law 
Especially after experiencing two major wars, states have tried 
to find ways to avoid large scale armed conflicts. To this end, in the 
aftermath of World War I and particularly World War II, different 
legal rules on the basis of the customary rules of international law of 
the then days have been adopted. Following the end of the First 
World War, recognising the cruelty of war, states engaged in 
developing norms, for instance of jus in bello,157 like the 1929 Geneva 
Convention.158 Norm development continued in the aftermath of the 
Second World War with the conclusion of multilateral agreements, 
and the first example was the 1949 Geneva Convention, which 
revised the prior Geneva Convention. 
The second line of rules emerged under the UN framework 
through the establishment of the Charter as well as the adoption of 
decisions and resolutions by the relevant organs of the Organisation. 
On this basis, war and aggression were outlawed while “non-use of 
force” and “non-intervention” have become two fundamental 
principles of international law as well as a part of jus cogens159 
                                                
157 It can be observed that philosophers of law of the earlier centuries who focused 
on just causes of war, or helped the evolution of the just war theory for that 
matter, mainly directed their attention to jus ad bellum. Distinctively, the Geneva 
Convention brought in the jus in bello aspect to international law. 
158 This is the “Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War” signed at 
Geneva on 27 July 1929 and entered into force on 19 June 1931. 
159 Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are on 
peremptory norms. Article 53 reads: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For 
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
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norms in interstate relations. This was a fundamental change that 
took place since recourse to force in the conduct of international 
affairs was not prohibited in the pre-Charter period. 
Within the context of the post-Charter period, to argue for the 
existence of a right to intervene means assuming that unilateral 
humanitarian interventions undertaken without Security Council 
authorisation can be accepted as lawful. The fundamental challenge 
to this assertion comes from restrictionist scholars who base their 
arguments on the basic principles of the UN Charter.160 
a. Sovereignty, Non-Intervention and Non-use of Force 
The core of the restrictionist arguments lies in the Westphalian 
notion of national sovereignty, according to which States are not 
legally permitted to intervene in the internal affairs of another state 
for any reason. According to the terms of Article 1 of the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which as a 
model is also reflected in the UN Charter, “[t]he state as a person of 
                                                                                                                                     
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.” 
Article 64 states: “If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, 
any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates.” Retrieved from: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments 
/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (accessed September 19, 2009). 
160 Bruno Simma describes the UN Charter as “not just one multilateral treaty 
among others, but an instrument of singular legal weight, something akin to a 
'constitution' of the international community” (Cited in House of Commons, Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Fourth Report, Session 1999-2000, http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm (accessed July 29, 
2011). 
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international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”161 Such 
qualities of statehood are also connected with the understandings of 
territorial integrity and political independence.  
In this context, as it can be observed from its several 
resolutions throughout the years, the Security Council has expressly 
reaffirmed its “commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of” states, and underlined this as a 
priority while taking action. There are numerous examples of such 
resolutions, like for instance Resolution 688 (1991) concerning Iraq, 
Resolution 1079 (1996) concerning the Republic of Croatia, 
Resolution 1802 (2008) concerning Timor-Leste, and Resolution 1858 
(2008) concerning Burundi. Although it is placed as a higher value, 
from an international law point of view it is important not to confuse 
sovereignty by considering it an equivalent of “unlimited power” on 
the part of a state; it is rather “the fact of not being subject to any 
higher authority, or to any obligation to which the sovereign has not 
consented.” Therefore, as Hélène Ruiz Fabri suggests it can be 
conceived as a freedom, naturally having its limitations.162 
                                                
161 Full text of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States is 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp (accessed 
September 06, 2009). 
162 Hélène Ruiz Fabri. “Human Rights and State Sovereignty” in Human Rights, 
Intervention, and the Use of Force. Philip Alston and Euan MacDonald (eds.) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34. 
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The notion of sovereignty is interconnected with the principle of 
non-intervention, which is in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter laid out 
as follows: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter. 
 Although this paragraph neither defines the principle of non-
intervention nor is directed towards organizing interstate relations, it 
identifies the boundaries of action under the framework of the UN. 
Therefore, it is of importance when it comes to discussing actions to 
be undertaken by the Organisation as well as the expected behaviour 
in upholding general principles of the UN Charter.  
 The UN General Assembly, in its 1408th plenary meeting on 21 
December 1965, by a resolution confirmed this principle in the 
following words: 
No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic, or cultural elements are 
condemned.163 
                                                
163 Resolution adopted by General Assembly. (A/RES/2131 (XX)), Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
Their Independence and Sovereignty, 21 December 1965. Available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/94/IMG/NR021894
.pdf?OpenElement (accessed February 08, 2009). 
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This provision not only reaffirms the sanctity of state sovereignty and 
the principle of non-intervention, but also carries these two 
principles to the level of interstate relations.164 Although a direct 
reference by the Security Council in its resolutions to Article 2(7) is 
not very common, an example of this can be seen in Resolution 688 
on Iraq dated 5 April 1991 where the Council explicitly recalls “the 
provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter.165 
In addition, the judgements of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) provide precedents as well as confirmation of 
fundamental principles. For instance, in the Judgement of the Case 
Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activates in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) dated 27 June 
1986, the ICJ in paragraph 241 found that giving support of any sort 
to the opposition (military and paramilitary forces and activities, and 
in this case the contras whose aim was to overthrow the Government 
of Nicaragua) signals intervention and also falls contrary to Article 
2(4). As indicated in the summary of the judgement under the section 
entitled the principle of non-intervention (paras. 239 to 245), the Court 
considers that if one State, with a view to the coercion of 
another State, supports and assists armed bands in 
that State whose purpose is to overthrow its 
government, that amounts to an intervention in its 
                                                
164 The same principle is established also in Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. 
165 Security Council, Resolution 688 (1991), preambular paragraph 2. Available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm (accessed September 23, 2009). 
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internal affairs, whatever the political objective of the 
State giving support.166 
Therefore, this sort of an act is taken as an undisputed breach of the 
customary law principle of non-intervention.167 
Restrictionists also argue that humanitarian intervention falls 
contrary to the prohibition of the use of force,168 which is established 
                                                
166 “Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activates in and Against 
Nicaragua” (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Summary of the Judgement of 
the Court, 27 June 1986, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6505.pdf 
(accessed January 29, 2009). For the full text of the judgement, see 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf.  
167 Nonetheless, in Paragraph 242 of the Judgement, the Court goes for a 
differentiation in a way to establish that humanitarian assistance, no matter what 
its underlying reasons may be, is not to be considered as illegal intervention. From 
this, it follows that humanitarian action through various means of supply, in order 
not to be considered as a breach of non-intervention principle, or as intervention in 
general, should cover all people without any discrimination. “The Court recalls that 
if the provision of ‘humanitarian assistance’ is to escape condemnation as an 
intervention in the internal affairs of another State, it must be limited to the 
purposes allowed in the practice of the Red Cross, and above all be given without 
discrimination” (“Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activates in and 
Against Nicaragua” (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgement of the Court, 
27 June 1986), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6505.pdf (accessed 
January 29, 2009). It is also important to underline that humanitarian intervention 
is a forceful action whereas humanitarian assistance is not. 
168 The principle of non-use of force has its place in numerous international 
documents of the 20th Century. Fundamental documents related to non-use of 
force can chronologically be listed as follows: Covenant of the League of Nations of 
1924 (Article 10 tries to guarantee the borders, territorial integrity and the 
independence of States against external aggression); Geneva Protocol of 1924 (it 
was not put into force); Locarno Agreement of 1925 (wars waged to acquire territory 
were declared to be illegal); Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 (called that war should not 
be a means of national policy and States should refrain from it. In addition, it 
stated that resort to war in order to settle a dispute is declared to be illegal. The 
use of the right to self-defence for the purpose of protecting its own nationals at 
abroad was found to be legal); 1928 Geneva Final Act (determines various means of 
peaceful settlement); Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928 (aimed at outlawing war as a 
means of foreign policy); the Litvinof (Moscow) Protocol of 1929; Stimson Doctrine 
of 1931 (later was also accepted by the League of Nations); the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 (it did not come into force); 
Rio de Janeiro Agreement of 1933 (repeats the 1931 Stimson Doctrine); 1970 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN; 1975 
Helsinki Final Act; Manila Declaration of 1982; the 1988 Declaration on the 
Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten Peace 
and Security and the Role of the United Nations in this Field (A/RES/43/51); and 
finally the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe. 
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in the UN Charter by Article 2(4). This provision, in principle, 
requires that “all members in their international relations shall 
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
and political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN,” (e.g. providing assistance 
to one of the parties during the course of a civil war,169 engaging in 
humanitarian violations, or getting involved in acts of aggression, 
etc). It prohibits war and any sort of aggression.170 Moreover, 
Resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law (24 October 1970) establishes that 
Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or 
use of force to violate the existing international 
boundaries of another State or as a means of solving 
international disputes, including territorial disputes and 
problems concerning frontiers of States. 
                                                
169 In view of the Institute of International Law, an exception to this can be found 
in the provisions of “the Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars” determined by 
the Institute. Article 5 reads: “Whenever it appears that intervention has taken 
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other relevant rule of international law, subject to any such measures as are 
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International Law, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars, (English 
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(2000) on “ensuring an effective role for the Security Council in the maintenance of 
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under Paragraph I of the Annex “[r]eaffirms the importance of adhering to the 
principles of the non-threat or non-use of force in international relations in any 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and of peaceful 
settlement of international disputes” (S/RES/1318 (2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm (accessed September 11, 2009). 
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The territory of a State shall not be the object of military 
occupation resulting from the use of force in 
contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The 
territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition 
by another State resulting from the threat or use of 
force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat 
or use of force shall be recognized.171 
The wording of the Resolution strengthens the principle laid out in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter. Likewise, a number of Security Council 
resolutions172 and presidential statements173 make affirmative 
references to this principle. 
The acquisition of territory through use of force is declared as 
illegal, and thus, outlawed. It is for this reason that no acquisition of 
this nature shall receive recognition from other states or international 
organisations. This provision, despite the fact that it addresses only 
                                                
171 General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, 6th Committee, 25th session, 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, 
pp. 122-3. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm 
(accessed September 12, 2009). 
172 For instance, a Security Council resolution reaffirming this principle is 
S/RES/884 (1993) on Armenia-Azerbaijan dated 12 November 1993, which in its 
7th preambular paragraph states “the inviolability of international borders and the 
inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition territory. Available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm (accessed October 20, 2009). 
Another example is Resolution 748 which reaffirmed “that, in accordance with the 
principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, every state 
has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in 
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its 
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a 
threat or use of force.” S/R/748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, adopted at the 3063rd 
meeting, http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/ scres92.htm (accessed 
October 19, 2009). 
173 Some examples of these presidential statements are as follows: S/21418 of 31 
July 1990; S/22176 of 30 January 1991; S/22862 of 31 July 1991, S/23495 and 
S/23496 of 29 June 1992, S/23597 of 14 February 1992, S/23610 of 19 February 
1992, S/23904 of 12 May 1992, S/23945 and S/23946 of 18 May 1992, S/23982 
of 20 May 1992, S/24241 of 6 July 1992 and S/24362 of 30 July 1992. S/25185, 
para. 2; S/26183, para. 2; S/PRST/1994/5, para. 2; S/PRST/1994/37, para. 2; 
S/PRST/1995/4, para. 2; S/PRST/1995/35, para. 2. 
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the Member States in a direct manner, also covers non-Member 
States since it has become an erga omnes principle of law as well as a 
jus cogens rule. Paragraph 6 of Article 2 also reads that “the 
Organisation shall ensure that States which are not Members of the 
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may 
be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”174 Therefore, this provision acquires a binding nature also 
upon non-Member States as far as international peace and security 
are concerned. From an undisputed legal point of view, as established 
by the UN Charter, the Security Council is the primary organ that 
can authorise or legitimise use of force for the protection of 
international peace and security.175 
General Assembly Resolutions 2131 (1965)176 and 2625 
(1970),177 which do not have legally binding effect but can be 
interpreted under certain circumstances as evidence of state 
practice, are also taken as references in support of the restrictionist 
approach. Resolution 2131 (UN Doc. A/6220) states that “[n]o state 
                                                
174 An example of such an attempt can be observed in Resolution 558 (1984) on 
South Africa dated 13 December 1984, where the Council “[r]equests all States, 
including States not Members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance 
with the provisions of the present resolution” (Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1984/scres84.htm (accessed October 20, 
2009). 
175 Boutros-Boutros Ghali once noted: “Our whole philosophy is based on talk-
negotiate-and then talk again. To use force is an expression of failure. Our job is 
diplomacy, the peaceful resolution of disputes… If you read the UN Charter …the 
whole philosophy of the charter is to avoid military force.” (Boutros-Boutros Ghali 
cited in Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide 2003, 116). 
176 Retrieved from http://www.un-documents.net/a20r2131.htm (accessed October 
20, 2009). 
177 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm 
(accessed October 20, 2009). 
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has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” To 
this, Resolution 2625 (UN Doc. A/8028) adds that “armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic 
and cultural elements, are in violation of international law. 
Restrictionists like Ulrich Beyerlin argue that humanitarian 
intervention is, “clearly enough, in conflict with the prohibition on 
the use of (armed) force in Article 2(4) of the Charter.”178 Disagreeing 
with this, Reisman argues that Article 2(4) “should be interpreted in 
accordance with its plain language, so as to prohibit the threat or use 
of force only when directed at the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a State.”179 Since humanitarian interventions are 
directed neither at the territorial integrity nor the political 
independence of a state, Reisman posits, “this specific modality of the 
use of force is “not only not inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations but is rather in conformity with the most 
fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter.”180 In support of this 
view, Garrett notes that the purpose of humanitarian intervention is 
                                                
178 Ulrich Beyerlin cited in Duke 1994: 34. 
179 Reisman quoted in Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne. “The Customary International Law 
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. 
Charter” California Western International Law Journal 4 (1973-1974): 253. 
180 Reisman quoted in Fonteyne 1974: 254. 
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“to compel the state to observe fundamental international norms of 
human rights.”181 
On the other hand, Olivier Corten criticises these contrario 
interpretations of the UN Charter by asserting that 
no provision of the Charter provides for a right of 
humanitarian intervention, whether in its parts on 
armed action or those on human rights. Then because 
article 2(3) of the Charter very generally compels States 
to settle their disputes peacefully. As humanitarian 
intervention invariably follows from a disagreement 
between the intervening State and the State that is the 
target of allegations about human rights’ violations, and 
so from a ‘dispute’ in the legal sense of the term, such 
an intervention can hardly be considered compatible 
with the UN Charter. 
Furthermore, in objection to Reisman, Fonteyne argues that Article 
2(4) is not necessarily concerned with the intentions of the states 
involved in the action. Any sort of intervention, even though 
temporary, constitutes a breach of the territorial integrity and 
political independence of the state, as long as it is undertaken 
without the consent of that state. Moreover, in the specific case of 
humanitarian intervention, Fonteyne notes that this is a far serious 
breach since an effective long-term solution to the issue often times 
rests in the “change of government or even a secession.” Therefore, 
the intervention eventually ends up with a vital impact on the 
                                                
181 Stephen A. Garrett. Doing Good and Doing Well: an examination of 
humanitarian intervention (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 47. 
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domestic political and/or legal order of the state that has been 
subjected to the humanitarian intervention.182  
b. Possible Legal Grounds under the UN Framework 
Despite the fact that the principles of sovereignty, non-
intervention and non-use of force have been widely recognized by the 
international community, the aftermath of World War II brought 
about new challenges to the implementation of these principles. 
First, with the drafting of the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal in 
1945, “crimes against humanity” were recognized in international 
law. Then, especially after genocide was officially defined to be a 
crime by the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide” in 1948, humanitarian concerns and human 
rights became paramount issues of international law. It was within 
such a context that states have begun to assume a right or (put more 
mildly) a responsibility to take action, up to and including use of 
force, against atrocities towards people. 
Such direct connection is seen in the formulation of RtoP by 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, 
where RtoP is termed as a “Responsibility to Protect Populations from 
Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against 
Humanity”, and established within the limits of the four grave 
                                                
182 Fonteyne 1974: 255. 
  79 
crimes.183 In this vein, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, and the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court of 1998 constitute the two key 
documents where the four grave crimes are defined. Additionally, for 
war crimes, International Humanitarian Law establishes the legal 
basis.184 
Article I of the Genocide Convention states that both in times of 
war and peace, genocide is considered as a crime under international 
law. According to the terms of Article II, as repeated in Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute,185 
genocide means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group. 
                                                
183 For a detailed analysis of the 2005 Outcome Document, see Section 4.2.c.  
184 International humanitarian law and human rights law are different from each 
other, nonetheless, they share a common objective: the safeguarding of “human 
dignity in all circumstances.” The former “applies in situations of international or 
non-international armed conflict. Human rights law establishes rules for the 
harmonious development of the individual in society” (Inter-Parliamentary Union 
and ICRC. Respect for International Humanitarian Law, (Geneva: Inter-
Parliamentary Union and ICRC, 1999), 11). Fundamental international 
instruments of international humanitarian law can be listed as the Hague 
Regulations of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 as well as 
the Additional Protocols of 1977. 
185 Rome Statute deals with the crime of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. For a detailed definition of crimes against humanity see Article 7, for 
war crimes see Article 8(2). Full text of the Statute is available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/ (accessed September 07, 2009). 
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In addition, Article VIII states: “Any Contracting Party may call 
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action 
[that is granting extradition] under the Charter of the United Nations 
as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of 
acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”186 
In this vein, UN involvement can be made possible on the basis of the 
international criminal law —that is to say in case the crimes defined 
under this law are committed— which in the end may invoke a 
humanitarian intervention under the auspices of the UN upon the 
determination of a gross violation of human rights. It is important to 
note that, in general terms, humanitarian interventions are not 
authorised on the basis of international criminal law itself, but rather 
the crimes that are defined by this law fall under the scopes of 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. 
Also given the exception to the general rule implied under 
Chapter VII187 as well as the exceptions188 of cases listed under 
Article 2(7), towards the end of the twentieth century the principles of 
sovereignty and non-use of force validated by the UN Charter under 
                                                
186 Article III states the following acts as punishable: “(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy 
to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) 
Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.” Retrieved from 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/FULL/357?OpenDocument (accessed September 01, 
2009). 
187 Article 51 of the Charter defining self-defence also constitutes an exception to 
the general rule of non-use of force. Nonetheless, it is outside the context of 
humanitarian intervention, and thus not a relevant reference as a cause for 
undertaking such an intervention.  
188 Reference to Article 2(7) as a legal basis is especially made in cases of 
intervention in civil wars for humanitarian purposes. 
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Article 2 began to lose their solid character due to substantial 
infringements of human rights taking place in Yugoslavia and in 
some African States. These post-Cold War events189 weakened the 
idea that humanitarian intervention is an indisputably illegal act.190 
In this vein, the question of what to do in cases of mass 
humanitarian atrocities and the legal basis of taking action once 
again became a prominent area of attention. 
According to counter-restrictionist scholars, the UN Charter 
leaves room for legitimacy and/or legality of humanitarian 
interventions, although, as Sean D. Murphy asserts, “the language 
and intent behind the UN Charter does not provide an express legal 
basis for the conduct of humanitarian intervention by States or by 
regional organisations.”191 Olivier Corten in his criticism of a contrario 
interpretation of the UN Charter asserts that the wording of the 
Charter, in terms of its prohibition of the use of force, was  
devised to strengthen and not weaken the stringency of 
the prohibition. Allowance for context argues along the 
same lines. First because no provision of the Charter 
provides for a right of humanitarian intervention, 
whether in its parts on armed action or those on human 
rights. Then because article 2(3) of the Charter very 
generally compels States to settle their disputes 
peacefully. As humanitarian intervention invariably 
follows from a disagreement between the intervening 
State and the State that is the target of allegations 
                                                
189 Robertson posits that “the first clear-cut abandonment of the pure sovereignty 
doctrine in favour of humanitarian intervention was probably the UN action in Iraq 
after the Gulf War of 1991 to protect both the Kurds in the north and the Marsh 
Arabs in the south” (Robertson 2004, 199). 
190 Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2002, 146. 
191 Sean D. Murphy 1996, 83. 
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about human rights’ violations, and so from a ‘dispute’ 
in the legal sense of the term, such an intervention can 
hardly be considered compatible with the UN Charter.192 
In this vein, Corten argues against any claim for justification of 
humanitarian intervention doctrine on the basis of the UN Charter. 
Addressing the same aspects of the legal context, Hersch Lauterpacht 
defines humanitarian intervention as an act signifying “dictatorial 
interference of the State”, involving threat or use of force.193 
Nevertheless, he considers intervention as permissible in legal terms 
when a state commits atrocities against fundamental human 
rights.194 
In this regard, counter-restrictionist scholars take the 
Preamble to the Charter as well as Articles 1, 13, 55 and 56 as a 
legal basis for humanitarian intervention.195 In other words, the 
arguments in favour of the legitimacy and/or legality of 
humanitarian intervention are based on the purpose of the 
promotion and protection of human rights, which are indicated in the 
Charter among the purposes of the UN. Both the Preamble and 
Article 1(3) of the Charter place human rights196 as a higher value. 
The referred paragraphs, in a consecutive order, read as follows: 
                                                
192 Olivier Corten 2010, 501. 
193 Cited in Garrett 1999, 4. 
194 Duke 1994: 33. 
195 Duke 1994: 35. 
196 There are also references in Security Council resolutions. An example of this 
can be seen in Annex I of Resolution 1318 (2000) where it is stated that the 
Security Council “[p]ledges to uphold the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations, reaffirms its commitment to the principles of sovereign 
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We the peoples of the United Nations determined [...] to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small 
[…] have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish 
[the stated] aims. 
The Purposes of the United Nations are to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion. 
Article 13 establishes that “the General Assembly shall initiate 
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of […] assisting 
in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” More 
importantly, Article 55(c) reads: “the United Nations shall promote 
[…] universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. In this vein, Article 56 establishes that “[a]ll 
Members pledge themselves to take joint or separate action in co-
operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55.” 
In addition to what has been stated in the UN Charter, the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 28 recognizes 
                                                                                                                                     
equality, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all 
States, and underlines the need for respect for human rights and the rule of law.” 
Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm (accessed 
September 12, 2009). 
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for everyone the right “to a social and international order in which 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized.” Moreover, Article 30 aims to assure that nothing in the 
content of the Declaration “may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity to perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
set forth herein.”197 Although these provisions by themselves do not 
necessarily constitute exceptions to the prohibition of the use of 
force, they can be interpreted as complementary to what has been 
established by the Charter regarding respect for human rights.  
In this vein, as an exception to the dictates of Article 2(7), 
proponents of humanitarian intervention argue that human rights 
standards are not simply matters of domestic jurisdiction of states if 
states are parties to the related international treaties. It is as a result 
of these legal bonds that human rights matters need to be considered 
as part of the international duties of states leading to or allowing “for 
the supervision and possible sanction of the international 
community.”198 For instance, Oppenheim acknowledges that 
although it might be possible for a state to get around its legal —but 
not moral— responsibility towards its subjects in certain cases 
through changing parts of its municipal law, the same is not 
                                                
197 Full text of the Declaration is available at http://www.un.org/en/ 
documents/udhr/ (accessed June 15, 2009).  
198 Garrett 1999, 47. 
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necessarily true concerning the state’s legal responsibility in so far as 
its international duties are concerned.199 
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal 
and territorial authority, a state can treat its own 
nationals according to discretion. But a substantial 
body of opinion and of practice has supported the view 
that there are limits to that discretion and that when a 
state commits cruelties against and persecution of its 
nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental 
human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, 
the matter ceases to be of sole concern to that state200 
and even intervention in the interest of humanity might 
be legally permissible.201 
Evaluated from this perspective, RtoP as established by the Outcome 
Document does not leave much of a leeway for States since it defines 
sovereignty primarily as responsibility, in which the international 
society is to monitor and assist states in keeping up with this duty. 
In this regard, the protection of the fundamental rights of 
populations/masses is placed in the international realm rather than 
the domestic. 
In this vein, the implications of “sovereignty as responsibility” 
understanding —built on Francis Deng’s conceptualisation— can be 
summarised as follows: 
                                                
199 L.F. Lawrence Oppenheim. International Law: a treatise. Vol. 1 Peace, ed. Hersch 
Lauterpacht. (Great Britain: Longmans, 1955), 336-7. 
200 For instance, in the case of Duško Tadić, “the Appeals Chamber (in considering 
jurisdictional issues) concluded that article 3 of its Statute, which gave it 
jurisdiction over ‘violations of the laws or customs of war’, provided it with 
jurisdiction ‘regardless of whether they occurred within an internal or international 
armed conflict’” (Shaw 2001, 1070). 
201 L.F. Lawrence Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 Peace, Sir 
Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds.) (Harlow: Longman,1992), 442. 
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First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible 
for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of 
citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it 
suggests that the national political authorities are 
responsible to the citizens internally and to the 
international community through the UN. And thirdly, it 
means that the agents of state are responsible for their 
actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their 
acts of commission and omission.202 
José Alvarez interprets this treatment of sovereignty as “more 
hindrance than protection; the UN Charter (and the Security Council) 
less as sovereignty’s guarantor than the guarantor of the rights of the 
individuals.”203 
Concerning the principle of non-use of force, Richard B. Lillich 
argues for “a right of forcible humanitarian intervention”204 and 
makes reference to the argument, also cited by Brownlie, that “Article 
2(4) does not constitute an absolute prohibition against all unilateral 
humanitarian interventions.”205 On the other hand, Ian Brownlie 
argues that the “position taken up by Lillich is completely outside the 
general consensus of state practice and the opinion of experts of 
various nationalities,”206 and that no such right exists. Likewise, José 
Alvarez considers unilateral interventions undertaken in the absence 
of a UN Security Council resolution as legally problematic.207  
                                                
202 ICISS 2001a, 13. 
203 José E. Alvarez. “The Schizophrenias of RtoP” in Human Rights, Intervention, and 
the Use of Force, Philip Alston and Euan MacDonald (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 279. 
204 Ian Brownlie in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 1974, 218. 
205 Richard B. Lillich in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 1974, 241. 
206 Ian Brownlie in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 1974, 227. 
207 José Alvarez, interview by author, New York, NY, November 06, 2008. 
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As Corten notes, on the basis of the UN Charter one may 
possibly talk about lawful use of force in relation to humanitarian 
intervention only under the three circumstances of self-defence, State 
consent, or Security Council authorisation. He adds that “in all cases 
where there is genuine use of force, the protection of nationals 
cannot be considered as a distinctive argument but must be 
connected up with others such as the consent of the State in 
question, self-defence or Security Council authorisation.”208 
Nevertheless, self-defence when invoked on the basis of the 
protection of nationals, in general terms, does not qualify as a 
humanitarian intervention. An example in this regard is the US 
intervention in Grenada, where the US failed to receive support from 
the Security Council although it based its intervention on “an 
invitation from the Grenadan Governor General to restore order to 
the island, a request from the Organization of East Caribbean States 
for collective security action in Grenada, and the need to protect US 
nationals in Grenada.”209 The intervention was debated in the 
Security Council and a draft resolution that condemned the US’s 
action failed due to a veto by the US itself.210 Therefore, in a sense, 
the Security Council process was hindered by Washington. 
Nevertheless, the US was not able to prevent the drafting of a General 
                                                
208 Corten 2010, 547. 
209 Murphy 1996, 109. 
210 ICISS 2001b, 65. 
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Assembly resolution condemning the intervention as a “flagrant 
violation of international law.”211 
In the incidence of the 1989 US intervention in Panama, the 
Security Council convened upon the request of Nicaragua.212 
The action was immediately repudiated by 79 
governments, and condemned as a violation of 
international law by a 108 to 9 vote in the UN General 
Assembly. The United States invasion of Panama on 20 
December 1989 […] was only obliquely presented as a 
humanitarian operation. President Bush gave four 
objectives for the mission: (a) protection of US nationals, 
(b) defence of democracy, (c) elimination of drug-
trafficking, and (d) upholding the Panama Canal 
Treaty.213 
At the same time that the Organization of American States raised 
their strong criticisms against the United States, the Soviet Union 
and its allies unsurprisingly voted in favour of the resolution 
condemning the United States’ intervention. In the end, it was 
nothing else but the British, French and American vetoes that 
prevented a condemnatory Security Council resolution. 
Oppenheim draws attention to the fact that the unilateral 
character of an intervention tends “to weaken its standing as a lawful 
practice” since it can be a conduct of abuse by a state.214 
Nonetheless, he adds, such a case is not applicable to collective 
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interventions,215 because “the growing involvement of the 
international community on both a global and a regional basis, with 
the protection of human rights diminishes any need for states to 
retain or exercise an individual right of humanitarian 
intervention.”216 In this vein, what is legally contested by default is 
the existence of a right for unilateral intervention. 
Furthermore, Bruno Simma argues that the availability of 
Security Council authorisation for a humanitarian intervention that 
would take place through threat or use of force is of vital importance 
in order to assess whether this act violates international law or 
not.217 Nicholas J. Wheeler argues that: 
norms have clearly changed since the debates in the UN 
over India’s, Vietnam’s and Tanzania’s use of force in 
the 1970s, and Kofi Annan is right to believe that there 
is a ‘developing international norm’ in support of 
intervention. However, this normative change is subject 
to the very important caveat that the society of states 
shows little or no enthusiasm for legitimating acts of 
humanitarian intervention not authorized by the 
Security Council.218 
In this vein, Security Council authorisation becomes an important 
criterion in assessing the legitimacy, and above all, legality of a 
humanitarian intervention.  
                                                
215 An example of a UN authorised multilateral intervention is the July 1994 
intervention in Haiti. 
216 Oppenheim 1995, 443-4. 
217 Bruno Simma. “NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” European 
Journal of International Law 10 (1999): 4. 
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The basis of such authorisation may be found in the last part 
of Article 2(7), where it is stated the principle of non-intervention 
“shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII.” In this vein, a fundamental exception to the dictates of 
Article 2(4) is Chapter VII of the Charter dealing with “action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression”. Despite the fact that there is not yet a legal norm on 
humanitarian intervention, as can be inferred from a review of the 
literature, international law scholars seem to agree that the UN 
Security Council is legally capable –but not necessarily morally 
obliged– to authorize humanitarian interventions given Article 39 of 
the Charter vesting the power on the Security Council “to determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, […to] make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.” If there is a case of gross 
violation of human rights that constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security, Brownlie notes, then action can be undertaken 
within the terms of Chapter VII. “Such action may relate to Articles 
40 (provisional measures), 41 (economic sanctions), or 42219 (military 
                                                
219 “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Charter of 
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sanctions).”220 Provisions of this Chapter take into consideration 
measures (up to and including use of force) to be adopted in order to 
ensure international peace and security, specifically in cases of 
“threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. 
The case of Somalia is considered to be a prominent example of 
the invocation of Chapter VII. Security Council Resolution 794 dated 
3 December 1992 found that “the magnitude of the human tragedy 
caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the 
obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.”221 Resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994 on Rwanda 
determined “that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in 
Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,” and 
“[a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General 
to conduct the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above using all 
necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in 
subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 (1994). Resolution 940 
(1994) of 31 July 1994 on Haiti adopted a similar language and 
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considered the situation “a threat to peace and security in the 
region.” On the basis of Chapter VII, it authorized  
Member States to form a multinational force under 
unified command and control and, in this framework, to 
use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from 
Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the 
Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the 
legitimately elected President and the restoration of the 
legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to 
establish and maintain a secure and stable environment 
that will permit implementation of the Governors Island 
Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of 
implementing this temporary operation will be borne by 
the participating Member States.  
Similarly, Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999) established 
“that the present situation in East Timor constitutes a threat to 
peace and security”, and acted under the mandate of Chapter VII. 
With this Resolution, the Security Council also authorized  
the establishment of a multinational force under a 
unified command structure, pursuant to the request of 
the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-
General on 12 September 1999, with the following 
tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to 
protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks 
and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian 
assistance operations, and authorizes the States 
participating in the multinational force to take all 
necessary measures to fulfil this mandate. 
In another instance, concerning the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
in Resolution 1305 (2000), the Council determined “that the situation 
in the region continues222 to constitute a threat to international 
                                                
222 Similar statements are present in numerous Security Council resolutions, some 
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adopted by the Security Council at its 6076th meeting, on 27 January 2009 
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peace and security.”223 Moreover, Resolutions 1199 and 1203 on 
Kosovo have also urged the UN to act under Chapter VII.  
Despite all the disagreements between the restrictionist and 
counter-restrictionist legal scholars, there is one point of clear 
consensus, that is, on the basis of the UN Charter the Security 
Council stands out as the organ with the power to authorize lawful 
use of force. In this vein, humanitarian interventions, whether 
unilateral or collective, undertaken without Security Council 
authorisation have always been contested in terms of legality as 
scholars have failed to reach a consensus at the theoretical level 
about the existence of a right to intervene. As Ian Brownlie posits: “a 
jurist asserting a right of forcible humanitarian intervention has a 
very heavy burden of proof”.224 If such proof exists, it is to be found 
in the examples of past state practices. The subsequent brief 
historical overview of past conducts of humanitarian interventions 
prior to the introduction of RtoP serves to (1) question the 
existence/acceptance of a right to intervene; (2) have a general 
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opinion about state practice, and (3) outline the remaining 
constraints about the humanitarian intervention doctrine. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ROAD TO RtoP IN PRACTICE 
The subsequent overview on practices of humanitarian 
intervention focuses on two main periods: the Cold War-era, and the 
1990s. The reason for differentiating between these two periods is to 
reflect the change in state behaviour as well as the evolution of a 
sense of moral responsibility within the international community, 
which paved the way to the development of RtoP.  
As will be seen, in the three cases from the Cold War-era, 
which are widely accepted by scholars as the primary examples of 
humanitarian intervention —namely the cases of East Pakistan, 
Cambodia, and Uganda— intervening states justified their actions on 
grounds of self-defence,225 and “humanitarian” concerns, when (and 
if) mentioned, were not claimed to be the main motives for action. It 
was the humanitarian results of these unilateral acts that 
constituted the foundations of the contemporary debate on 
humanitarian intervention from various aspects.226 On the other 
hand, “[s]ince 1990 there haven been many precedents of military 
operations conducted essentially in the context of internal conflicts 
formally motivated by humanitarian interventions. In this sense, 
                                                
225 ICISS 2001b, 47. 
226 The ICISS observes that “[i]n retrospect, these three cases have become clear 
examples of necessity —and even legitimacy— of humanitarian intervention, even 
though few such arguments were made at the time” (ICISS 2001b, 67). 
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humanitarian intervention has without contest taken on a new 
dimension compared with the Cold War years”.227 
4.1. Historical Overview 
While arguing for the existence of a right to intervene 
Oppenheim bases his observations on the interventions that have 
taken place in 1800s. Nevertheless, speaking about a right of 
humanitarian intervention, state practices as well as the debates228 
within the UN in the period between 1945 and 1990 reveal neither a 
foundation of nor support for it.229 The evidence suggests an 
adherence to the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention and 
non-use of force more rigidly than before. 
The period was characterised by the ideological differences 
between the two blocks which frequently resulted with the use of the 
veto right by one or more of the five permanent members during the 
Security Council meetings. As a consequence, there are no examples 
                                                
227 Corten 2010, 537. 
228 For instance, “on the occasion of the armed action by the USA in Lebanon in 
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Keesings’ Contemporary Archives (1978), at 29128 - cited in Antonio Cassese. 
International Law. 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 368. 
229 ICISS 2001b, 68. 
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of humanitarian interventions authorised by the Security Council or 
undertaken by the UN itself during the Cold War.230 
In numerous cases of the Cold War the Council was made 
inoperable by the use of the veto. The end result was a deadlock 
which was followed by a call –through a General Assembly resolution, 
based on the authorisation of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, and 
Article 10231 of the UN Charter– for an immediate withdrawal of all 
foreign forces, which in nature implicitly addressed the intervening 
state itself but none other. A prominent example of this is the Indian 
intervention in Pakistan, which followed the civil war that erupted in 
March 1971 in East Pakistan. During the war, the actions of the 
West Pakistani troops led ten million people to take refugee in India, 
which in the end caused tension between India and Pakistan. India 
did not refrain from supporting the “Bengali liberation movement,” 
and following the bombardment of its military airfields by Pakistan, it 
recognized the newly independent state of Bangladesh in December.  
This was followed by the occupation of the province of former 
East Pakistan by Indian forces for the purpose of ousting the 
Pakistani Army. Upon this, the Security Council was asked for a 
session where India presented its main justification as an act of self-
                                                
230 Murphy 1996, 84. 
231 Article 10 establishes that “the General Assembly may discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and 
functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as 
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United 
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defence. The Indian claim was that “the influx of 10 million refugees 
amounted to ‘refugee aggression’ and represented such an intolerable 
burden that it constituted a kind of ‘constructive’ attack.”232 A minor 
point of justification raised was the necessity to aid the “Bengali 
victims of the Pakistani Army’s onslaught.”233 
In this conflict, the United States along with China sided with 
Pakistan whereas India found support from the Soviet Union on the 
basis of their 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. In 
the eyes of the United States and China, a victory of India —a 
country that aligned itself with the Soviets— would mean a 
possibility for the Soviet Union to exercise “some control over the new 
state of Bangladesh, and, most important of all, [this] gave Moscow 
important advantage in the geopolitical competition against China 
and the USA.”234 The superpower rivalry, eventually, prevented the 
Security Council from taking effective action, and therefore, the first 
step that could be taken towards a peaceful settlement by the 
Secretary General U Thant remained limited to an international aid 
programme.235  
In the Security Council meeting, India’s justifications of self-
defence and humanitarian action for its use of force against Pakistan 
found support from the Soviet Union. The United States and China 
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objected to the claimed justifications and “condemned India’s action 
as ‘an unjustified move that could lead to international anarchy.’”236 
During the discussions, the United States argued for an “immediate 
ceasefire” and China repeated its condemnation of India many times, 
whereas the Soviets asked for a “ceasefire as part of a political 
settlement.” Later on, the Soviet Union vetoed the Security Council 
draft resolutions asking for an “immediate ceasefire,” and caused a 
deadlock.237 Upon the pressure of the non-aligned group, the issue 
was brought before the General Assembly for a discussion, and as a 
result Resolution 2793 (XXVI) which called for the withdrawal of all 
military forces was adopted.238 The Soviet Union and Poland were 
among the states that voted against this Resolution. Nevertheless, 
Resolution 2793 was indeed a compromise between the superpowers, 
as it was a decision calling for an immediate ceasefire without a 
condemnation on India.239 
A similar situation existed in the 1978 intervention of Vietnam 
in Cambodia where the UN Security Council was made inoperable 
through the use of the veto right. From March 1978 to March 1979, 
human rights abuses in Cambodia were recorded in the resolutions 
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of the UN Commission on Human Rights.240 In the ongoing war 
between Cambodia and Vietnam on the border, “humanitarian” 
reasons were available for Vietnam to claim as a justification of its 
acts. However, as in the example of India, the primary reasoning for 
intervention was presented as the right of “self-defence” against the 
aggression by the Khemer Rouge regime.241  
The opposition to the Vietnamese intervention came from three 
different groups. The first was “the USA and its allies, who 
interpreted Vietnam’s action as a move in the game of cold-war power 
politics”.242 The second was the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) which interpreted the intervention in Cambodia as a 
sign of the Vietnamese ambition to become a regional hegemon, and 
the last group was of the neutrals and non-aligneds which 
considered the Vietnamese intervention as an erosion of “the rule of 
law in international relations.”243 
The Soviet Union and the eastern block countries were the 
supporters of the Vietnamese argument that the Khemer Rouge 
regime was overthrown by the Cambodian people themselves through 
a revolution.244 The western block, on the other hand, not only 
rejected such an argument but also refused the justification of 
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Vietnamese action through the right of self-defence and further 
investigated the “humanitarian” aspect of the intervention. 
Nonetheless, no “humanitarian” cause was accepted to constitute a 
reason to permit a breach of the principle of non-intervention, which 
served the purpose of preventing states from intervening in the 
domestic affairs of other states. The Soviet Union vetoed the draft 
resolution asking “for the withdrawal of all foreign (that is, 
Vietnamese) forces from Cambodia.”245 
The debate in the General Assembly was crucial in the sense 
that the question “whether substantial human rights violations could 
provide a justification for intervention” was raised.246  
The USA recognized that Vietnam had legitimate 
security anxieties relating to Cambodian attacks against 
its citizens in the border areas, but Young argued that 
‘border disputes do not grant one nation the right to 
impose a government on another by military force’. […] 
The Carter administration had sought to elevate human 
rights in the hierarchy of foreign-policy principles, but, 
when it came to a choice between upholding the rule of 
law or permitting an exception in the name of rescuing 
the Cambodian people, an absolutist interpretation of 
the rules won out.”247 
The end result was the same as in the case of India since an 
immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese forces was called for. Moreover, 
the new Cambodian government was not recognized and the ousted 
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government remained as the official government by a decision of the 
General Assembly.248  
Although the incidents were similar to the ones in the 
Vietnamese case, in the 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, the 
international community reached a contrary outcome. In April 1979, 
President Idi Amin’s government of Uganda was overthrown, and Idi 
Amin was considered responsible for mass murder of Ugandan 
people. The course of events reached its peak when the atrocities 
were made public by the British press, and Britain asked the UN 
Commission on Human Rights for an international investigation in 
Uganda concerning human rights violations. There was international 
condemnation by the heads of governments. In the course of events, 
in April 1978, internal unrest also reached its peak. “Amin was 
forced to suppress mutinies at a number of army bases. Loyal troops 
pursued some of the mutineering soldiers across the border into the 
Kagera region of northwest Tanzania.”249 Later on, Idi Amin declared 
his annexation of Kagera region in an Ugandan radio.250 This 
declaration was followed by a counter-attack by Tanzania in 
November.251  
Upon the growing success of Tanzanian forces and Ugandan 
rebel forces against those of Uganda, Amin asked for foreign support, 
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and this constituted the reason for Tanzania to move deeper in 
Uganda. Following this, Tanzanian forces captured the capital and 
Amin’s government was ousted. Like India and Vietnam, Tanzania 
also claimed the right of “self-defence” for its actions, and stated that 
“there were two wars being fought: ‘First there are Ugandans fighting 
to remove the Fascist dictator. Then there are Tanzanians fighting to 
maintain national security.”252 The main difference of the Tanzanian 
intervention from Indian and Vietnamese interventions was that, 
there was almost no international reaction to the Tanzanian 
intervention. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was a supplier of 
advisers and arms to Uganda throughout the 1970s up until Amin’s 
invasion of Kagera region, the Soviets did not intend to support Idi 
Amin against Tanzania.253 The superpower competition for spreading 
influence did not stretch to Tanzania as there was another issue at 
stake between the United States and the Soviet Union: the conflict 
between Somalia and Ethiopia. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet 
competition, where “China [was] acting as a patron for Tanzania 
while the Soviet Union backed Amin,” was not aggravated, first due 
to non-involvement by the US, second because of “the Soviet Union’s 
growing embarrassment at Amin’s actions.”254 
“At the sixteenth OAU [Organization of African Unity] summit 
in Monrovia in July 1979, most states ‘remained silent, thereby 
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indicating a tacit approval of Tanzanian action.’”255 Western states, 
including the United States, refrained from commenting on 
Tanzania’s use of force and the toppling of Idi Amin.256 Contrary to 
the outcome of the Vietnamese intervention, the new government in 
Kampala was recognized by most countries in a short period of time, 
and there were no condemnations regarding the actions of 
Tanzania.257 Nonetheless, the Tanzanian intervention was never 
authorised by the Security Council. 
As Corten observes: 
A review of precedents characteristic of the Cold War 
clearly show that States remain attached to a classical 
conception by which violations of human rights cannot 
justify military actions from outside. […] it was only in 
the 1990s that States as a whole admitted an extended 
competence of the Security Council to deal with 
situations that had formerly been considered as purely 
internal, including by authorising an outside military 
intervention.258 
In this context, in the aftermath of the Cold War two fundamental 
changes of understanding come to the fore on the part of the 
international community: (1) the description of “civil war and internal 
strife […] as threats to international peace and security” and the 
acceptance that these may constitute “the basis for Chapter VII 
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enforcement action”;259 and (2) the possibility of the consideration of 
refugee influxes as a threat to international peace and security.260 
In the 1990s, nine cases, namely Liberia, Northern Iraq, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East 
Timor come to the fore as the main examples of invocation of 
humanitarian reasons in the period prior to the announcement of 
RtoP by the ICISS. The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and 
Rwanda can be presented as precedents of use of force justified on 
humanitarian grounds, and undertaken with Security Council 
authorisation based on Chapter VII. Likewise, for instance in the 
case of Liberia, the Security Council with Resolution 788 (1992) 
determined that “deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes 
a threat to international peace and security, particularly in West 
Africa as a whole.”  
Thus, in contrast to the Cold War-era, it is observed that the 
Security Council assumed a much more active role in addressing 
cases of mass atrocities and did not necessarily refrain from adopting 
coercive measures. Alongside military interventions, two preferred 
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methods (generally prior to the adoption of the use of force) were 
sanctions and international prosecution.261 
Furthermore, as the ICISS notes:  
Unlike the earlier cases, in which the rescue of 
nationals and self-defence were the prominent 
justifications, the conscience-shocking and truly 
‘humanitarian’ elements of the post-1990 cases were 
explicitly recognized as important justifications for 
international action. Instead of single-state military 
operations, the interventions of the 1990s were also 
genuinely multilateral.”262 
Furthermore, in cases where the interventions were carried out by 
forces other than that of the UN, it can be observed that the 
operations were authorised by the Security Council. For instance, the 
bombings of the Serbian forces (from 1994 to 1995) by the NATO 
directed to stop the atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina had Security 
Council authorisation through resolutions such as 770, 776 and 
836.263 
 One major exception to this prevalent trend is the case of 
Kosovo. Occurring in the aftermath of the international community’s 
failure264 to take effective action in Rwanda –where the death toll was 
                                                
261 “The 1990s have been labelled the “sanctions decade” because the Security 
Council imposed 12 sanctions regimes, several times more than in the previous 40 
years combined. As well as being used more frequently, sanctions were also applied 
more widely, including against nonstate actors in Angola and Cambodia”  (ICISS 
2001b, 118). 
262 ICISS 2001b, 117. 
263 Corten 2010, 539. 
264 “The failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to stop the 
genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole. The 
fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to 
developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there” (UN Document 
S/1999/1257 (December 15, 1999), 3). 
  107 
around 800,000 due to the “systematic slaughter of men, women and 
children which took place over the course of about 100 days between 
April and July of 1994”265–, the Kosovo case constituted a 
fundamental test of morality. 
Despite the fact that the Security Council in its Resolutions 
1199 (23 September 1998) and 1203 (24 October 1998) described the 
situation in Kosovo as a “threat to peace and security in the region”, 
and indicated that it is acting under Chapter VII, the NATO action 
was never authorized by the Council.266 Thus, in the absence of a 
clear Security Council authorisation, state consent or NATO’s 
coercive action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(specifically Serbia and Montenegro),267 undertaken collectively upon 
the decision of 19 states, is considered to be an example of an illegal 
intervention.268 
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The ICISS notes: 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 brought the 
controversy to its most intense head. Security Council 
members were divided; the legal justification for military 
action without new Security Council authority was 
asserted but largely unargued; the moral or 
humanitarian justification for the action, which on the 
face of it was much stronger, was clouded by allegations 
that the intervention generated more carnage than it 
averted; and there were many criticisms of the way in 
which the NATO allies conducted the operation.269 
Although the intervening states argued for the legality270 of their 
action, not all the members of the international community were of 
the same opinion. By mid-1998 China and Russia had already 
signalled that they would veto any Security Council authorisation 
under Chapter VII. In the aftermath of the operation, Russia 
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proposed a draft resolution for the condemnation of NATO’s forceful 
action, but this was turned down by twelve votes to three.271  
Taking into consideration the veto issue, and the fact that the 
intervention was carried out without Security Council authorisation, 
it is possible to trace certain similarities between the Kosovo case 
and those of the Cold War period. Nevertheless, the claimed 
humanitarian justifications for undertaking action instead of 
invocation of self-defence (as it was the case in the Cold War) and the 
undertaking of the humanitarian intervention in a consistent manner 
with the claimed reasons constitutes a genuine case for the 
assumption of a moral responsibility and the prioritisation of human 
rights matters over legality concerns. 
  At the heat of political rivalries, throughout the Cold War, the 
Security Council was neither able to authorise nor to condemn the 
use of force by States. This, from a political point of view, reveals the 
politicised nature of the relationship and is classically interpreted as 
a prevalence of interests over moral concerns. Thus, it is not possible 
to claim that importance was genuinely placed on humanitarian 
norms. 
 From a legal point of view, in the light of the cases mentioned, 
it can be argued that there is no solid proof to support the arguments 
in favour of the existence of a (unilateral) right to intervene. In the 
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Cold War-era there is no assertive evidence of states undertaking 
action based on motivations of humanitarian concerns. Yet, one can 
talk about an increasing importance of human rights within the 
international community as through the conventions, resolutions 
and declarations it adopted the UN has assumed the mission of law-
making for the purpose of protecting human rights while trying to 
avoid interference in states’ domestic affairs. That is to say, there was 
an increasing consciousness regarding human rights alongside 
adherence to fundamental principles of international law in the 
international conduct. 
Unlike the previous decades, the 1990s were characterised in 
general by collective humanitarian interventions based on Security 
Council resolutions that invoked action under Chapter VII. This was 
an era where inaction (as in the case of Rwanda) was criticised 
severely. The controversial case of Kosovo while reignited the debates 
on the lawfulness of forceful action without Security Council 
authorisation UN, once again led practitioners and researchers to 
question the legitimate bases for action in the name of halting mass 
atrocities. In the meanwhile, the humanitarian situations that arose 
in the 1990s reaffirmed a sense of moral duty, which later on was 
translated into language of RtoP.  
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4.2. Adoption of RtoP at the International Level 
In the foreword to the report on RtoP it is indicated that “it was 
in response to [Kofi Annan’s] challenge that the Government of 
Canada, together with a group of major foundations, announced at 
the General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”.272 
As the Secretary-General to the UN, Annan first in 1999 and then in 
2000 addressed the Members of the General Assembly with the 
following question: “…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?”273 
The ICISS taking up on this challenging question, in the light 
of the experiences of Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia affirmed 
in December 2001 an increasing concern regarding human security 
within the international community with its Report on RtoP.274 The 
Commission identified its purpose as to find a “new common ground” 
in order to respond to “gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that affect every precept of our common humanity.”275 
Published in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 events the Report 
                                                
272 ICISS 2001a, vii. 
273 ICISS 2001a, vii. 
274 This also brought back into the debate the relevance of the issue of human 
suffering. 
275 ICISS 2001a, vii. 
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attracted varying responses.276 The US’s invocation of RtoP as one of 
its justifications for its intervention in (or —as scholars like Gelijn 
Molier277 put it— invasion of) Iraq in 2003 did not help to ease the 
suspicion that RtoP could be a “Trojan Horse” for Western states to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of weaker states. 
While addressing the negative comments about RtoP, in an 
attempt to gain support for the Report, Gareth Evans argued that 
“the RtoP concept was first seriously embraced in the doctrine of the 
newly emerging African Union, created in 2002” since non-
indifference was emphasized over non-interference278 by the 
Organisation as a main principle.279 Nevertheless, the connection 
between RtoP and African Union’s position are not as direct as Evans 
posits. The AU recognizes in Article 4(g) of its Constitutive Act the 
principle of “non-interference by any Member State in the internal 
                                                
276 For instance, area specialist Lawrence Woocher gives the example of classical 
just war theory references in the Report as well as noting that “sovereignty as 
responsibility” idea existed before the ICISS introduced it via RtoP (Lawrence 
Woocher, interview by author, Washington D.C., October 17, 2008). 
277 See Gelijn Molier. “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect 
after 9/11.” Netherlands International Law Review, LIII (2006): 37-62. 
278 Wafula Okumu highlights that the adoption of the principle of non-indifference 
by the African Union (AU) is a major difference with the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU). He also notes that among the number of catastrophic situations 
Africa has faced Rwanda was a case where the prevailing idea became to be the one 
that Africa could not be dependent on the West all the time when there was need to 
take action” (Wafula Okumu, phone interview by author, November 03, 2008). 
Similarly, Mashood Issaka notes that the case of Liberia was signalling the need for 
change. The situation was affecting other states, and when Liberia was collapsing, 
the OAU stood back because of the non-intervention principle. ECOWAS eventually 
intervened to contain the situation and to prevent it from further affecting 
regional/neighbouring states in a negative way (Mashood Issaka, interview by 
author, New York, NY, November 06, 2008). 
279 Evans 2008, 44. 
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affairs of another,”280 whereas in Article 4(h) it endorses “the right of 
the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of 
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.”281 As Mashood Issaka notes, 
this is rather an embracement of the principle of non-indifference 
(where the AU Member States are expected to intervene before state 
failure) than a “responsibility to protect.”282 As can be read in the 
paragraph, the Article talks about “a right to intervene,” which in fact 
is exactly the language that was rejected and/or purposefully avoided 
in the Report of the ICISS because of its negative connotations.283 
The fundamental challenge to introducing a new 
doctrine/international norm and making it real is putting it into 
practice and obtaining international recognition for that practice.284 
As indicated at the beginning of the Chapter, the ICISS’s RtoP was 
not welcomed very warmly by numerous states. As far as the 
discussions within the UN are concerned, on the one hand two 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely China and 
Russia, were in favour of outlawing unauthorized interventions 
without exception. On the other hand, the rest of the permanent 
                                                
280 The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted on 11 July 2000, which 
is before the Report of the ICISS was published. 
281 Retrieved from http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm 
#Article4 (accessed October 28, 2009).  
282 Mashood Issaka, interview by author, New York, NY, November 06, 2008. 
283 For further information on this aspect of RtoP, see Section 4.1. Conceptual 
Contributions.  
284 For a list and short description of the documents adopted by the UN and the 
African Union, see Appendix B. 
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members, i.e. the US, the UK, and France, supported the doctrine. 
Nevertheless, they too had certain concerns: “[i]n particular, they 
worried that agreement on criteria would not necessarily produce the 
political will and consensus required to respond effectively to 
humanitarian crises.”285 
Foreseeing potential problems in the implementation of the 
principles introduced, the Commission made recommendations in 
the Report both to the General Assembly286 and the Security 
Council287 taking these two organs as the main and the most 
influential bodies of the international community for norm 
enforcement. From these recommendations, those concerning the 
Security Council have hitherto been far from achievable in light of 
                                                
285 Alex J. Bellamy. “Whither the Responsibility to Protect.” (Summer 2006): 151-2. 
286 “The Commission recommends to the General Assembly: 
That the General Assembly adopt a draft declaratory resolution embodying the 
basic principles of the responsibility to protect, and containing four basic elements:  
(1) an affirmation of the idea of sovereignty as responsibility; 
(2) an assertion of the threefold responsibility of the international community of 
states – to prevent, to react and to rebuild – when faced with human protection 
claims in states that are either unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibility 
to protect; 
(3) a definition of the threshold (large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, actual or 
apprehended) which human protection claims must meet if they are to justify 
military intervention; and 
(4) an articulation of the precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, 
proportional means and reasonable prospects) that must be observed when 
military force is used for human protection purposes” (ICISS, 2001a, 74). 
287 “The Commission recommends to the Security Council: 
(1) That the members of the Security Council should consider and seek to reach 
agreement on a set of guidelines, embracing the “Principles for Military 
Intervention” summarized in the Synopsis, to govern their responses to claims for 
military intervention for human protection purposes. 
(2) That the Permanent Five members of the Security Council should consider and 
seek to reach agreement not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital 
state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing 
military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise 
majority support” (ICISS, 2001a, 74-5). 
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the political realities of the day whereas those relating to the General 
Assembly have been partially realised thanks to the efforts of the 
latest two Secretary Generals Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon. 
a. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
For the implementation of RtoP, the initiative was first taken by 
the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2004 through the “Report 
of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change” entitled “A More Secure World: our shared 
responsibility.” This report in Part 3 deals with Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations as well as internal threats and the 
responsibility to protect.288 For instance, the opening sentence of 
Paragraph 199 addresses the ambiguities in the Charter concerning 
cases of “saving lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity,” 
and adds that the Charter “‘reaffirm(s) faith in fundamental human 
rights’ but does not do much to protect them.” Paragraph 200 posits 
that the 
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot 
be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, 
such as large-scale violations of international 
humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which 
can properly be considered a threat to international 
security and as such provoke action by the Security 
Council. 
This Paragraph in a way asserts that the non-intervention principle 
should not lead to indifference within the UN. In accordance with this 
                                                
288 See pages 65 to 66. 
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understanding, the Secretary-General introduces the “responsibility 
to protect” in Paragraph 201.289 
The subsequent paragraph addresses the inefficiency of the 
Security Council in responding to catastrophic cases and raises the 
issue of authorisation of action by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII.290 Finally, Paragraph 203 endorses 
the emerging norm that there is a collective 
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the 
Security Council authorizing military intervention as a 
last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law which sovereign 
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to 
prevent. 
In seeking an answer to the legitimacy question, the Report 
proposes in Paragraph 207 the adoption of criteria similar to those in 
the ICISS’s report. The first is the “seriousness of threat”291 which 
                                                
289 The paragraph reads as follows: “[…] There is a growing recognition that the 
issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” 
of every State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe –mass 
murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate 
starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance that while 
sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens 
from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that 
responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community -with it 
spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and 
rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on assisting the 
cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of 
people through such measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and 
police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort.” 
290 “[…] step by step, the Council and the wider international community have 
come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of a 
collective international responsibility to protect, it [/the Security Council] can 
always authorize military action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is 
prepared to declare that the situation is a ‘threat to international peace and 
security’, not especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved.” 
291 (a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a 
kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military 
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corresponds to the “just cause” criterion of RtoP. Nevertheless, this 
one is more limited in scope as it does not make reference to “large 
scale of loss of life,” or “cases of natural and environmental 
disasters.” The second criterion is “proper purpose” according to 
which the goal of the intervention is to stop a threat. This clause 
refers to the same understanding as that of the “right intention” of 
ICISS with different wording. Paragraph (c) makes reference with the 
exact wording to the principle of “last resort” according to which 
military intervention should be the final alternative to be employed. 
That is to say, peaceful and non-military options should be tried and 
exhausted first. The fourth criterion is “proportional means”, which 
uses the same wording and is the same in essence with the principle 
proposed in the Report of the ICISS. Finally, there is the “balance of 
consequences,” which shares the same understanding with the 
“reasonable prospects” criterion of RtoP but is named differently in a 
way to make the principle clearer in essence. In this regard, in order 
to undertake a military intervention there needs to be reasonable 
chance of success of the act, and the crucial point is that the 
aftermath of the intervention should improve the conditions, not 
make things worse compared to the pre-intervention period. 
Last but not least, Part 4, Paragraph 256 asks “the permanent 
members, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to 
                                                                                                                                     
force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
actual or imminently apprehended? 
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refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale 
human rights abuses.” Carsten Stahn interprets this as a reflection 
of “the panel’s intention to make the Council both a vehicle for, and 
an addressee of, the concept of the responsibility to protect.”292 
Moreover, the Report links ICISS’s “vision of shared responsibility 
directly to the United Nations” and utilizes the concept as a “means 
to strengthen the collective security system under the Charter.”293 
In the aftermath of the High Level Panel, the African Union 
convened to determine the Common African Position on the Proposed 
Reform of the United Nations, namely “the Ezulwini Consensus” of 7- 
8 March 2005. The Union deals with the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect under Part B, which is entitled “collective 
security and the use of force.” Accordingly, the document accepts the 
criteria of the Panel concerning authorisation of the use of force by 
the Security Council while acknowledging that “this condition should 
not undermine the responsibility of the international community to 
protect.”294 Secondly, the Union makes reference to regional 
organisations regarding their vital role as actors with the ability to 
take action due to their proximity to the areas of conflict especially in 
cases where the UN is not in a position to assess the situation 
                                                
292 Stahn 2007: 106. 
293 Stahn 2007: 105. 
294 African Union, Executive Council 7th Extraordinary Session. The Common 
African Position On The Proposed Reform Of The United Nations: The Ezulwini 
Consensus. (7- 8 March 2005), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6. 
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effectively.295 Finally, while reiterating the idea of sovereignty as 
responsibility, the Consensus underlines that “this should not be 
used as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of states.”296 This emphasis affirms the remaining 
concern among states regarding potential abuses of norms by 
governments for legitimising their interventions in pursuit of their 
states’ national interests. 
b. Report on UN Reform: In Larger Freedom 
In continuing his efforts to establish RtoP on a concrete basis, 
Kofi Annan prepared the report entitled “Report on UN Reform: In 
Larger Freedom”, and presented it on 21 March 2005. In Paragraph 
135 Annan states: 
I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to 
protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This 
responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each 
individual State, whose primary raison d’être and duty 
is to protect its population. But if national authorities 
are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then 
the responsibility shifts to the international community 
to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to 
help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian 
populations.297 
                                                
295 “The African Union agrees with the Panel that the intervention of Regional 
Organisations should be with the approval of the Security Council; although in 
certain situations, such approval could be granted “after the fact” in circumstances 
requiring urgent action.  In such cases, the UN should assume responsibility for 
financing such operations.” 
296 Ezulwini Consensus (2005, 6). 
297 Report of the Secretary-General, “In larger freedom: towards development, 
security and human rights for all,” (March 21, 2005) A/59/2005, 35. 
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In this report the responsibility to protect is placed under the 
chapter on “Freedom to Live in Dignity” whereas in the High Level 
Panel Report it is covered under the heading of “Collective Security 
and Use of Force.” This change is relevant to the arguments of the 
proponents of RtoP who each and every time emphasise that the 
concept is beyond an attempt to legitimise the use of force, and that 
RtoP is not a synonym for humanitarian intervention. 
c. World Summit Outcome Document 
Later, on 24 October 2005, the General Assembly unanimously 
adopted the “World Summit Outcome Document” (A/RES/60/1). The 
Document in Paragraph 121 assigns all states, on an equal basis, 
“the duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”298 Under the separate heading of “Responsibility to Protect 
Populations from Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and 
Crimes Against Humanity,” Paragraph 138 takes states individually 
responsible for the protection of their populations from these four 
grave crimes, and includes the prevention of these crimes as well as 
                                                
298 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/60/1), 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005, 27-28. Full text is available at 
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenEle
ment, accessed: 10 May 2008. Furthermore, paragraph 122 reads that: “We 
emphasize the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter, to 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any 
kind as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status” (pp. 27-8). 
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their incitement.299 Moreover, Paragraph 139 urges for collective 
action: 
The international community, through the United 
Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to 
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this 
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a 
timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation 
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.300 
In an implicit manner, these two paragraphs consecutively refer to 
the “responsibility to prevent” and “the responsibility to react” 
aspects of RtoP. Nevertheless, concerning the latter, unlike the 
Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel, the text of the 
Summit does not touch upon any criterion of legitimacy for the 
authorisation of forceful action by the Security Council. As far as the 
third and final feature of RtoP, in other words the “responsibility to 
rebuild” is concerned, there is no explicit reference in the Outcome 
                                                
299 “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will 
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, 
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.” 
300 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/60/1), p. 30. Paragraph 
143 adds that the General Assembly is committed to discuss and define “the notion 
of human security” for the full exercise of the rights to “live in freedom and dignity” 
(p. 31). 
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Document under the “Responsibility to Protect” heading. Yet, peace-
building is separately considered through paragraphs 97 to 105 
under the framework of the peace-building commission to be 
established as an advisory intergovernmental body by the General 
Assembly. 
Wafula Okumu interprets the way the UN adopted the notion of 
the “responsibility to protect” as a compromise. He notes that the 
Document was done in such a way that it would be adopted without 
objection.301 A careful reading of the text of the 2005 World Summit 
exemplifies his point. In comparison to the Report of the ICISS, the 
acts invoking a responsibility to protect, as enumerated in Paragraph 
138, are limited in the Outcome Document to a set of four 
fundamental crimes defined by international criminal law. This 
restriction can be seen as an attempt to make the terms of the 
concept less ambiguous, less flexible, and less open to interpretation.  
The document adopts a cautious language while assigning 
responsibility to the international community.  In Paragraph 138, it 
uses the phrase “as appropriate” and makes the conditions of action 
more flexible. In Paragraph 139, the Heads of State talk about their 
preparedness “to take collective action” signalling that they refrain 
from undertaking a responsibility in a strict manner, which in 
essence would be an obligation. This attitude is strengthened by the 
                                                
301 Wafula Okumu. Phone interview by the author. 03 November 2008, South 
Africa. 
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phrase “case-by-case basis”, which enables the international 
community to leave certain cases out upon consideration.302  
Hurst Hannum stresses that the limiting nature of the 
Outcome Document while defining the extent of RtoP is unfortunate 
since it only focuses on a specific set of international crimes as 
opposed to focusing on saving people’s lives. He notes that this 
simply distracts us from the problematic issue and does not add 
much to what already exists.303 Thomas Weiss posits that the 
“responsibility to protect” of the World Summit can be named as 
“RtoP lite” since it does not leave room for interventions not 
authorised by the Security Council.304 In a similar fashion, Mr. Puri, 
the representative of India, in the General Assembly meeting 
(A/63/PV.99) considered the Document as “a cautious go ahead” for 
the embracement of the responsibility to protect.305 
In affirmation of what was adopted in the Document, the 
Security Council at times has referred to paragraphs of the World 
Summit Outcome. For instance, Resolution 1674 (2006)306 
unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 5430th meeting 
on 28 April 2006, concerning the protection of civilians in armed 
                                                
302 It is important to note that although the case-by-case consideration 
understanding of Paragraph 139 is subject to criticism based on the concern of 
differential treatment, it can also be considered as a precautionary principle to 
avoid abuses of the norm. 
303 Hurst Hannum, interview by the author, Boston, MA, March 06, 2009. 
304 Thomas Weiss. Interview by the author. 07 November 2008, CUNY, New York. 
305 General Assembly, (A/63/PV.99), p. 25. 
306 Full text of the Resolution is available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_ 
resolutions06.htm (accessed October 28, 2009). 
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conflict, in Paragraph 4 reaffirmed “the provisions of paragraphs 138 
and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” Resolution 1706 
(2006)307 adopted by the Security Council at its 5519th meeting on 31 
August 2006 makes reference to 
its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace 
and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of 
humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 
(2005) on children and armed conflict, and 1674 (2006) 
on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which 
reaffirms inter alia the provisions of paragraphs 138 
and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit 
outcome document, as well as the report of its Mission 
to the Sudan and Chad from 4 to 10 June 2006. 
It should be noted that in the name of further exploration and 
clarification of the concept, the Outcome Document in the last part of 
Paragraph 139 stresses 
the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind 
the principles of the Charter and international law.308 
In line with this proposition, the General Assembly has been 
continuing its efforts for the implementation of the responsibility to 
protect in the following years. 
                                                
307 Full text of the Resolution is available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ 
unsc_resolutions06.htm (accessed October 28, 2009). 
308 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/60/1), p. 30. Paragraph 
143 adds that the General Assembly is committed to discuss and define “the notion 
of human security” for the full exercise of the rights to “live in freedom and dignity” 
(p. 31). 
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d. The 2009 Report of the Secretary-General 
On 25 September 2007 Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated 
that he “will strive to translate the concept of our Responsibility to 
Protect from words into deeds, to ensure timely action so that 
populations do not face genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”309 To this end, he prepared Report A/63/677 
(dated 12 January 2009) addressing the issue of the implementation 
of the responsibility to protect pursuant to the World Summit 
Outcome Document. In this vein, Ban Ki-Moon in a press conference 
on 23 July stated that the Report 
“seeks to situate the responsibility to protect squarely 
under the UN roof and within our Charter, where it 
belongs,” he added, stressing the need for the world 
body to sharpen its capacities for early warning and 
assessment. 
When prevention fails, the United Nations needs to 
pursue an early and flexible response tailored to the 
circumstances of each case. Military action is a measure 
of last, not first, resort and should only be undertaken 
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.310 
This report on the implementation of the responsibility to 
protect is based on the three pillars of (1) state responsibility, (2) 
international assistance and capacity-building, and (3) timely and 
decisive response. Pillar one addresses the individual responsibility of 
                                                
309 SG/SM/11182, retrieved from: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ 
sgsm11182.doc.htm, accessed: 29 November 2009. 
310 Gerard Aziakou (AFP). UN debates responsibility to protect threatened 
populations. July 23, 2009. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/hostednews/ 
afp/article/ALeqM5jUBFUNA723tsQokBAIMj-KcEYYug (accessed September 20, 
2009). 
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states to protect their populations from the four crimes as well as 
from their incitement. The second pillar is concerned with the role of 
the international community in assisting states to meet their 
responsibilities. Finally, pillar three is concerned about “timely and 
decisive response” where Member States of the UN are expected to 
act in a collective manner in case of a failure of a state to fulfil its 
obligations towards its population. In accomplishing this task, an 
array of measures ranging from pacific (under Chapter VI) to coercive 
(under Chapter VII)311 can be adopted alongside regional 
arrangements (under Chapter VIII). It is under this pillar that 
humanitarian interventions can be undertaken by the authorisation 
of the Security Council.312 
In line with the understanding of not remaining silent as the 
international community against grave atrocities, the Secretary-
General draws attention to the issue of the use of veto, and urges the 
permanent members of the Security Council “to refrain from 
employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations of manifest 
failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect, as 
defined in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, and to reach a 
                                                
311 “In accordance with the Charter, measures under Chapter VII must be 
authorized by the Security Council. The General Assembly may exercise a range of 
related functions under Articles 10 and 14, as well as under the ‘Uniting for peace’ 
process set out in its resolution 377(V)” (A/63/677), p. 9. 
312 It is important to note that under the framework of the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution, the General Assembly has recommendatory power. 
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mutual understanding to that effect.”313 The Secretary-General also 
notes that the UN has not yet established a rapid-response military 
capacity to respond to the four crimes. Addressing an issue not dealt 
within the Summit Outcome, he adds, there may be a need to 
“consider the principles, rules and doctrine that should guide the 
application of coercive force in extreme situations relating to the 
responsibility to protect.”314 
Concerning the way forward, in Section V the Secretary-
General suggests the discussion of the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect without revisiting the unanimously adopted 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome.315 On this basis, 
on 21 July 2009 Ban Ki-Moon presented his report to be discussed in 
the plenary meetings of the General Assembly as agenda items 44 
and 107 (“Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-
up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and 
summits in the economic, social and related fields,” “Follow-up to the 
outcome of the Millennium Summit”, Report of the Secretary-
General) on 21, 23, 24, and 28 July 2009.316 During these four days, 
94 speakers (of whom one representative spoke on behalf of the 
European Union and the other on behalf of the Non-Aligned 
                                                
313 (A/63/677), p. 27. 
314 (A/63/677), p. 27. 
315 (A/63/677), p. 29. 
316 The minutes of the meetings are documented under the following call numbers: 
A/63/PV.97, A/63/PV.98, A/63/PV.99, A/63/PV.100, A/63/PV.101.  
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Movement) presented their countries’ positions regarding the Report 
of the Secretary-General.317 
During the meetings, Member States argued that their current 
task should be the implementation of the responsibility to protect on 
the basis of Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit. In 
this vein, they have welcomed the narrow understanding of the 
responsibility to protect as outlined by these paragraphs. The vast 
majority of States indicated that these criteria should not be subject 
to change or renegotiation. In other words, they opted for adhering to 
the criteria of four major crimes instead of extending the scope of the 
responsibility to protect to include the war against terrorism,318 
natural disasters, pandemics or other calamities319 that may require 
the assistance of the international community. 
                                                
317 For a summary of the views (with a special focus on points relating to 
humanitarian intervention and use of force) presented by states during the 
preliminary meetings, see Appendix C. 
318 Sri Lanka favoured a possible extension arguing that “responsible sovereignty 
must also apply to key issues such as the prohibition of the use of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, nuclear disarmament, non-
proliferation, counter-terrorism, global warming, biological security and economic 
prosperity” (A/63/PV.100, p. 4). 
319 For instance, France in its statement noted that it “will also remain vigilant to 
ensure that natural disasters, when combined with deliberate inaction on the part 
of a Government that refuses to provide assistance to its population in distress or 
to ask the international community for aid, do not lead to human tragedies in 
which the international community can only look on helplessly” (A/63/PV.97, p. 9), 
whereas states like Cuba and South Africa openly opposed any possible extension 
of the concept. For example, Cuba stated that “[a]ny attempt to expand the term to 
cover other calamities —such as AIDS, climate change or natural disasters— would 
undermine the language of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document” 
(A/63/PV.99, p. 16). Likewise, the representative of Philippines indicated: “Any 
attempt to enlarge its coverage even before RtoP is effectively implemented will only 
delay, if not derail, such implementation; or worse yet, diminish its value or 
devalue its original intent and scope” (A/63/PV.97, p. 11). 
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Concerning pillar one, states have agreed that the 
responsibility to protect lies first and foremost with the states 
individually. Some states favoured a more proactive part for regional 
organisations320 in responding to cases of RtoP while others 
considered the general role of the international community in the 
implementation of RtoP as complementary. “Many Member States 
have spoken of the root causes of RtoP situations and highlighted the 
urgency of addressing development issues.”321 The importance of 
early warning322 has been emphasised, and prevention323 was 
considered to be the key element of the responsibility to protect. 
Moreover, the need for capacity building was raised as an issue 
requiring immediate attention.324 It was often highlighted that 
prevention must be prioritised over other methods in order to provide 
early and effective responses to cases of RtoP. 
                                                
320 Some of the Members States that pointed to this issue were Chile, South Africa, 
Vietnam and the UK. 
321 A/63/PV.101, p. 20. 
322 Mali, Slovakia, Sudan and Uruguay were among the States that made reference 
to this point. For instance, Sudan suggested that “[t]he way forward should be the 
establishment of an effective early warning mechanism, as articulated in the report 
of the Secretary-General, and not the usurpation of the doctrine of State 
sovereignty” (A/63/PV.101, p. 11). 
323 Algeria, Canada, Czech Republic, Ghana, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Uruguay 
were among the many states that considered prevention the key element of RtoP. 
For instance, Nigeria argued that “Emphasis should be placed on prevention rather 
than on intervention” (A/63/PV.98, p. 27). Bringing an additional element to 
prevention understanding, Chile suggested that “a prevention strategy could 
include the promotion of democracy” (A/63/PV.98, p. 11).  
324 Gambia, Jordan, Mali, Sudan and Uruguay were among those that raised the 
issue. 
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Most states in their statements considered the three pillars 
complementary.325 Regarding taking action under the third pillar, 
there was consensus that use of force should be a last resort326 
employed in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.327 In 
this regard, the understanding of a case-by-case implementation of 
the responsibility to protect328 (as suggested by the 2005 Outcome 
Document) was preferred by the majority of the Member States. 
Accordingly, the prevalent idea was that “any coercion has to be 
under the existing collective security provisions of the United Nations 
Charter, and only in cases of immediate threat to international peace 
and security.”329 
Many states of the developing world, especially those that have 
aligned themselves with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), expressed 
their concern that the concept is prone to abuse.330 As can be 
                                                
325 For instance, Austria noted that the three pillars are “of equal importance, and 
at the same time there is no automatism and no necessary sequencing between 
one and the other” (A/63/PV.98, p. 1). Liechtenstein indicated that the three 
pillars are integral parts (A/63/PV.97, p. 21). Moreover, Benin noted that “the 
three pillars constitute inseparable elements of a single body of law that is unique 
in itself” (A/63/PV.100, p. 24). 
326 Bangladesh, Chile, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, 
Panama, Russian Federation, Switzerland and Turkey were among the states that 
made a specific reference to use of force as a last resort. 
327 According to Brazil “[t]he responsibility to protect a population from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is first and foremost an 
obligation of the State. Only if and when a State manifestly fails to fulfil such 
obligation may the international community take collective action in accordance 
with the Charter. In other words, the third pillar is subsidiary to the first one and a 
truly exceptional course of action, a measure of last resort.” (A/63/PV.97, p. 13). 
328 Some of the states that indicated their position in this direction were Cameroon, 
India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg and Viet Nam. 
329 A/63/PV.101, p. 20. 
330 Egypt in its statement that it delivered on behalf of the NAM noted the 
“concerns about the possible abuse of RtoP by expanding its application to 
situations that fall beyond the four areas defined in the 2005 World Summit 
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inferred from the statements, the question of national interest 
remains for many states, especially for those of the non-Western 
world, as a concern.331 The President of the General Assembly 
reiterated such concern in his opening statement with the following 
words: 
The problem for many nations, I believe, is that our 
system of collective security is not yet sufficiently 
evolved to allow the doctrine of responsibility to protect 
(RtoP) to operate in the way its proponents intend, in 
view of the prevailing lack of trust in developing 
countries when it comes to the use of force for 
humanitarian reasons.332 […] It seems unlikely that it 
[/General Assembly] will be able to agree any time soon 
on definitions of just cause and right intentions.333 
In this vein, many small and/or developing states in their statements 
have pointed to the issues politicization of cases,334 selective 
implementation335 as well as double standards336 existent within the 
                                                                                                                                     
Outcome, and by misusing it to legitimize unilateral coercive measures or 
intervention in the internal affairs of States” (A/63/PV. 97, p. 5). China, Gambia, 
Israel, Serbia, Solomon Islands and Sudan were among states that indicated a 
concern about possible abuse/misuse of the concept. 
331 Benin, Ireland, South Africa and Sudan were among those that raised this 
point. Ireland indicated that “there is the question of the selective application of the 
responsibility to protect or its misuse with a view to furthering a State’s own 
strategic national interests. This is another issue on which we must stand firm. It 
should be stated clearly and unambiguously, as it is in the Secretary-General’s 
report, that the responsibility to protect does not lower the threshold for legitimate 
use of force” (A/63/PV.99, p. 3) 
332 The cynicism about the real motives of humanitarian intervention is not new. 
For instance, “in 1978, on the occasion of the French and Belgian military 
operation in Zaire, the Soviet official news agency TASS stated that ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ was merely ‘a fig leaf to cover up an undisguised interference in the 
internal affairs of Zaire’.” (Keesings’ Contemporary Archives (1978), at 29128 cited 
in Antonio Cassese. International Law. 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 368). 
333 A/63/PV.97, p. 3. 
334 China, Gambia, Qatar and Viet Nam were some of the states that made 
reference to this issue. 
335 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Sri Lanka were some of those that made reference to the presence of selective 
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UN, and urged for adopting measures to avoid these.337 The issue of 
the reform338 of the UN, especially the Security Council,339 as well as 
the use of the veto right by the Permanent Members have also been 
raised in line with these concerns.340 Finally, numerous states noted 
the lack of political will in the international community to react to 
cases of mass humanitarian atrocities.341 
                                                                                                                                     
application in the Security Council. Likewise, political scholar Mohammed Ayoob 
suggests that “the selectivity of human rights interventionism generates 
considerable cynicism in the post-colonial world, among populations to whom it 
appears that some humans’ rights are more worthy of protection than others’.” 
Wesley (2005): 65. 
336 Among the states that mentioned double standards within the UN come China, 
Cuba, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Palestine (observer), Qatar and Viet Nam. 
Likewise, in his closing speech the President noted: “In responding to massive 
failures by Governments to protect their populations, we should not fall back on 
double standards that would ultimately unravel the credibility of international law 
and of the United Nations itself” (A/63/PV.101, p. 20). 
337 On the issue of intervention, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela raised the 
following questions: “Which organ of the United Nations will determine when it is 
necessary to intervene? What are the parameters to be taken into account when 
classifying a situation as sufficiently urgent to require military intervention? Who 
will ensure that such intervention is not undertaken for political reasons? Will all 
192 States Members of this Organization enjoy the same right to participate and to 
determine whether situations are emergencies?” (A/63/PV. 99, p. 5). 
338 For instance, Inis Claude notes that the “crucial feature of the United Nations is 
not its Charter but its members. What the Charter purports to require of the 
organization is less significant than what its members require it to import: their 
biases, objectives, rivalries, and concerns” (Lillich in Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World 1974, 243). 
339 Shortcomings of the Security Council in taking effective action were considered 
among reasons for the reform of the UN. 
340 Some of the states that referred to the issue of restraining the use of the veto 
right were Lesotho, Malaysia, Rwanda, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, and Timor-
Leste. 
341 Among the states that mentioned this issue were Benin, Botswana, Croatia, 
Cuba, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Timor-Leste, and the US. For instance, Iran argued that “there is no 
illusion that tragic cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and outrageous acts 
of aggression have been left unanswered not because of a lack of empowering legal 
norms, but simply due to a lack of political will dictated by power politics —that is, 
political and strategic considerations— on the part of certain major Powers 
permanently seated in the Security Council” (A/63/PV.100, p. 11). Switzerland 
highlighted that “the problem is not usually the lack of information; rather, it is the 
absence of political will at the right time that is at the heart of our past failures” 
(A/63/PV. 98, p. 5). 
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Following preliminary meetings of July 2009, with document 
A/63/L.80/Rev.1 the General Assembly decided to continue its 
consideration of the responsibility to protect. Later on, in its 105th 
plenary meeting on 14 September 2009, it adopted a resolution on 
the responsibility to protect (A/RES/63/308) in which it recalls the 
two paragraphs of the Outcome Document. Accordingly, the General 
Assembly, 
1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and 
of the timely and productive debate organized by the 
President of the General Assembly on the responsibility 
to protect, held on 21, 23, 24 and 28 July 2009, with 
full participation by Member States; 
2. Decides to continue its consideration of the 
responsibility to protect. 
In this respect, it can be concluded that under the auspices of the 
General Assembly the international community continues its efforts 
to establish the framework for the implementation of RtoP in an 
effective manner while trying to improve the inner mechanisms of the 
Organisation. 
4.3. RtoP: A moral, legal, and/or political norm 
Initially perceived as a phenomenon imposed by Western 
countries (also given its endorsement by the Canadian Government), 
RtoP has often been approached suspiciously (or at best cautiously) 
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by numerous governments.342 After it was placed in the agenda of the 
General Assembly, certain modifications and/or limitations were 
imposed on the concept. Through such delimitation, an 
intersubjective meaning for RtoP was adopted within the UN 
framework, which is to become the standard in the implementations 
by the international community. 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document in terms of the 
acceptance of the RtoP notion by the Member States of the UN has 
constituted a milestone as it was adopted unanimously. This also 
became the tipping point343 for the evolution of an RtoP norm, and 
carried it to the second level of “norm cascade.” Since then, the 
socialisation process has been taking place through the efforts of the 
current Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the points that Ban Ki-
Moon has raised in his 2009 Report as well as the debates at the 
General Assembly that followed the report signal the problems on the 
                                                
342 For instance, the Chinese government “had opposed The Responsibility to Protect 
throughout the ICISS process and insisted that all questions relating to the use of 
force defer to the Security Council. In its position paper on UN reform, however, 
China accepted that “massive humanitarian” crises were ‘‘the legitimate concern of 
the international community.’’ While Russia supported the rhetoric of the 
responsibility to protect, it shared China’s belief that no action should be taken 
without Security Council approval […] and suggested that, by countenancing 
unauthorized intervention, the Responsibility to Protect risked undermining the 
Charter. […] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rejected the concept. India, for 
example, argued that the council was already sufficiently empowered to act in 
humanitarian emergencies and observed that the failure to act in the past was 
caused by a lack of political will, not a lack of authority. Speaking on behalf of the 
NAM, the Malaysian government argued that The Responsibility to Protect 
potentially represented a reincarnation of humanitarian intervention for which 
there was no basis in international law” (Alex J. Bellamy. “Whither the 
Responsibility to Protect. (Summer 2006): 151-2). 
343 In the case of RtoP as the members of the General Assembly unanimously 
accepted the norm, this can be considered as an acceptable number to meet the 
“tipping point criteria”. 
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way of the internalisation of RtoP by individual states and the 
international community as a whole.344  
Although RtoP as a norm in evolution can be seen as a part of 
de lege ferenda, at this phase of the “norm life cycle”, it is far from 
being established as a legal norm. The language adopted in this 
Document avoided any legal commitment on the part of the 
international community.345 For instance, “[a]t the negotiations on 
the World Summit Outcome Document, the then US Permanent 
Representative John Bolton stated accurately that the commitment 
made in the Document was ‘not of a legal character.’”346 In a similar 
                                                
344 Ban Ki-Moon noted that “if principles relating to the responsibility to protect 
are to take full effect and be sustainable, they must be integrated into each culture 
and society without hesitation or condition, as a reflection of not only global but 
also local values and standards” (Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium 
Summit: Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-
General, 12 January 2009, para. 20, p. 12). In this vein, political concerns rather 
than humanitarian ones have been at the core of the implementation debate. For 
instance, Wafula Okumu indicates that in 2006 a series of studies were conducted 
to answer the question “how to operationalise RtoP in Africa?” According to the 
study, participants indicated their fear that RtoP would turn into a Western 
imposition on Africa to interfere in the domestic affairs of states. Nevertheless, 
Okumu also notes that RtoP as a concept is not alien to Africa. The South African 
principle of ubundu, (which is essentially about humanity, caring about each other 
as human beings, helping other human beings when they need, and respecting 
human life), already exists in many African cultures. In this regard, although RtoP 
is not alien to Africa, Africans need to somehow Africanize it so as not to fear from 
it as a foreign concept or a Western imposition being tested on Africa. Since 
Africans were not much involved in the processes of the making of RtoP, and given 
the example of Iraq, the fear that the case of Darfur would become a test case for 
RtoP’s implementation seems to have played a role towards such perception. 
(Wafula Okumu, phone interview by author, November 03, 2008). 
345 Based on the framework of the Outcome Document, Coppieters, Ceulmans, and 
Hartle argue that “the concept of a ‘responsibility to protect’ […] does not amount 
to a legal norm that would legitimize unilateral intervention in domestic affairs by 
individual states or regional organizations, but refers on the contrary to the 
encouragement and support the international community has to give to states so 
that they exercise this responsibility” (Coppieters and Fotion (eds.) 2008, 48). 
346 Office of the President of the General Assembly. Concept note on responsibility 
to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
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vein, the representative of Singapore noted in the preliminary 
meeting of the General Assembly: “[f]or my delegation, it is clear that, 
four years ago, our leaders pledged their strong resolve to the notion 
of RtoP. Certainly, that did not make RtoP part of international law or 
a legally binding commitment.”347 
The debates in the General Assembly pursuant to the Report of 
the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect followed a similar trend. For example, the 
representative of the Netherlands argued that the ongoing discussion 
about the implementation of the responsibility to protect “is not a 
legal discussion, nor should it be.”348 Also concerned about possible 
abuse of the concept, states refrained from making any legal 
commitment. Numerous states pointed to the need of the 
embracement of the principle of non-indifference. In terms of taking 
precautions to avoid inaction, a fundamental proposition made was 
the reform of the UN, especially of the Security Council.  
It should be reminded that individual states’ behaviour (in 
terms of failure or unwillingness to protect their populations from 
mass atrocities or to take timely action for that matter) is subject to 
punishment by the international community and/or authorities like 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the penalisation of 
                                                                                                                                     
against humanity. Retrieved from www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/ 
protect/conceptnote.pdf (accessed October 21, 2009). 
347 A/63/PV.98, pp. 6-7. 
348 A/63/PV. 97, p. 26. 
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the individuals who have committed the atrocities. In this regard, it 
becomes possible to talk about a legal responsibility of the 
individuals on the part of the state.349 Nevertheless, inaction by the 
international community goes without a sanction. Legal scholar 
Hurst Hannum indicates that states purposefully avoid legal 
responsibility and the consideration or discussion of a possibility of 
sanctioning of inaction by the international community.350  
Both in the 2005 Outcome Document and the follow-up 
documents, states have refrained from turning the responsibility to 
protect into a legal obligation on the part of the international 
community as far as undertaking of collective action is concerned. 
Therefore, at this stage it is not possible to interpret this notion of 
“responsibility” as a legal one. Thus, the question that arises is 
whether RtoP is genuinely an obligation, (legal or moral), also for the 
international community or just a label? As indicated previously, the 
wording of Paragraph 139 hints at a flexible, not clear-cut 
interpretation of the word responsibility since there is the phrase 
“case-by-case”, which leaves room for inaction depending on the 
case. Such wording was reiterated in the Report of the Secretary-
General in 2009 as well as the statements of various Member States 
during the follow-up preliminary meetings. 
                                                
349 In the Rome Statute of the ICC, three of the four crimes that limit the scope of 
RtoP, namely genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, are defined in 
detail as these crimes are considered within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
350 Hurst Hannum, interview by the author, Boston, MA, March 06, 2009. 
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Thus, currently there is neither an existing legal mechanism 
nor an attempt to establish one to assure international community’s 
collective response at times when there is state failure to prevent or 
halt grave violations of human rights. Consequently, in general 
terms, it is not necessarily possible to talk about a well-established 
legal responsibility to protect at the international level. In the 
absence of strictly established criteria for implementing RtoP, the 
duty assumed by the international community stands out as a moral 
duty rather than a legal one.  
Alex J. Bellamy notes that  
[t]here is general consensus that RtoP is a norm, but 
much less agreement on what sort of norm it is. There 
are two elements to this particular problem. First, RtoP 
is not a single norm but a collection of shared 
expectations that have different qualities. On the one 
hand, RtoP involves expectations about how states 
relate to populations under their care. […] RtoP’s first 
pillar is therefore best understood as a reaffirmation 
and codification of already existing norms.351 
The test of whether pillars two and three are properly 
called norms is the extent to which there is a shared 
expectation that 1) governments and international 
organizations will exercise this responsibility, that 2) 
they recognize a duty and right to do so, and that 3) 
failure to act will attract criticism from the society of 
states. There is some evidence to support the view that 
such positive duties exist. […] Combined with 
international society’s commitment to RtoP, these legal 
developments have given rise to claims that a positive 
duty to prevent genocide and mass atrocities is 
emerging.”352 
                                                
351 Bellamy 2010: 160. 
352 Bellamy 2010: 161. 
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As the President of the General Assembly concluded in his closing 
statement, there is “need to ensure that all the elements353 are in 
place to make […RtoP] a viable and consistent legal norm.”354 
Likewise, Bellamy refers to the “problem of indeterminacy” as a factor 
which weakens the compliance-pull of norms.355 
In the current state of affairs, as Stahn puts forth, the 
“[r]esponsibility to protect is thus in many ways still a political 
catchword rather than a legal norm,”356 but with prominent moral 
implications and/or underpinnings. As the ICISS highlighted in its 
Report: 
The notion of responsibility itself entails fundamental 
moral reasoning and challenges determinist theories of 
human behaviour and international relations theory. 
The behaviour of states is not predetermined by 
systemic or structural factors, and moral considerations 
are not merely after-the-fact justifications or simply 
irrelevant.357 
Parallel to this observation, despite the fact that RtoP is not yet an 
international legal norm, it is possible to argue that RtoP has been 
internalised as a moral norm in international politics given the 
                                                
353 Although paragraphs 138 and 139 have limited the invocation of RtoP to the 
cases of four grave crimes, the issues of the right authority and how to determine 
what qualifies as an RtoP case remain unclear. As Finnemore and Sikkink note: 
“[t]hose stressing the form of the norm argue that norms that are clear and 
specific, rather than ambiguous and complex […] are more likely to be effective” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 907). This argument seems to hold in the case of 
RtoP, since states have asked during the 2009 General Assembly meetings for 
further clarification of the norm before fully implementing (and maybe legalizing) it. 
354 A/63/PV.101, p. 20. 
355 Bellamy 2010: 161. 
356 Stahn 2007: 120. 
357 Taking such a position about the role of responsibility also challenges 
postmodern views that deny the possibility of engaging in intelligible moral 
reasoning across cultures and across time (ICISS, 2001b, 129). 
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international and regional documents adopted by states as well as 
severe criticisms raised against inaction or late action by states 
and/or the international community in cases of humanitarian 
atrocities (such as those in Rwanda and Darfur). 
In the light of this, the acceptance of the necessity to avoid 
human suffering caused by man-made disasters and prioritisation of 
human rights through international recognition, at the current state 
of affairs, hint at the first admission of RtoP as a moral norm. Recent 
examples where states use language that value moral constraints can 
be found in the proceedings of the preliminary meetings on the 2009 
Report of the Secretary-General. For instance, the Netherlands notes: 
“Our task is to translate our moral commitment into political and 
operational readiness.”358 New Zealand talks about the “moral 
burden” of past cases, and considers it a responsibility of the 
international community alongside individual states.359 In its 
statement, Algeria notes that it “honours its moral obligation to 
protect populations threatened with genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity or ethnic cleansing in accordance with 
international law and the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.”360 
                                                
358 A/63/PV. 97, p. 26. 
359 A/63/PV.97, p. 24. 
360 A/63/PV.98, p. 6. 
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Chile argues that this “is a political debate with moral 
underpinnings,”361 and that the issue of morality should be 
reintroduced into the debate, since “the challenge of humanitarian 
protection is a global one.”362 In a similar vein, Israel talks about the 
moral imperative of non-indifference.363 Moreover, Romania asserts 
that “[b]esides legal and political considerations, the responsibility of 
the international community ultimately arises from the moral 
principle of humanity, which calls for action instead of indifference 
when fellow human beings are subjected to the most horrendous 
crimes.”364 Likewise, Kazakhstan believes that “protecting 
populations from grave human rights violations […] is a moral 
imperative,” and posits that the principle of non-indifference should 
be embraced.365 In an affirming manner, Holy See indicates that 
“[t]he international community has a moral responsibility to fulfil its 
various commitments.”366 
Norway argues that the UN is vested with “the moral authority” 
to act in cases of RtoP,367 and Jordan notes that Paragraphs 138 and 
139 “form a firm political and moral foundation for” RtoP to be 
implemented through the UN.368 In this vein, Hungary points that 
                                                
361 A/63/PV.98, p. 10. 
362 A/63/PV.98, p. 12. 
363 A/63/PV.98, p. 15. 
364 A/63/PV.99, p. 10. 
365 A/63/PV.100, p. 19. 
366 A/63/PV.101, p. 17. 
367 A/63/PV.99, p. 7. 
368 A/63/PV.99, p. 16. 
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when an individual state fails to fulfil its responsibility “the 
international community has the moral obligation to give a timely 
and decisive response.”369 
In the light of these statements, it can be argued that there is 
an understanding by the Member States of a moral responsibility to 
act in cases of RtoP. Yet, there is also the fact that the international 
community is not always highly efficient in or willing for taking 
action in such cases. This technically leaves room for the possibility 
of unilateral action by states that assume (or claim to assume) a 
moral responsibility not to remain silent.  
Thus, a related question is whether unilateral interventions are 
acceptable or not on the basis of the international documents 
adopted since 2005. Alicia L. Bannon argues that 
“[t]he Summit agreement strengthens the justification 
for unilateral action in two main ways. First, the 
agreement affirms important limits on national 
sovereignty by recognizing a state’s responsibility to 
protect its own citizens. Second, the agreement sets 
clear responsibilities for the international community 
when a country fails to protect its own citizens. In cases 
of U.N. inaction, would-be unilateral actors can point to 
an explicit failure to fulfil a duty.370 However, the 
agreement only supports unilateral action in a narrow 
set of circumstances. First, the agreement is limited to a 
small set of extreme human rights abuses. Second, the 
agreement implies a hierarchy of actors and of 
                                                
369 A/63/PV.99, p. 24. 
370 In counterpoint to Bannon Bellamy notes that “[w]hile the ICISS was right to be 
concerned about reducing the danger that states might abuse humanitarian 
justifications to legitimate unjust wars, it evidently should have paid more 
attention to the danger that responsibility to protect language could itself be 
abused by states keen to avoid assuming any responsibility for saving some of the 
world’s most vulnerable people” (Bellamy 2005, 53). 
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interventions: Good faith U.N. action is privileged over 
unilateralism and peaceful action is privileged over 
violent means. Finally, the agreement limits the scope of 
intervention to the goal of protection.”371 
Although it is true that the Outcome Document restrains state 
sovereignty, it does not necessarily clearly, or for that matter strictly, 
define the responsibility of the international community. Paragraph 
139 talks about preparedness to act as well as assuming a 
responsibility to protect on a case-by-case basis, which can be seen 
as an outcome of a general practice to achieve equity and to avoid 
arbitrary decisions.372 As indicated previously, Member States of the 
UN had opted for a flexible understanding of RtoP regarding action by 
the international community while they held states individually 
responsible for the protection of their populations under all 
circumstances and at all times. The case-by-case consideration of 
developments/events will always give the international community a 
leeway in which it can avoid responsibility for inaction. In this 
regard, the international community’s responsibility cannot be 
considered a legal one. As also Bannon indicates in the second half of 
the paragraph,373 the UN action is more about good faith or good will, 
especially under the given (political) circumstances. The Summit 
                                                
371 Alicia L. Bannon. “The Responsibility To Protect: The U.N. World Summit and 
the Question of Unilateralism.” The Yale Law Journal 115 (2006): 1158. 
372 In other words, just interventions are determined according to the 
characteristics of each specific case. 
373 Bannon first talks about the duty of the UN, and then calls it an act of good-
faith. This is a contradictory way of picturing the situation since the former refers 
to a clear obligation whereas the latter is a moral choice. 
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Outcome surely invokes an understanding of moral responsibility 
both for states individually and the international community as a 
whole. Nevertheless, from a legal point of view it does not strengthen 
the justification for unilateral intervention. Neither Paragraph 138 
nor 139 mention a possible acceptance of unilateral action in the 
case of a failure of the UN to act. Cooperation with regional 
organisations is considered as a viable option but there is no 
implication in the paragraph to take that unilateral action is to be 
condoned under any circumstance. 
As Bannon talks about the case where the UN fails to fulfil its 
duty, this also means that a Security Council authorisation of the 
concerned intervention is out of question. Without such 
authorisation, the legitimacy of an intervention whether unilateral or 
multilateral, let alone the legality of the act, is always subject to 
challenge. In this regard, although it can be considered as a call for 
the international community not to remain indifferent to specific 
cases of mass humanitarian atrocities, the Summit Outcome 
Document does not contain any explicit or implicit statement to lead 
to a belief that the Document “strengthens the justification for 
unilateral action.” 
Likewise, states’ individual interpretations of the UN 
documents demonstrate a picture that not only counter Bannon’s 
argument but also indicate a concern about such interpretations of 
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the concept of RtoP. As can be inferred from the General Assembly 
debates of July 2009, the majority of states are against the idea of 
unilateral (humanitarian) interventions. As indicated in the previous 
section, there is a concern that the concept of RtoP might be abused 
to justify arbitrary conducts of individual states. For instance, Egypt 
on behalf of the NAM indicated a concern about a potential misuse of 
the RtoP context to legitimise unilateral action.374 Affirmatively, India 
urged that RtoP should not serve as a pretext for humanitarian 
intervention or unilateral action.375 China and Mexico indicated their 
explicit opposition against any unilateral action (no matter what the 
immediacy of the case is).376 Finally, Costa Rica and Denmark 
underlined that RtoP is “far from authorising unilateral 
interventions.”377 This is also true for the UN Charter, since it does 
not recognise states the right to act unilaterally.378 Such approach is 
necessary to avoid arbitrary actions of states. 
With regard to responding to cases of RtoP past the stage of 
prevention, i.e. when action under the third pillar is called for, there 
are varying opinions where some states are more inclined towards 
embracing the measures of this pillar whereas others are much more 
                                                
374 A/63/PV.97, p. 5. 
375 A/63/PV.99, p. 25. 
376 A/63/PV.98, p. 23, and A/63/PV.99, p. 19. 
377 A/63/PV.97, p. 24. 
378 The exceptions are self-defence and self-determination. 
  146 
cautious.379 An example of a positive approach is that of Timor-Leste 
where its representative notes: “we feel we have a moral obligation to 
accept the third pillar. […] The Security Council has a moral and 
legal responsibility to give special attention to unfolding genocide and 
other high-visibility crimes relating to RtoP.”380 France considers the 
third pillar as the one that “gives the concept its full meaning.”381 
Bosnia Herzegovina in its statement argues that  
when it is evident that diplomatic efforts have failed and 
that States or non-State actors are committing or are 
about to commit crimes related to the responsibility to 
protect, collective international military assistance, as 
proposed by the Secretary-General in his report, may be 
the surest way to support States in meeting their 
obligations relating to the responsibility to protect.382 
Similarly, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia notes that in 
case of a failure to prevent, “the international community should 
ensure an early and flexible response, not through graduated 
measures, but through collective action to be taken by the Security 
Council in accordance with Chapter VII.”383 Japan talks about taking 
collective forceful action when necessary under the framework of 
                                                
379 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela considers the third pillar as “a challenge to the 
basic principles of international law, such as the territorial integrity of States, non-
interference in internal affairs and, of course the indivisible sovereignty of States” 
(PV.99, p. 5). Pakistan considers pillar three as a reappearance of the right to 
intervene “with a much larger spectre” (A/63/PV.98, p. 4). Brazil states that “the 
third pillar is subsidiary to the first one and a truly exceptional course of action, a 
measure of last resort” (PV.97, p. 13). Likewise Switzerland argues that measures 
of the third pillar should be the last resort (PV.98, p. 5). Germany notes that third 
pillar comes to question when prevention fails, and thus is only of complementary 
nature (PV.99, p. 7).  
380 A/63/PV.99, p. 24. 
381 A/63/PV.97, p. 10. 
382 A/63/PV.97, p. 16. 
383 A/63/PV.100, p. 8. 
  147 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.384 Ireland suggests to “approach, with 
similar imagination and openness, the third pillar,”385 including 
“peace enforcement measures under Chapter VII” by the UN in 
accordance with its Charter.386 
Nevertheless, in connection with the notion of humanitarian 
intervention, the increasing concern about grave violations of human 
rights and the embracement of the responsibility to protect as a 
moral duty do not necessarily mean that states have become more 
sympathetic towards the idea of humanitarian interventions in 
general. On the contrary, during the preliminary meetings of July 
2009 numerous states indicated their negative opinion towards 
humanitarian intervention. For instance, Cuba reaffirmed “that 
international humanitarian law does not provide for the right of 
humanitarian intervention as an exception to the principle of non-
use of force.”387 Moreover, Iran argued that international RtoP 
response “by no means whatsoever may imply permission to use of 
force against another State under any pretext, such as humanitarian 
intervention.”388 
                                                
384 A/63/PV.98, p. 22. 
385 Sierra Leone believes that concerns related to the third pillar can be overcome 
“by putting proper guidance and modalities in place, buttressed by the institutional 
reform of the United Nations advocated by our world leaders in 2005” 
(A/63/PV.100, p. 6). Additionally, Uruguay argues that in cases where use of force 
is a measure to be applied, “the General Assembly should not be underestimated or 
marginalized in the debate on the development of this pillar” (A/63/PV.98, p. 18). 
386 A/63/PV.99, p. 2. 
387 A/63/PV. 99, p. 22. 
388 A/63/PV. 100, p. 10. 
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When RtoP was first introduced by the ICISS, the Commission 
indicated in the Foreword that their “report is about the so-called 
‘right of humanitarian intervention’: the question of when, if ever, it 
is appropriate for states to take coercive –and in particular military– 
action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at 
risk in that other state.”389 This opening statement is quite 
misleading in terms of fully setting the scope of the Report. 
Unsurprisingly, it has led to concerns on the part of certain Member 
States of the UN, which were also spoken out in the later follow-up 
debates in the General Assembly. For instance, Morocco and 
Switzerland in their statements asked for a clear distinction between 
RtoP and the right to humanitarian intervention.390 Panama noted 
that “[t]he concepts of the responsibility to protect and humanitarian 
intervention are so dissimilar that they must not be confused.”391 
Similarly, Republic of Korea distinguished RtoP from unilateral 
humanitarian interventions.392 China underlined that “[n]o state 
should expand the concept or interpret it in an arbitrary manner. It 
is imperative to avoid abuse of the concept and to prevent it from 
becoming a kind of humanitarian intervention.”393 Australia 
considered humanitarian intervention discredited394 while Sudan 
                                                
389 ICISS, 2001a, vii. 
390 A/63/PV.98, 13 and A/63/PV.98, p. 4. 
391 A/63/PV.100, p. 17. 
392 A/63/PV.100, p. 19. 
393 A/63/PV.98, p. 23. 
394 A/63/PV.97, p. 20. 
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sceptically considered RtoP and humanitarian intervention to be “two 
sides of the same coin.”395  
All the similar points that have been raised during the 
meetings hint at the lack of clarity about the concept and the extent 
to which it is connected to the act and/or notion of humanitarian 
intervention.396 Therefore, clarifications are required to be able to 
establish RtoP as a solid norm under the auspices of the UN. At 
present, it may be approached suspiciously by many and not 
prioritised, but humanitarian intervention is still a part of the notion 
of RtoP under the framework of pillar three.  
All in all, although the acceptance of the RtoP with the 
Outcome Document can be interpreted as a positive sign in the 
assumption of a moral duty, this does not prove that RtoP is 
internalised as an international norm. In this vein, it is not only the 
acceptance of the RtoP norm by the international community, but 
also its implementation that is required for the completion of a 
norm’s life cycle. 
 
                                                
395 A/63/PV.101, p. 11. 
396 Leaving aside full-fledged humanitarian interventions, there is consensus in the 
General Assembly that coercive measures ought to be avoided. If it is necessary or 
unavoidable to take such measures, this has to be only as a last resort. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DRIVES FOR UNDERTAKING INTERVENTION 
Otte notes that “it is one of the ironies of international studies 
that while interventions are frequently recurring phenomena and 
possibly even a ‘built-in feature of the international system’, 
international theorists have not succeeded to solve the ‘intervention 
puzzle.’”397 This failure can be due to the complex nature of the 
concept as well as the number of interacting factors involved in the 
realisation of the act of intervention. As Urs Schwarz describes, 
“intervention is a ‘twilight area’ where the four constitutive elements 
of the international system (i.e. power, self-interest, international law 
and morality –or rather the lack of it) meet.”398 Such a combination of 
elements leaves theorists with an intertwined structure to deal with. 
Within such structure, international law and the principles of 
morality are to provide the organising principles for action by states 
and the international community, albeit in practice it seems that 
political factors play a much more influential role in determining the 
general picture of interstate and/or international relations. In an 
affirming manner, Stephen A. Garrett points that humanitarian 
intervention is innately political in essence since it takes place or is 
invoked due to deliberate acts of a given political authority, or as “it 
                                                
397 Thomas G. Otte in Dorman and Otte 1995, 3. 
398 Quoted in Dorman and Otte 1995, 3. 
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results from the absence of any such authority that can provide 
minimal protection for a community of people and in particular 
ensure that basic standards of civilized treatment are afforded to 
them.”399 From a practitioner’s point of view, as a US state official, 
Margaret J. McKelvey argues that humanitarian intervention is 
mainly about self-interest maybe dressed with ethics.400 Legal 
Advisor of Italy to the UN and also a legal scholar Giuseppe Nesi 
notes that though may states intervene based on ethical 
considerations, humanitarian intervention is generally all about 
power politics.401 Another legal scholar, Hurst Hannum, agrees that 
the key driving force is self-interest, and adds that the larger problem 
is focusing too much on the moral component; he says: “intervening 
for the sake of intervening due to moral concerns is not the 
answer.”402 Area specialist Lawrence Woocher refers to a combination 
of factors, (such as material interests, which he considers to increase 
the chance of humanitarian intervention; the estimation of the 
ability; bearable costs; and national interests other than core/vital 
ones).403 Thomas Weiss comments that ethical concerns are helpful 
in pushing a reluctant set of decision-makers to take action, but they 
                                                
399 Stephen A. Garrett. Doing Good and Doing Well: an examination of 
humanitarian intervention. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 3. 
400 Margaret J. McKelvey, interview by author, Washington D.C., October 17, 2008.  
401 Giuseppe Nesi, interview by author, New York, NY, November 06, 2008. 
402 He also comments: “If we really care about everyone in the world equally, we 
should also be focusing more on health, education, etc.” (Hurst Hannum, interview 
by author, Boston, MA, March 06, 2009). 
403 Lawrence Woocher, interview by author, Washington D.C., October 17, 2008. 
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are not enough on their own. It is rather the calculations of interests 
that play a more prominent role. He also suggests that “the moral 
impulse” is not imperative; what also leads to action is the visceral 
impulse where there is the idea that one can make a change.404 
In general terms, although there seems to be a tendency to 
single out national interest as the factor leading to humanitarian 
interventions, there are different factors and values as well as 
interrelationships to take into account in order to conduct an 
inclusive analysis of the practice of humanitarian intervention. 
Within the UN Charter, Lori F. Damrosch detects two groups of 
values, namely system and human rights values, which “intersect 
with each other and […] may sometimes work at cross-purposes.”405 
In differentiating these two clusters of values, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse identify four gradations in the international society 
spectrum ranging from the international anarchy of realists to the 
international society of pluralists to the international society of 
solidarists, and finally to the world community of universalists. 
Within such categorization, the international community is located in 
between the final two.406 On the basis of such spectrum, this chapter 
looks at the factors that lead the international community and/or 
states to undertake humanitarian interventions under the four main 
                                                
404 Thomas Weiss, interview by author, New York, NY, November 07, 2008. 
405 Quoted in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Humanitarian Intervention 
in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996), 57. 
406 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996, 223. 
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headings of human security, international norms, moral 
considerations, and national interests. 
 
 
Figure 2. Factors leading to humanitarian interventions 
 
As can be observed in Figure 2, this research approaches the 
key drives influential in the decision to undertake humanitarian 
interventions from three main aspects, which are depicted to be in 
interaction with each other. Human security, which is placed at the 
intersection of the three sets, is considered to be at the heart of the 
drives for humanitarian intervention and RtoP, whereas abidance to 
international norms is not considered to be in the common 
intersection because sometimes acts based on moral drives may 
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constitute a breach of international norms/laws just as in the case of 
humanitarian interventions which (as laid out in Chapter 2) most 
often constitute a breach of legal principles like non-use of force and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In line with its 
general constructivist approach, throughout the dissertation the 
notion of national interest will be interpreted in an inclusive manner 
than a mere calculation of economic, military and/or geopolitical407 
elements (as posited in section 2.4). The acceptance of the realist 
argument that states pursue their national interests will not be 
interpreted in a way to posit that such understanding annuls the 
moral drives of an action. It will be taken that interests and moral 
concerns can co-exist in the same realm, at the same time. 
5.1. Human Security 
The notion of human security lies at the core of the doctrines of 
humanitarian intervention and RtoP, as the genuine purpose of an 
intervention ought to be securing human lives. Thomas and Tow 
argue that “traditional interpretations of security cannot fully meet 
the international security community’s present needs” since, in the 
contemporary international structure, states’ internal activities are 
highly connected to the security constraints of the international 
                                                
407 Geopolitical approach can be seen as one that is top-down, statist, military-
backed (Kaldor 2008, 14). 
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society.408 In this respect, they suggest that a “human security 
approach to transnational security problems offers an alternative 
analytical framework.”409 Such approach brings human rights and 
human development together, and focuses on the security of 
individuals instead of states’ security.410 This reflects a 
transformation in the international community’s approach to security 
understanding and provides a rationale for undertaking 
humanitarian interventions. 
It is important to clarify what is meant by the term human 
security. The people-centred, universal concept of human security 
was taken up in UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Human 
Development Report. The Report while defining the concept generally 
as “freedom from fear and want”411 enumerates seven types of 
security —specifically economic, food, health, environmental, 
personal, community and political— as central interdependent 
components of the concept of human security.412 The Report posits: 
“development must be focused on people (even though grouped by 
country) rather than the security of their national boundaries, and 
on advancing health, education, and political freedom in addition to 
                                                
408 Nicholas Thomas, and William T. Tow. “The Utility of Human Security: 
Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention” Security Dialogue 33(2) (2002): 189-
190. 
409 Thomas and Tow 2002: 190. 
410 Mary Kaldor. Human Security: reflections on globalization and intervention. 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 182. 
411 King and Murray 2001-02: 585. 
412 Kaldor 2008, 182. 
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economic well-being.”413 Parallel to this understanding, Inge Kaul 
identifies two prominent features for the concept of human security: 
human survival and sustainability. The former means that 
individuals are capable of ensuring “their own basic livelihood and 
hence their security” and the latter means that “people should be 
protected against an undue degree of unpredictability and radical 
change in their living conditions.”414 
More recently, the Commission on Human Security defined 
human security as the protection of 
the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance 
human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human 
security means protecting fundamental freedoms—
freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting 
people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) 
threats and situations. It means using processes that 
build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means 
creating political, social, environmental, economic, 
military and cultural systems that together give people 
the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.415 
Human security, as defined, raises questions about the limits to 
national sovereignty in cases where the state itself is either incapable 
or unwilling to protect its people(s)/citizens.416 Therefore, what is 
                                                
413 King and Murray 2001-02: 587. “Another seminal document, prepared by the 
UN Commission on Global Governance the following year (1995), argued that 
recent episodes of humanitarian intervention in the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere 
by collective security entities (i.e. NATO and the UN) necessitated a widening of the 
security concept to recognize the ‘unrelenting human costs of violent conflicts’ 
within boundaries” (Thomas and Tow (2002): 178). 
414 Inge Kaul. “Peace Needs No Weapons: From Military Security To Human 
Security” The Ecumenical Review 47(3) (1995): 315. 
415 Commission on Human Security. Human Security Now (New York: 2003), 4. 
416 “This approach imposes constraints on state sovereignty through the 
mobilization of international civil society to safeguard international norms ‘and the 
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claimed to be complementary to national security also becomes a 
challenge to state sovereignty in instances of massive breaches of 
human security where there arises the necessity for outside 
intervention417 to stop the atrocities. 
It is also argued that human security rather than abolishing 
conceptions of state-based security complements the narrow 
interpretation in a way to make it more comprehensive. The 
Commission on Human Security lists the complementary aspects as 
follows: (1) the individual and the community are the main concerns 
but not the state; (2) threats against human security, which 
traditionally were not taken into consideration as a part of state 
security, are now also classified as threats; (3) states are no longer 
the only actors, but rather there is a multiplicity of actors; (4) 
“[a]chieving human security includes not just protecting people but 
also empowering people to fend for themselves.”418 These four aspects 
are fundamental to the discussion in this dissertation in terms of 
                                                                                                                                     
sharing of power between state and non-state actors in a globalising world’” 
(Thomas and Tow 2002: 178). 
417 Within the confines of human security, Mary Kaldor identifies the aim of an 
intervention as to prevent the reoccurrence of mass violation of human rights (as in 
Srebrenica and Rwanda). She takes that the “primacy of human rights also implies 
that those who commit gross human rights violations are treated as individual 
criminals rather than collective enemies.” Moreover, Kaldor identifies the main 
objective of the military forces as not to gain a victory over an enemy but to protect 
the populations that are suffering from the mass violation of human rights (Kaldor 
2008, 186). She first argues that the global character of the human security 
approach requires its practice “through multilateral action” (Kaldor 2008, 188). 
Secondly, such “approach would aim both to stabilize conflicts and to address the 
sources of insecurity” (Kaldor 2008, 191). Finally, a “human security approach 
implies more not less assistance for development, since human development is a 
key component of human security” (Kaldor 2008, 193). 
418 Commission on Human Security 2003, 4. 
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understanding the notion of RtoP and the impact of its 
implementation on the humanitarian intervention doctrine. 
Given its idealistic as well as controversial aspects, three 
states, namely Canada, Norway and Japan, have been the pioneers 
in terms of implementing a human security approach within their 
foreign policies.419 Nevertheless, their interpretations of the concept 
vary. For instance, on the one hand 
Canada defines human security as “safety for people 
from both violent and non-violent threats,” a more 
conservative and narrower focus than the UNDP 
version. According to Canada's Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, human security does 
not re-place national security. Rather, state security 
and human security are mutually supportive. According 
to this limited definition, human security is freedom 
from fear, and human development is freedom from 
want.420 
One the other hand, Japan has adopted a more comprehensive 
approach according to which human security comprises of all sorts of 
                                                
419 As Mary Kaldor observes, “the concept of human security seems to have 
developed in two directions. One was the approach taken by the Canadian 
government, which adopted the concept and established a network of like-minded 
states who subscribe to the concept. Their version is reflected in the Human 
Security Report, published in 2005, and has some affinity to the notion of ‘the 
responsibility to protect’. They emphasize the security of the individual as opposed 
to the state, but their primary emphasis is on security in the face of political 
violence. The other approach was the UNDP approach, also reflected in the work of 
the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the 
Secretary General’s response, In Larger Freedom. This approach emphasized the 
interrelatedness of different types of security and the importance of development, 
in particular, as a security strategy” (Kaldor 2008, 182-3). 
420 “Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Thailand, and Norway have also promoted a more limited human 
security agenda. These countries focus on antipersonnel landmines, small arms, 
children in armed conflict, and international humanitarian and human rights law” 
(King and Murray 2001-2002: 590). 
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threats to “human survival, daily life and dignity421 […,] and 
strengthens efforts to confront these threats.”422 
 Although with nuances or visible differences as to why some 
states have been more eager or active to adopt the concept, theorists 
put forth different explanations. Among these comes an interest-
based approach towards the promotion of human security, which can 
be located within the neorealist tradition. According to this 
perspective “norms or ideas are understood as mere ideology: they 
mask, sustain or advance the power-oriented interests of states. The 
Norwegian-Canadian support for ‘human security’ can to some extent 
be explained in this perspective.”423 Astri Suhrke observes that in 
1999 Canada made use of the concept of human security to assert 
“itself as a progressive middle power” like when it placed human 
security as a matter “on the agenda in the form of a general 
discussion about transgressions against civilians during violent 
conflict” using its Security Council Presidency at the time as an 
opportunity.424 Suhrke likewise argues that for the isolated Norway of 
the 1990s the concept was likely to serve as a means of achieving a 
                                                
421 Some examples are “environmental degradation, violations of human rights, 
transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel 
landmines and other infectious diseases such as AIDS” (King and Murray 2001-
2002: 590). 
422 King and Murray 2001-2002: 590. 
423 Astri Suhrke. “Human Security and the Interests of States” Security Dialogue 30 
(3) (1999): 265. 
424 Suhrke 1999: 266. 
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“humanitarian large power status,”425 which could be realised 
through the establishment of “a global coalition of states on human 
security issues.”426 Therefore, it can be argued that for Canada and 
Norway their promotion of the human security approach seemed as a 
viable way for enhancing their international status and say so in the 
arena.427 
Although it puts forth reasonable explications for Canada’s and 
Norway’s choices, an interest-based approach provides a limited or 
partial explanation for state behaviour since it underestimates the 
power of norms and ideas as well as failing to explain the success of 
certain ideas in becoming a part of the international system whereas 
others cease to exist or remain insignificant.428 Moreover, it 
disregards the notion of mutual construction, as proposed by 
constructivist scholars, where interests and ideas can reciprocally 
affect each other in the course of time. 
Alternatively, Suhrke proposes “a combined interest-and-
institutional perspective” to be able analyse the power of ideas within 
their historical contexts. She finds that at the close of the twentieth 
century “humanitarian ideas have become a principal normative 
reference for states and organizations to clarify their international 
                                                
425 “The term was frequently used in the early 1990s by Jan Egeland, Deputy 
Foreign Minister in the Labour government” (Suhrke 1999: 275). 
426 Suhrke 1999: 267. 
427 Suhrke 1999: 267. 
428 Suhrke 1999: 267. 
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obligations, or against which to hold others responsible.”429 Thomas 
and Tow argue that this trend of “embedded430 humanitarianism” led 
to attempts to further clarify the concept of human security as well 
as necessitating states to guarantee their peoples’ security as much 
as possible. Accordingly, it came to the point that the responsibility 
to guarantee “compliance with humanitarian norms” was also borne 
with the international actors other than individual states.431 Such an 
approach is clearly reflected in the report of the ICISS on the 
responsibility to protect.  
Finally, for the purpose of “strengthening the international 
humanitarian regime to protect victims of conflict” Suhrke suggests 
three essentials, which are “developing norms; strengthening 
institutions (national and international); and operationalizing and 
implementing strategies.”432 When evaluated within this framework, 
it can be argued that following the new approaches emerging in the 
academia, the international community has seriously been putting 
an effort to strengthen the humanitarian regime previously 
established within/by the UN. The adoption of the RtoP under the 
auspices of the UN with the 2005 Outcome Document, the 
establishment of institutions such as the International Criminal 
                                                
429 Suhrke 1999: 268. 
430 The “term ‘embedded’ suggests that the norms are diffuse, often permitting non-
articulated compromises, yet generally understood in a consensual way and 
invested with much legitimacy. The idea of ‘human security’ has been extracted 
from this embedded stock of ideas” (Suhrke 1999: 269). 
431 Thomas and Tow 2002: 180. 
432 Suhrke 1999: 273. 
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Court, and the continuing efforts within the General Assembly for 
enabling timely and decisive implementation of RtoP as well as efforts 
to improve the early warning capabilities are just some of the 
examples. All in all, it can be asserted that the human security 
approach has found a place in the mentality of the international 
community. 
5.2. International Norms 
There can be no mutually comprehensible conduct of 
international relations, constructivists hold, without 
mutually recognized constitutive rules resting on 
collective intentionality. These rules may be more or less 
‘‘thick’’ or ‘‘thin,’’ depending on the issue area or the 
international grouping at hand. Similarly, they may be 
constitutive of conflict or cooperation. But in any event, 
these constitutive rules prestructure the domains of 
action within which regulative rules take effect.433 
International norms, in this regard, serve as organising principles for 
the international community of states, and in general terms they can 
be defined “as those expectations of appropriate behaviour which are 
shared within international society or within a particular subsystem 
of international society by states, its constituent entities.”434 Thus, 
(principles and provisions of international law, that is to say) legal 
norms as well as ethical principles are considered as a part of this 
                                                
433 John Gerard Ruggie. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge” International Organization 52(4) (Autumn 
1998): 879. 
434 Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner. “Norms and Foreign 
Policy: Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory” Center for International 
Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies, 34A (1999): 14. 
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whole. In this vein, this section overviews international norms by 
starting from specific (that is, a general consideration of international 
legal norms with relevance to humanitarian intervention doctrine) 
and moving on to the general notion of norms from a theoretical 
point of view. It should be noted that humanitarian intervention itself 
is not analysed as a norm under this section. 
International legal norms are fundamental to the discussions 
in this dissertation in the sense that the humanitarian intervention 
doctrine and the evolving norm of RtoP are not only abundantly 
interconnected with but also restrained by fundamental principles of 
international law.435 Humanitarian intervention becomes legally 
problematic in the absence of authorisation of the action by the UN 
Security Council. Therefore, the first part of this section considers 
international legal norms as a drive for states to undertake unilateral 
or multilateral humanitarian interventions without Security Council 
authorisation. 
In their choice to undertake humanitarian interventions 
decision-makers may be influenced positively or negatively by 
fundamental principles and understandings of international law. On 
the one hand, there are human rights norms436 that urge states to 
                                                
435 As specific fundamental principles of international law were studied in section 
2.3., repetitive references will be avoided in this Chapter, and accordingly the 
analysis will be kept limited to theoretical divisions in international law regarding 
questions of legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. 
436 In the context of this dissertation, human rights are considered from a legal 
point of view, and thus, as a part of international legal norms rather than mere 
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take action, and on the other hand there is the issue of legitimacy, 
which may lead an individual state or a coalition of states to a 
reluctance to intervene.437 Simon Duke identifies three broad 
approaches to the debate on the legitimacy and/or legality question 
within the international law literature: (1) the restrictionist tradition, 
(2) the natural law tradition, and (3) the international community 
approach, which can be grouped more generally into two as 
restrictionist438 and counter-restrictionist439 approaches. Within this 
classification, the restrictionists fall into the group that considers 
humanitarian intervention as “a violation of the territorial integrity 
and political independence of the state.”440 Scholars of natural law 
tradition, on the other hand, leave room for the legitimacy and/or 
legality of a forceful humanitarian action on the basis of the basic 
principles laid down in the UN Charter with regard to the protection 
                                                                                                                                     
ethical values and/or principles since these are rights established by international 
conventions and/or declarations (such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the 1966 Twin Covenants, and the 1953 European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), and protected also 
within the UN system. 
437 The issue of the legality of humanitarian interventions is discussed in depth in 
Chapter 3: Legal Framework. 
438 For examples of restrictionist arguments, see Ian Brownlie. “Humanitarian 
Intervention” in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, John Norton Moore (ed.) 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 217-51; see Michael 
Akehurst. “Humanitarian Intervention” in Intervention in World Politics, Hedley Bull 
(ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 95-118; see Ulrich Beyerlin. “Humanitarian 
Intervention” in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), 
vol. 3 (New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1982), 212. 
439 For examples of counter-restrictionist arguments, see Richard B. Lillich. 
“Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and Plea for Constructive 
Alternatives” in Law and Civil War in the Modern World. John Norton Moore (ed.). 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 229-251; see Edwin M. 
Bouchard. The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (New York: The Banks Law 
Publishing Co., 1922); see Hersch Lauterpacht. International Law and Human 
Rights (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1950). 
440 Duke 1994: 33. 
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of human rights. In contrast with the restrictionist considerations, 
“armed humanitarian intervention is not just permissible under 
customary international law, but part of the duty of states to promote 
and uphold fundamental human rights.”441 In a similar manner, also 
scholars of the international community approach leave room for the 
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions and place an emphasis on 
the collective conduct of the act, which in their view “expresses the 
will of the international community.”442 Lori Fisler Damrosch 
observes that 
[i]nstead of the view that interventions in internal 
conflicts must be presumptively illegitimate, the 
prevailing trend today is to take seriously the claim that 
international community ought to intercede to prevent 
bloodshed with whatever means are available.443 
As can be inferred from these varying points of view and as 
revealed in the historical overview, legitimacy and/or legality remains 
a concern as well as a constraint for states in their decision to 
undertake a humanitarian intervention in the absence of a Security 
Council authorisation444 to take action. Nevertheless, this does not 
                                                
441 Duke 1994: 35. 
442 Duke 1994: 33. 
443 She further posits that “arguments now focus not on condemning or justifying 
intervention in principle, but rather on how best to solve practical problems of 
mobilizing collective efforts to mitigate internal violence” (Abiew 1998, 223). As will 
be revealed in Chapter 4, such an attitude is valid for the debates on RtoP but as 
far as humanitarian intervention is concerned, a vast number of both theorists and 
state representatives seem to be much more sceptical. 
444 In the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95), Somalia (1992-93), Rwanda 
(1994-96), Haiti (1994-97), Kosovo (1998-99), and East Timor (1999) the UN 
Security Council authorized action under Chapter VII and possible use of force. For 
instance, concerning the case of Somalia, Resolution 794 (3 December 1992) 
“authorized the Secretary-General and UN member states, acting under Chapter 
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necessarily lead to inaction all the time. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
there are examples445 of state action, whether unilateral or 
multilateral, where states intervened on the basis of human rights 
norms, but without Security Council authorisation. Nonetheless, the 
constraining impact of legality/legitimacy considerations of states on 
decision-making can be interpreted as a positive indicator of the 
mutually constructive relationship between the actors and the norms 
they have created.  
Regarding the potential positive drives for undertaking 
humanitarian interventions, for internationalists and cosmopolitans 
(of international relations theorists) the function of human rights 
norms are of vital importance. Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                     
VII ‘to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’.” Regarding Kosovo, 
Resolution 1160 (31 December 1998) invoked Chapter VII, Article 39 considering 
the situation a threat to international peace and security in the region. Resolution 
1199 (23 September 1998) indicated grave concern, and a reference to a possible 
use of force was made in Resolution 1203 (24 October 1998). In both resolutions 
the Security Council considered the situation a threat to peace and security in the 
region. In all resolutions it was indicated that the Security Council was acting 
under Chapter VII. The decisions were taken unanimously. 
445 One of the most controversial examples is the 1999 NATO intervention in 
Kosovo. The legitimacy of NATO’s intervention, and the air strikes in particular, 
have been subject to fierce discussions in international political milieus as well 
between scholars of international law and politics. At the political level, the UN has 
been the key arena of debate. For instance, in March 1999 a Security Council 
resolution –favoured by China, Namibia and Russia– condemning NATO’s forceful 
action was rejected by 3 votes in favour and 12 against. On the other hand, NATO 
allies too had varying comments on the issue. For example, the then German 
Foreign Minister underlined that this act ought not to become a precedent for 
future cases. For the US, it signalled that UN Security Council authorisation was to 
be sought but not necessarily an obligation to take action. “At the other end of the 
spectrum, some NATO states, notably Belgium and the Netherlands, seem[ed] 
willing to argue for humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for action in the 
future if the Security Council is unable or unwilling to authorize force” (Jane 
Stromseth. “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental 
Change” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 238-239). 
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[h]uman rights and values are given as much weight as 
state system values, and individuals and peoples are 
recognized as subjects for whom international society as 
a whole has responsibility. Such responsibility also 
carries concomitant rights to act in appropriate ways 
and through appropriate channels as legitimized 
through international law.446 
It is such an understanding that stands for the ethical/moral basis 
for humanitarian interventions, which is also assumed to prevent the 
exploitation of principles of non-intervention and sovereignty by 
states when violation of human rights on a massive scale occurs. 
Reflecting a similar line of thought, Francis Kofi Abiew argues that 
“sovereignty implies responsibility, and thus, when egregious human 
rights violations occur either arising from governmental acts or in 
situations of internal conflict, intervention is justified to protect those 
rights.”447 
Nevertheless, a rule consequentialist approach suggests that 
populations are better off in a system where humanitarian 
intervention is legally prohibited rather than one in which there is no 
consensus on the rules governing the right to forcible intervention for 
humanitarian purposes.448 This is parallel to the pluralist concern 
that in the given lack of agreement regulating unilateral 
humanitarian interventions, “states will act on their own moral 
principles, thereby weakening an international order built on the 
                                                
446 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996, 60. 
447 Abiew 1998, 5. 
448 Wheeler 2000, 29. 
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rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force.”449 
Similarly, Wheeler and Morris question the impartiality in decision-
making and argue that it is more favourable for the international 
community to stick to the non-intervention principle under such 
circumstances.450 
Given these opposing points of view, humanitarian intervention 
remains controversial both when it takes place and when there is 
inaction. The 1994 Rwandan case constitutes an example of the 
consequences of inaction.451 Concerning this specific case Martha 
Finnemore argues that 
the episode also reveals something about the normative 
terrain on which these interventions are debated. […] 
States understood and publicly acknowledged a set of 
obligations that certainly did not exist in the nineteenth 
century and probably not during most of the cold war. 
States understood that they had not just a right but a 
duty to intervene in this case. That the Americans 
apologized substantiates this.452 
Likewise, legal scholar José Alvarez considers the then President 
Clinton’s apology an “act out of grace,” which comes closest to legal 
responsibility.453 
As constructivists claim, it is such challenges that the 
international community has been facing, which lead or contribute to 
                                                
449 Wheeler 2000, 29. 
450 Nicholas J. Wheeler, and Justin Morris. “Humanitarian Intervention and State 
Practice at the End of the Cold War” in International Society after the Cold War, Rick 
Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.) (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 139. 
451 ICISS 2001b, 1. 
452 Finnemore 2003, 79-80. 
453 José Alvarez, interview by author, New York, NY, November 06, 2008. 
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the emergence and implementation of new norms. The emergence of 
the RtoP norm can be explained on this basis. Due to the lack of 
action in the face of mass atrocities, and in the absence of a formal 
and/or legal embracement of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, in order to secure lives and human rights of 
populations, norm entrepreneurs such as Gareth Evans and Kofi 
Annan opted for introducing a “new” norm, namely “the 
responsibility to protect” instead of adhering to the arguments in 
favour of a “right to intervene.” 
 Emergence of new norms aside, a fundamental theoretical 
question to ask is why do states comply with norms? According to 
neo-realists, dominant norms of the day achieve their status because 
they are favoured (and thus, supported) by the more powerful states. 
Correspondingly, norms are made, and abided by, since they enable 
states to achieve their objectives.454 Such understanding is labelled 
as “logic of consequences.” The realist assumption that norms are 
means for states in seeking their national interests constitutes a 
primary break point not only between realism(s) and 
constructivism(s) but also between realism(s) and the English School. 
For instance, Hedley Bull posits: “even if a state decides to break the 
rules, it recognizes ‘that it owes other states an explanation of its 
                                                
454 Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change” International Organization 52(4) (1998): 912. 
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conduct, in terms of rules that they accept’.”455 This is a reflection of 
the understanding that rules are there to be conformed to, and 
breaking them does not make them cease to exist. This assertion 
reveals a “core assumption of the English School that states ‘form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations with one another’.”456 
The constructivist substitute for the “logic of consequences” is, 
as March and Olsen label it, the “logic of appropriateness.” According 
to this understanding,  
actors internalize roles and rules as scripts to which 
they conform, not for instrumental reasons—to get what 
they want—but because they understand the behaviour 
to be good, desirable, and appropriate. Habit, duty, 
sense of obligation and responsibility as well as 
principled belief may all be powerful motivators for 
people and underpin significant episodes of world 
politics.457 
Such logic does not only impact on “notions of duty, responsibility, 
identity, and obligation (all social constructions) [but also] may drive 
behaviour as well as self-interest and gain.” Norms may also change 
states’ perception of their certain national interests458 over time.459 In 
this regard, the mutually constructive nature of norms gains further 
                                                
455 Wheeler 2000, 24. 
456 Wheeler 2000, 24-5. 
457 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 912. 
458 Also Kersbergen and Verbeek note that “actors may internalize international 
norms and accept them as intrinsically worth striving for, rather than considering 
them useful in purchasing basic, unchanging, long-term interests” (Kees Van 
Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek. “The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity 
and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union.” European Journal 
of International Relations 13(2) (2007): 220). 
459 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 913. The issue of self/national interests will be 
studied in Section 2.4.  
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importance since every new norm during its evolution has an effect 
on already existing (relevant) norms.460 In other words, as Finnemore 
posits, norms coevolve. “In this sense, logic internal to norms 
themselves shapes their development, and, consequently, shapes 
social change.”461 In this respect, the case of RtoP is a basic example: 
building on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, RtoP was 
formulated with certain changes to the inherent mentality such as 
the assumption of a responsibility rather than a right to intervene, 
and the reformulation of the sovereignty understanding. With the 
World Summit Outcome Document sovereignty as responsibility 
understanding was introduced to the UN framework and received 
recognition in an organisation which traditionally places national 
sovereignty as a higher value. Thus, it can be argued that as RtoP 
continues to evolve and becomes internalised by the international 
community, its impact on existing norms will be greater. 
5.3. Moral Considerations 
As in the case of international law, scholars seem not to be in 
consensus with each other in their approaches to the issue of 
humanitarian interventions while studying its moral aspects. Two 
main positions can be exemplified in the following statements: Mark 
                                                
460 As in the case of RtoP, which attempts to modify the principle of state 
sovereignty by introducing “sovereignty as responsibility” understanding. For 
further details, see Section 4.1 in Chapter 4.  
461 Finnemore 2003, 71. 
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R. Wicclair argues that “independent of what international law 
proscribes or prescribes, intervention on behalf of human rights is 
morally impermissible.”462 In opposition, Bernard states that 
although intervention is legally prohibited, in certain cases, arising 
from moral reasons “it becomes a positive duty to transgress” the 
law.463 The first approach totally rejects the idea of humanitarian 
interventions based on moral grounds without questioning the 
legality of the act whereas the second one admits that the act is 
against law but morally necessary. 
Wheeler notes the moral argument that “humanitarian 
intervention is one of those hard cases where ethical concerns should 
trump legality, and that, [the] legal requirement[s] can be overridden 
in cases of supreme humanitarian emergency.”464 Alternatively, 
Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley assert that unilateral humanitarian 
intervention pertains to the realm of “moral choice,” not law.465 
Likewise, Hartcourt notes that “[i]ntervention is a question rather of 
                                                
462 Mark R. Wicclair. “Human Rights and Intervention” in Human Rights and U.S. 
Foreign Policy. Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean (eds.) (USA: Lexington Books, 
1979), 141. 
463 Quoted in Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne. “The Customary International Law Doctrine 
of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter” 
California Western International Law Journal (4) (1973-1974): 218. 
464 Wheeler 2000, 41. 
465 Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley. “After Bangladesh: the law of humanitarian 
intervention by military force.” American Journal of International Law 67 (1973): 
275, 304. Likewise, legal scholar José Alvarez considers the duty to act an ethical 
but not a legal one (José Alvarez, interview by author, New York, NY, November 06, 
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policy than of law, and when wisely and equitably handled […] may 
be the higher policy of justice and humanity.”466 
For some ethicists like the sceptics, states —which are the 
main agents of the conduct of international ethics— “are frequently 
blatantly immoral, both in their treatment of their own citizens and 
citizens of other nations.”467 On the other hand, realists take states 
to be amoral. Thus, a question that comes to mind is why is the 
conduct of ethical foreign policy a matter of concern? Frost 
summarises the factors as follows: The first is the impact of changing 
and new technologies on the conjuncture, and the necessity arising 
to act within these changing circumstances. The second is the 
unforeseen happenings.468 
The third new factor is that there may be a clash 
between the underlying ethic embedded in one of our 
major international practices, global civil society, on the 
one hand, and the ethic inherent in another of these 
practices, the society of democratic and democratizing 
states. The former —the practice within which many 
human beings recognise one another as first-generation 
rights holders— requires that we not do anything that 
would damage the rights of other rights holders 
wherever they happen to be, and that we do what we 
can to protect their rights. The latter requires that we 
protect the state within which we enjoy citizenship 
rights, and that we respect the autonomy of states 
elsewhere. Respect for states’ rights and the non-
intervention rule, however, sometimes seem to require 
that we turn a blind eye to human rights abuses in 
                                                
466 Quoted in Fonteyne 1973-1974: 218. 
467 Gerard Elfstrom. International Ethics: A reference handbook (California: ABC-
Clio, 1998), 6. 
468 Mervyn Frost. “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: protecting civilians to 
make democratic citizenship possible” in Ethics and Foreign Policy. Karen E. Smith 
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other states.469 It is at this point that the tension 
between our practices emerges.470 
Following from this, it can be deduced that “[a]ny policy decision of 
consequence is taken within a dense web of normative claims that 
often conflict with one another and create serious ethical dilemmas 
for decision makers.”471 A fundamental ethical dilemma of this sort 
that requires consideration is “human suffering.” 
a. Human Suffering 
The relationship between intervention and human suffering472 
can be considered on two levels: (1) Humanitarian intervention aims 
at eliminating (or at least diminishing) human suffering; (2) 
humanitarian intervention may cause human suffering in the form of 
collateral damage. In light of this, human suffering can both be a 
positive and a negative drive for states in making a decision to 
undertake humanitarian interventions or not. 
                                                
469 “It may be argued that when states violate the most fundamental rights of their 
own population in a systematic and gross way, they forfeit their sovereignty. This 
line of argument is rooted in social contract theory. State sovereignty, so it is said, 
ultimately derives its legitimacy from the rights that the individuals gained in a 
social contract that led to the formation of the state. And so once a state stops 
respecting the contract of its citizens, it can no longer be considered as a legitimate 
political organization” (Bruno Coppieters, and Nick Fotion (eds.). Moral Constraints 
on War: Principles and Cases. Second Edition (USA: Lexington Books, 2008), 44). 
470 Frost 2001, 43. 
471 Martha Finnemore. “Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention” Symposium on 
Norms and Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention at the Center for Global Peace and 
Conflict Studies, University of California at Irvine, April 14, 2000, p. 2 (revised in 
Sept. 2000). Retrieved from http://www.cgpacs.uci.edu/files/cgpacs/docs/2010/ 
working_papers/martha_finnemore_humanitarian_intervention.pdf (accessed 
November 28, 2010). 
472 Some sub-questions relating to human suffering are whether this is suffering in 
quantity or quality? Suffering of whom (does it cover all human beings or just 
women and children)? What kind of suffering, etc. 
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Taking human suffering as a positive drive is to consider it as 
an obligation to protect the vulnerable ones. For instance, moral 
philosophers like Robert Goodin find that “the rationale lies in our 
own responsibility for the misfortune of others, and the ultimately 
weak distinction between negative and positive duties (i.e. to refrain 
from doing something harmful, or to do something beneficial).”473 
Karl Popper argues that “human suffering makes a direct moral 
appeal, namely the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to 
increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway.” In this 
regard, he considers that, morally, pleasure cannot compensate for 
pain. Therefore, he posits that “[i]nstead of the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least 
amount of avoidable suffering for all.”474 Following a similar logic, 
proponents of international ethics defend the argument to undertake 
humanitarian interventions in order to end human suffering 
although the intervention may not be able to save all those who 
suffer. Their claim is that undertaking action can serve at least to 
save some of the victims while encouraging other states to assist to 
save a larger number of people.475 
On the other hand, the success as well as the targets of the 
intervention remain as important concerns since action may lead to 
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collateral damage. To begin with, from a consequentialist point of 
view, there needs to be substantial hope for the success of the 
mission. In case the intervention is thought to increase human 
suffering, the moral argument suggests that no action is taken. There 
is also the question of targets as well as those who are victimised 
unintentionally when forceful intervention is concerned. According to 
international law, civilians ought not to be the target of the military 
action. Nevertheless, in certain cases “military necessity can be used 
to justify the killing of innocents on the grounds that this happens to 
be an inadvertent consequence of attacks against legitimate military 
targets.” Such understanding of “double effect” is rooted in the 
Middle Ages and was established by Catholic theologians.476 This 
doctrine  
is typically put as a set of necessary conditions on 
morally permissible agency in which a morally 
questionable bad upshot is foreseen: (a) the intended 
final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it 
must be morally acceptable, (c) the foreseen bad upshot 
must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some 
sense, intended), and (d) the good end must be 
proportionate to the bad upshot (that is, must be 
important enough to justify the bad upshot).477 
In this vein, Fernando Teson suggests: “proportionate collateral harm 
caused by a humanitarian intervention, where the goal is to rescue 
                                                
476 Wheeler 2000, 36. 
477 Warren S. Quinn. “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of 
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victims of tyranny or anarchy, may, depending on circumstances, be 
morally excusable.”478 
A controversial example is the case of Kosovo, where NATO 
mainly conducted its intervention through air strikes resulting with 
collateral damage. While the intervening states aimed at minimum 
risking of their soldiers’ lives, the air strikes caused civilian deaths, 
and this has been a point of harsh criticism against the 
interveners.479 Legal scholar Hurst Hannum argues that Kosovo was 
an example of a bad intervention. He also notes that intervention 
generally causes more harm than good.480 All in all, human suffering 
may constitute a primary rationale for undertaking forceful action for 
humanitarian purposes, whereas it can also be a major point of 
criticism for international ethicists in case the intervention fails to 
halt the suffering and causes collateral damage. 
b. Duty of Assistance 
Among the moral considerations that can justify humanitarian 
interventions, it is possible to mention “the duty of assistance” and 
“the law of peoples” understandings of John Rawls. On the basis of 
                                                
478 Fernando Teson. “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention” in Holzgrefe 
and Keohane (eds.). Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas 
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479 For a detailed account of the collateral damage of the NATO intervention, see 
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the distinction between well-ordered and burdened481 societies, 
Rawls suggests that a duty of assistance exists. Financial assistance 
is not sufficient to correct injustices inherent within the so-called 
burdened societies, nevertheless, “an emphasis on human rights may 
work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of the rulers who 
have been callous about the well-being of their own people.”482 The 
affirmation of basic human rights, he notes, is not necessarily only a 
traditional part of the institutions and practices of liberal societies, 
but also of all decent societies in general.483 
Furthermore, Rawls argues that citizens are capable of “two 
moral powers”, which are “a capacity for a sense of justice and a 
capacity for a conception of the good. It is also assumed that each 
citizen has, at any time, a conception of the good compatible with a 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine”484 which is 
followed by the understanding of “a first principle that all persons 
have equal rights and liberties.”485 In the Law of Peoples human 
rights “express a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from 
                                                
481 Burdened societies are those which are “burdened by unfavourable conditions, 
[… these,] while they are not expansive or aggressive, lack the political and cultural 
traditions, the human capital and know-how, and often, the material and 
technological resources needed to be well-ordered. The long-term goal of (relatively) 
well-ordered-societies should be to bring burdened societies, like outlaw states, 
into the Society of well-ordered Peoples” (John Rawls. The Law of Peoples with “The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 106). 
Rawls additionally notes: “A society with few natural resources and little wealth 
can be well-ordered if its political traditions, law and property and class structure 
with their underlying religious and moral beliefs and culture are such as to sustain 
a liberal or decent society” (Rawls 1999, 106). 
482 Rawls 1999, 108-9. 
483 Rawls 1999, 111. 
484 Rawls 1999, 82. 
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slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and 
security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”486 
Accordingly, these rights have the following functions: 
1. Their fulfilment is a necessary condition of the 
decency of a society’s political institutions and of 
its legal order. 
2. Their fulfilment is sufficient to exclude justified 
and forceful intervention by other peoples, for 
example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, 
or in grave cases by military force. 
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among 
peoples.487 
In this regard, protection of peoples, for instance, from mass murder 
and genocide is a principal part of the understanding of human 
rights within the law of peoples. As can be inferred from the second 
function, the failure to provide these urgent rights constitutes a 
justified cause for “forceful intervention” (including a military 
intervention) by external actors.  
All in all, in terms of the relevance of Rawls’s assumptions with 
the contemporary understandings of human rights and 
humanitarian interventions, one can talk about an existent duty of 
assistance of the members of the international society to provide the 
necessary conditions for enabling the enjoyment of basic rights and 
freedoms by all peoples, through every mean possible, including use 
of military force in severe cases. 
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c. Interests and Morality 
Coppieters and Fotion posit that “[t]he belief in the existence of 
a universal moral order that unifies all of humanity establishes the 
right for states to intervene in the affairs of another state for the 
protection of innocent citizens belonging to that state.”488 For those 
who accept a moral responsibility, a related question is the extent of 
this responsibility and the right to intervene. Elfstrom identifies two 
main approaches to the issue. On the one hand, some international 
ethicists argue that the moral responsibility to help others is not 
restrained with the distance (to the location) or the nationality of 
those to be protected.489 On the other hand, some others 
“believe that our responsibilities to our neighbours or 
fellow countrymen greatly overweigh any obligations we 
have to human beings in general. In fact, many hold the 
position that we have nearly no obligation to humanity 
as a whole, and they would argue that the basic 
assumptions of the practice of international ethics are 
mistaken.”490 
Whether towards whole humanity or not, the assumption of a 
moral responsibility to undertake humanitarian interventions also 
requires risking the lives of the intervening states’ soldiers. In this 
regard, solidarists argue that in extraordinary cases of humanitarian 
catastrophe, it is a moral necessity that “state leaders should accept 
                                                
488 Coppieters and Fotion 2008, 44. 
489 “Some international ethicists believe that we should accept [the assumption 
that] our moral responsibilities to assist other human beings and avoid harming 
them are not erased if they live far away, reside in a different nation, or have no 
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the risk of casualties to end human rights abuses.”491 Thus, 
“solidarists’ conception of responsibility in statecraft […] demands 
that state leaders override their primary responsibility not to place 
citizens in danger and make the agonizing decision that saving the 
lives of civilians beyond their own borders requires risking the lives of 
those who serve in the armed forces.”492 Extreme statists argue the 
contrary. For instance, on the US intervention in Somalia Samuel P. 
Huntington posits that “it is morally unjustifiable and politically 
indefensible that members of the [US] armed forces should be killed 
to prevent Somalis from killing one another.”493  
From these opposing points of view it can be inferred that 
ethicists also do have different understandings of moral obligations 
where they prioritise one obligation over the other. Such difference is 
also reflected in the interaction between interests and morality in 
policy-making.494 For example, 
[t]he essence of realist ethics495 is that political leaders 
have an overriding moral obligation to advance the 
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494 A similar dillema was prevalent in the case of Rwanda. “At the time of 
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interests of their own, bounded moral communities 
against the interests of other moral communities. And, 
of course, this moral obligation is reinforced by the logic 
of political representation within states. So the basic 
components of any realist ethics must be the 
consideration of the motivation for political action, 
based on a government’s obligations to protect and 
advance the interests of its own constituents.496 
According to Walzer, the right to use force in defence of others, 
whose sovereignty and/or territorial integrity are being violated, is 
not so much an act of charity as it is simply an act of necessity. 
Because the rights of the members of international society cannot be 
enforced by a police force (as in a domestic society), police powers are 
distributed among its members. If the rights of states, Walzer says, 
cannot be upheld by those states, “international society collapses 
into a state of war or is transformed into a universal tyranny.”497 In 
this regard, as the main agents in the conduct of international ethics 
remain to be the states, national interests continue to be a criterion 
in ethical foreign policy making. 
Chris Brown notes that an ethical dimension to foreign policy 
distinguishes “between ‘interest’ which is associated with prosperity, 
and ‘ethics’ which is associated with ‘mutual respect’ and thus 
causing a potential conflict between an interest-based foreign policy 
and an ethically driven foreign policy to emerge.”498 He, however, also 
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argues that ethical behaviour does not mean “self-negation,” but it 
rather is having awareness and sensitivity towards others’ interests. 
He refuses “naked egoism,”499 and adds:  
If being partly motivated by self-interest is sufficient to 
undermine any claim that a state might be behaving 
ethically, then states never do behave ethically, because 
there is always some element of self-interest involved in 
state action. If being partly motivated by self-interest 
becomes morally equivalent to being wholly motivated 
by self-interest, states then do indeed come to be seen 
as the kind of nakedly egoistic beings that virtually all 
ethical theories condemn.500 
In light of such understanding, this dissertation accepts the 
assertion of Brown that in order to consider an act as moral, it is not 
required that the motives “are absolutely pure and untainted by self-
interest.”501 
5.4. National Interests 
Michael Wesley argues that “[c]onsiderations of interest, 
viability, and partiality continue to drive the pattern of 
                                                
499 “Theories which do envisage a potential contradiction between the moral point 
of view and one’s personal self-interest do not, as a rule, suggest that individuals 
should entirely submerge their interests in the interests of humanity; some very 
strict utilitarians suggest that we have no reason to treat our own interests as 
more compelling that those of any other human being, but they generally concede 
that the general good/happiness will usually be advanced if we assume that we do 
have such reasons. In the same way, even strict ‘impartialists’ and utilitarians will 
agree that we have at least some obligations towards our fellow citizens which are 
different from, go deeper than, those we have towards humanity taken as a whole – 
and most ethical theorists would have no difficulty in accepting that this is so” 
(Brown 2001, 21). 
500 Brown 2001, 23. 
501 Brown 2001, 23. 
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intervention.”502 From a realist point of view —according to which the 
international system is anarchic and composed of sovereign nation 
states that seek power and their national interests— humanitarian 
intervention is considered to be an action that may or may not be 
taken depending on the relative interests of the state.  
The suspicion503 towards the doctrines of humanitarian 
intervention and RtoP stem from such interest-based perceptions 
which question whether it is possible to talk about pure intentions in 
any act of the state or not. The answer, especially from a 
constructivist point of view, is “no”. How one defines self-interest 
varies depending on the context, and in this regard anything can be 
defined as in the interest of the state or the international community. 
This is why identities matter.504  
                                                
502 Wesley 2005: 55. 
503 As Stephen A. Garrett notes, “the vast majority of developing countries were 
once colonial appendages of the European powers, and there are understandable 
fears that a new writ for intervention in world affairs would simply be a disguise for 
these powers’ manipulation of their affairs as in the past” (Stephen A. Garrett. 
Doing Good and Doing Well: an examination of humanitarian intervention. 
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 51). Mashood Issaka posits that there is 
apprehension in Africa that RtoP can be used as a cover to justify acts due to the 
colonial history of the continent (Mashood Issaka, interview by author, New York, 
NY, November 06, 2008). For instance, Wafula Okumu gives the example of French 
interest in Chad stemming from Chad’s oil resources as well as its colonial 
attachments (Wafula Okumu, phone interview by author, November 03, 2008). 
504 For instance, in relation to the self-interested motives, David Chandler gives the 
example of the “liberal peace thesis, in which he traces the ideological roots of the 
“responsibility to protect”. He maintains that the attempt for the 
institutionalization of “a new international security framework which emphasizes 
the development of international norms and the promotion of democracy and 
human rights, by interventionist means if necessary, is often promoted under” this 
line of thought. Chandler notes that the “liberal peace thesis challenges both the 
Realist view that war is an inevitable result of shifting balances of power in an 
anarchic world, and the so-called English School approach, which emphasizes the 
consensual status quo framework of the UN Charter, which accords equal rights of 
protection to states regardless of their domestic political framework. Liberal peace 
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The main question in this regard is whether or not there is 
truly a necessity to have solely pure humanitarian motives to 
consider a humanitarian military intervention righteous or legitimate 
or moral… Such assessment should rather depend on an evaluation 
of the means adopted during intervention and the conduct of the act, 
receptivity/response of those who are suffering from the atrocities, 
and finally, the (positive or negative) outcomes of the intervention. 
Thus, it is the conduct and the outcome of the military intervention 
that makes the difference between a humanitarian intervention and 
interference in the affairs of a state.  
Wheeler notes that “humanitarian considerations can play a 
part in motivating a government to intervene, but states will not use 
force unless they judge vital interests to be at stake. […] The strength 
of this position is that it recognizes the reality of state interests and 
power; its weakness is that it makes humanitarianism dependent 
upon shifting geopolitical and strategic considerations.”505 In 
accordance with such understanding, it can be deduced that a 
state’s decision whether to take action or not is not necessarily based 
on moral considerations and/or obligations.  
An argument that follows from such perspective, which is also 
a point of consensus for the realist and pluralist schools is that, the 
                                                                                                                                     
theorists stress that international peace and individual rights are best advanced 
through cosmopolitan frameworks whereby democratic and peaceful states take a 
leading responsibility for ensuring the interests of common humanity” (Chandler 
2004: 60). 
505 Wheeler 2000, 30. 
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international system lacks the universal principles for the conduct of 
humanitarian intervention.506 This gap leaves room for the abuse of 
the doctrine by states, and thus, leads to suspicion on the part of the 
states that are relatively weaker compared to the others.507 In this 
regard, a pluralist approach towards humanitarian intervention is 
even more straightforward: there is adherence to the principle of non-
intervention, and therefore, in principle, humanitarian intervention is 
an unacceptable act. 
In its classical sense realism(s) define national interest in 
terms of power as well as the preservation of political authority and 
territorial integrity of the state (access to natural resources as well as 
economic, military and geopolitical gains may also be included within 
the scope of this definition). In this regard, national security 
concerns constitute an important part of the understanding of 
national interest. E.H. Carr observes that states are “continually 
                                                
506 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996, 59. 
507 Chris Brown notes that “many weaker states cling to a strict definition of the 
principle of non-intervention because they are aware that any kind of intervention, 
humanitarian or not, reflects power as well as moral principle” (Brown 2001, 26). 
For instance, “D'Escoto, a former priest who served as foreign minister under the 
leftist Sandinista regime from 1979 to 1990, immediately echoed the suspicions of 
some developing countries about humanitarian intervention[:] ‘Recent and painful 
memories related to the legacy of colonialism, give developing countries strong 
reasons to fear that laudable motives can end-up being misused, once more, to 
justify arbitrary and selective interventions against the weakest states [...] We must 
take into account the prevailing lack of trust from most of the developing countries 
when it comes to the use of force for humanitarian reasons’” (Gerard Aziakou 
(AFP). UN debates responsibility to protect threatened populations. July 23, 2009 
(Retrieved from: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jU BFUN 
A723tsQokBAIMj-KcEYYug (accessed May 8, 2010)). 
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preoccupied with the problem of their own security.”508 In line with 
such concern, a state may opt for undertaking a humanitarian 
intervention in case this serves for its security interests. For 
instance, an influx of excess number of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from mass atrocities being 
conducted within a country creates security concerns for the 
neighbouring states, and thus may be considered as a reason to 
conduct an intervention.509 Wesley notes that “every humanitarian 
intervention that has occurred since India’s invasion of East Pakistan 
in 1971 has been justified primarily not by humanitarian concern, 
but by reference to the international destabilization caused by the 
conflict or its humanitarian impact.”510 
As Malik and Dorman assess, coercive action continues to be a 
means of statecraft serving for states pursuit of their national 
interests.511 Likewise, Martha Finnemore notes: 
Traditional security scholars have struggled to 
understand the nature of “humanitarianism” as an 
interest, often with the result that they simply discount 
it and emphasize other possible motivations for 
                                                
508 Edward Hallett Carr. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to 
the study of International Relations. (London: Macmillan and Company, 2001), 
159. 
509 For example, in the Security Council session that convened upon India’s 
intervention in East Pakistan, India presented its main justification as an act of 
self-defence due to threats to its national security. The Indian claim was that “the 
influx of 10 million refugees amounted to ‘refugee aggression’ and represented such 
an intolerable burden that it constituted a kind of ‘constructive’ attack” (ICISS 
2001b, 54-55). 
510 Wesley 2005: 65. 
511 Shahin P. Malik, and Andrew M. Dorman. “United Nations and Military 
Intervention” in Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian 
Intervention. Dorman and Otte (eds.) (Great Britain: Dartmouth, 1995), 163. 
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intervention. In these analyses, the intervention in 
Somalia is explained as an effort to export US values, 
intervention in Haiti was about refugees, interventions 
in Bosnia and Kosovo are explained by the need to 
protect NATO’s credibility and maintain stability in 
Europe. Humanitarianism was only window-dressing in 
every case.512 
Finnemore finds such assertions of neorealist and neoliberal scholars 
goals parsimonious. In these, all states “are assumed to want some 
combination of power, security, and wealth.”513 Nevertheless, from a 
constructivist point of view, interests are not simply pre-given and 
unchanging, but rather they are socially constructed through 
interaction.  Therefore, they are affected/shaped also by international 
norms as well as under effect of logic of appropriateness.514  
“The normative context changes over time, and as 
internationally held norms and values change, they create 
coordinated shifts in state interests and behaviour across the 
system.”515 Finnemore claims “that states are socialised to accept 
new norms, values, and perceptions of interest by international 
organizations.”516 From a realist point of view, also abiding by 
international law can be considered to be in the interest of the state. 
Hedley Bull, in response to this, finds it more unexpected “that states 
‘so often judge it in their interests to conform to it’,” since 
                                                
512 Michael Mandelbaum and Richard Haas quoted in Finnemore 2000, 1. 
513 Finnemore 1996, 1. 
514 That is to say: “normative context influences the behaviour of decisionmakers 
and of mass publics who may choose and constrain those decisionmakers” 
(Finnemore 1996, 5). 
515 Finnemore 1996, 2. 
516 Finnemore 1996, 5. 
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international law fundamentally has a restraining and/or 
constraining impact on state behaviour.517 Wheeler posits that  
realists would conceive of international society in that 
they would argue that governments pursue their 
interests while paying lip service to the rules. State 
leaders recognize that they have to justify their actions 
in terms of the rules, but this owes nothing to a 
normative commitment to the rules and everything 
being seen to play the game so as to avoid moral 
censure and sanctions.518 
Furthermore, conformance may come to serve the national interests 
of states not only because it provides a more secure international 
environment519 but also the imposition of rules and norms may 
enable control over the acts of other states or the ability to 
punish/respond to unwanted behaviour on a legitimate/legal basis. 
In view of this, a constructivist approach enables several 
factors influential in decision-making (and consequently in state 
action) to be explained as a part of national interest. The spreading of 
certain ideologies and principles (such as imperialism,520 
liberalism,521 democracy,522 and human rights523), or the 
                                                
517 Wheeler 2000, 24. 
518 Wheeler 2000, 23. 
519 “Careful realists have always recognized that the “id” of state self-interest must 
conform to a “superego” of general normative principles of state behaviour in order 
for the state to function effectively and avoid destruction” (Wesley 2005: 57). 
520 Some humanitarian organizations and peace groups belong to the 
“humanitarian peace” strand in terms of their approach towards humanitarian 
interventions. As Kaldor observes, “[t]hey distrust US-led interventions because 
they fear a new form of Western imperialism; defending human rights becomes a 
new ‘colonizing enterprise’. They do not believe that governments, whose job is to 
protect the ‘national interest’, can act for ‘noble purposes’” (Kaldor 2008, 58). 
521 Concerning the interventions of the 19th century, Finnemore notes that “Liberals 
of a more classical and Kantian type might argue that these interventions were 
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improvement of the reputation and representation of a state can be 
included in this list of probable factors. 
As ideologies, reputation and representation, which are parts of 
the identity of the state, interests too can be considered as a by-
product of identity. An example of this can be seen in the Jon 
Western’s observation where he notes: 
Conventional arguments suggest that the CNN effect 
compelled the president to act in Somalia—that vivid 
images of starving children provoked a sense of moral 
outrage within the American populace. Among the three 
major U.S. television networks, however, Somalia was 
mentioned in only fifteen news stories in 1992 until 
Bush’s August decision to begin the airlift, and nearly 
half of those ‘showed only fleeting glimpses of Somalia’s 
plight’ within the context of other stories. […] The 
evidence suggests that Bush’s policy shift on Somalia 
came in response to the increasing pressure to take action 
and to the political backlash on Bosnia that occurred on 
the eve of the Republican National Convention. Scowcroft 
recalls, “It [the Bosnian camp issue] probably did have a 
significant influence on us. We did not want to portray the 
administration as wholly flint-hearted real-politik, and an 
                                                                                                                                     
motivated by an interest in promoting democracy and liberal values” (Finnemore 
2003, 56). 
522 Taking the idea of democratisation as a pro-interventionist drive, Wesley 
analyses that: “Democratization was seen not only as being in the interests of those 
who lived in autocracies, but also as a positive development for global stability, 
because it promised to reduce the number of dictators, who were seen as less 
trustworthy international partners and less inclined to respect international 
norms” (Wesley 2005: 62). In this regard, he concludes: “The appeal to the political 
liberties of subject peoples provided ample justification” (Wesley 2005: 62). Arguing 
against the w[Nevertheless, h]ow many democracies there are to be in a given area 
is for the civilians themselves to decide, not the intervening actors. Facilitating the 
emergence of a democracy is quite different to imposing a democratic form on an 
unwilling people” (Frost in Ethics and Foreign Policy, 2001, 53). 
523 Margot Light identifies that “respect for human rights is the hallmark of a 
democratic society. […] A major objective of a foreign policy that is informed by 
ethics is, therefore, the institution or renewal of democracy. Promoting human 
rights is a relatively recent foreign policy goal. Using force for humanitarian 
purposes is older. Exporting democracy predates both” (Margot Light. “Exporting 
Democracy” in Ethics and Foreign Policy. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.),  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 75). 
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airlift in Somalia was a lot cheaper [than intervention in 
Bosnia] to demonstrate that we had a heart.”524 
In view of this, humanitarian interventions while serving their ideal 
purpose of stopping atrocities against humanity, in the meantime 
may be (fundamentally) serving to states’ national interests in 
different ways. 
Nevertheless, states’ understandings of interests are not 
unchanging either. In her account of nineteenth century cases, 
Finnemore reveals that only Christians of white ancestry were 
considered in the interest of Western states, and thus only they were 
the subjects of the humanitarian action. In this regard, religion and 
race were the main determinants in defining who was “human”. 
Contemporarily, non-Christian and non-white people are also 
included within the scope of humanitarian interventions.525 
Moreover, humanitarian interventions are no longer undertaken for 
the purpose of the protection of the nationals of the intervening 
states who are residing in the territory of the state that is committing 
the atrocities against humanity or inhuman treatments on a massive 
scale. A forcible action directed towards such populations is rather 
evaluated as an act of self-defence. Following from this, it can be 
argued that the interventions have become humanitarian for all 
without exception. 
                                                
524 Jon Western. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: beliefs, information, and 
advocacy in the U.S. decisions on Somalia and Bosnia” International Security 26(4) 
(2002): 130. 
525 Finnemore 2003, 83. 
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Secondly, the multilateral character526 of intervention and the 
involvement of mass publics527 were among the features that were 
becoming a part of the pattern. Although unilateral interventions 
were not exempt from the scene, there was at least “multilateral 
consultation”. At that period, interventions took place not necessarily 
out of purely humanitarian considerations, which actually provided 
justification for use of force, but also strong geostrategic reasons 
came forth.528 For the nineteenth century states, humanitarian 
concerns did not necessitate action when their specific interests were 
at stake or when these were not concerned. States’ individual 
interests or realpolitik seemed to be above all humanitarian issues 
and moral considerations unless the humanitarian action would 
provide the justification for an act of a state. Accordingly, Finnemore 
concludes: “The role of humanitarian claims in these cases thus 
seems to be constitutive and permissive rather than 
determinative.”529 She also “argues that contemporary intervention 
norms contain powerful contradictions that make ‘success’ difficult 
to achieve, not for material or logistical reasons but for normative 
                                                
526 “The multilateral character of the intervention was different, however, in that 
there was multilateral consultation and agreement on the intervention plan but 
execution was essentially unilateral” (Finnemore 2003, 61-2). 
527 “Not only did public opinion influence policy making in a diffuse way, but 
publics were organized transnationally in ways that strongly foreshadow 
humanitarian activity by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the late 
twentieth century” (Finnemore 2003, 60). 
528 Finnemore 2003, 58. 
529 Finnemore 2003, 65. 
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ones.”530 In this respect, contemporary multilateralism531 in 
humanitarian interventions is not only strategic as in the nineteenth 
century but also highly political and normative.532  
Based on these observations,533 Finnemore posits that states’ 
interests and incentives have been going through a social 
construction process as a result of “state practice and evolution of 
shared norms through which states act.”534 A major criticism against 
mainstream theories that follows from this is that realist and 
neoliberal accounts do not question the sources and/or reasons of 
incentives and interests. In this vein, although national interest 
alongside security concerns should never be discarded as factors 
leading states to undertake interventions, basing the nature of 
humanitarian intervention purely on this assumption is prone to be 
oversimplistic and misleading. This sort of thinking also takes state 
behaviour as unchanging, and disregards the role of the international 
community as well as international norms in influencing state 
behaviour. Such an account (based on geostrategic and economic 
                                                
530 Finnemore 2003, 54. 
531 More recent cases of humanitarian intervention, especially since 1989, have 
occurred under the auspices of international organizations, and in most cases the 
UN Charter constituted the normative basis for action (Finnemore 2003, 78). 
532 Finnemore 2003, 81. 
533 In sum, following from Finnemore’s conclusions in The Purpose of Intervention, 
the three factors that have changed since the nineteenth century can be identified 
as follows: the understanding of who is human and who can claim humanitarian 
intervention; the manner of intervention (e.g. unilateral and multilateral); and 
finally, military objectives and what “success” comprises of (Finnemore 2003, 53). 
534 Finnemore 2003, 83. 
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importance) falls short in providing a full-scale rationale for forcible 
humanitarian action. 
5.5. The Question of Inaction 
Lessons from history reveal that in general it is a combination 
of motivations which affect the behaviour of the international 
community. In this vein, while arguing that the international 
community is influenced by moral motivations, this dissertation 
draws attention to two issues in order to explain cases of inaction 
where there is an obvious moral necessity to react. 
 Three main factors and their subsets were identified in Figure 
2. In this general picture, two elements that were not represented are 
capacity and capability.535 The reason is that, these two are not 
considered to be positive drives for the conduct of humanitarian 
interventions but rather can be labelled as “enabling factors” and/or 
“elements of success”. As they are not considered as motives for 
undertaking action, they are not included in the main set of factors. 
Furthermore, the lack of one or both of these elements does not 
necessitate that an intervention will not, or cannot be undertaken. 
Nevertheless, such absence is likely to affect the outcome, i.e. the 
success of the action, and also can be problematic in moral terms. In 
this regard, capacity and capability become the two key elements 
                                                
535 Within the international relations literature, capacity and capability are 
generally neglected to be mentioned in the analysis of humanitarian interventions. 
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either leading to the success536 of humanitarian interventions or 
enabling their realization.537 An example in this regard can be seen 
as the Rwandan case. In the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the 
Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda 
inaction was noted in the following words: 
There was a persistent lack of political will by Member 
States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness. This 
lack of political will affected the response by the 
Secretariat and decision-making by the Security 
Council, but was also evident in the recurrent 
difficulties to get the necessary troops for the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). 
Finally, although UNAMIR suffered from chronic lack of 
resources and political priority, it must also be said that 
serious mistakes were made with those resources which 
were at the disposal of the United Nations.538 
In the light of this, in counter point to the theoretical approaches 
arguing for action or inaction on the basis of self-interested motives, 
this dissertation argues that capacity and capability issues matter, 
and need to be taken into consideration among other considerations. 
                                                
536 Success can be defined as stopping the mass atrocities without causing 
collateral damage as well as the improvement of the conditions in comparison to 
the pre-intervention case. 
537 That is to say, it is only if the intervening states have the capability and capacity 
to undertake a humanitarian intervention so that the action can take place 
successfully. Otherwise, it is highly likely for an intervention to fail. For instance, 
the failure in Somalia led to reconsideration within the UN of the criteria for 
conducting peacekeeping operation. The concern to avert a failure was a 
determining factor in the reluctance to intervene in the case of Rwanda (Michael 
Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (USA: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 23). Later on, certain criteria were adopted to regulate the 
establishment of peacekeeping forces, (for further details, see Appendix A). Such 
concern also signals that states are aware of a moral responsibility to undertake 
successful humanitarian interventions. 
538 UN Document S/1999/1257 (December 15, 1999), 3. 
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CHAPTER 6 
UPHOLDING THE RESPONSIBILITY: RTOP IN ACTION? 
As the sociologist Max Weber suggested, violence is a 
part of what defines the state. A state is an organization 
that claims rights to exercise particular kinds of 
violence to prevent others from doing so. States claim to 
control the legitimate use of force. As a matter of 
historical record, most of the mass killings of modern 
history can be laid at the door of state organizations. 
States are the practitioners of slaughter par 
excellence.539 
As underlined by Shaw, states (or governments) are prone to be 
perpetrators of mass atrocities against their populations. The RtoP 
doctrine aims to address and/or halt such conscious acts of violence. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the unanimous adoption of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document setting the scope of RtoP norm, and later, the debates in 
the General Assembly following the 2009 Report of the Secretary-
General on the implementation of RtoP signal that states assume a 
moral responsibility to react in cases of severe violations of human 
rights. 
In this vein, the main question that this chapter seeks to 
answer through a brief study of recent cases is, to what extent has 
RtoP been embraced and taken effect since 2005? As two leading 
institutions focusing on the RtoP norm, the Global Centre for the 
                                                
539 Martin Shaw. War and Genocide: organized killing in modern society (Great 
Britain: Polity, 2003), 58. 
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Responsibility to Protect and the International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect draw attention to certain situations to be 
considered within the framework of the norm as established by 
paragraphs 138 and 139. As shown in Table 1, in total, twelve cases 
are mentioned and/or under focus. 
 
Table 1. Cases since 2006 considered for evaluation within the RtoP framework. 
 
  Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect 
International Coalition for 
the Responsibility to Protect 
  
Looks 
at? 
Refers to 
… as an 
RtoP 
case 
Invokes/
invoked 
RtoP? 
Looks 
at? 
Refers to 
… as an 
RtoP 
case 
Invokes/
invoked 
RtoP? 
        
P
op
u
la
ti
on
s 
in
 f
oc
u
s 
DRC ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Guinea ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Kenya ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Kyrgyzstan ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Myanmar ü ü ü ü ü ? 
Nigeria ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sri Lanka ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sudan ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Zimbabwe û û û ü ü tbm 
Gaza û û û ü ? ? 
Georgia û û û ü û û 
Somalia û û û ü ? tbm 
      
 Legend of symbols: 
  ü yes ?: unclear/not stated 
  û no tbm: the case is to be monitored 
 
 
Despite the fact that the two institutions are partners, there are 
differences in their consideration of the cases, (which are to be 
revealed in the case analyses). Based on such general overview of 
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practice, some related questions to be addressed will be as follows: 
As raised during the debates in the General Assembly in 2009, have 
the fears of states regarding a potential misuse/abuse of the RtoP 
norm been realised since 2005? Have there been examples of timely 
implementation of the RtoP norm? Have the members of the UN been 
fulfilling their assumed responsibility to protect? 
6.1. RtoP in Action: Prevention and timely response 
Concerning the practice of the RtoP norm, two main cases 
come to the fore as successful examples of the norm’s 
implementation in a timely manner. In this vein, Kenya and Guinea 
constitute the focuses of this section. 
a. Kenya 
In 2005, along with other Member States of the General 
Assembly, the Kenyan State committed itself to uphold its 
“responsibility to protect,” but failed to do so in December 2007 when 
violence erupted in the aftermath of the elections. This crisis 
attracted international community’s attention, first and foremost of 
the AU, and led to the invocation as well as successful 
implementation of the RtoP norm540 through the preventive measures 
adopted under Pillar Two. The AU initiative to solve the crisis 
                                                
540 Margaret J. McKelvey notes that success was achieved through the high-level 
visits, invocation of the RtoP norm, mediation, and by conveying “the world is 
watching you” message (interview by author, Washington D.C., October 17, 2008). 
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comprised of mediation efforts by a group of African mediators led by 
Kofi Annan.541  
The EU and individual states as well as the UN supported the 
mediation process.542 For instance, the Security Council made clear 
its attitude regarding the matter with the February 6, 2008 
Presidential Statement in which it emphasised that 
the only solution to the crisis lies through dialogue, 
negotiation and compromise and strongly urges Kenya’s 
political leaders to foster reconciliation and to elaborate 
and implement the actions agreed to on 1 February 
without delay, including by meeting their responsibility 
to engage fully in finding a sustainable political solution 
and taking action to end immediately violence, including 
ethnically motivated attacks, dismantle armed gangs, 
improve the humanitarian situation and restore human 
rights.543 
Wafula Okumu highlights that Kenya became the example of 
how RtoP can work, since peace was restored in the country before 
the situation went out of hand.544 Ban Ki-Moon considers the 2008 
response as “the first time both regional actors and the United 
Nations viewed the crisis in part from the perspective of the 
                                                
541 Kofi Annan stated: “I saw the crisis in the RtoP prism with a Kenyan 
government unable to contain the situation or protect its people. []… I knew that if 
the international community did not intervene, things would go hopelessly wrong. 
The problem is when we say ‘intervention,’ people think military, when in fact 
that’s a last resort. Kenya is a successful example of RtoP at work.” (Roger Cohen, 
“How Annan rescued Kenya from genocide.” The Observer, Published on 27 August 
2008, 
http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=34:ne
ws&id=918:how-annan-rescued-kenya-from-genocide&Itemid=59 (accessed June 
19, 2010). 
542 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Kenya,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/crisis-in-kenya (accessed September 24, 2010). 
543 UN Security Council, ‘‘Statement by the President of the Security Council,’’ 
S/PRST/2008/4, February 6, 2008. 
544 Wafula Okumu, phone interview by author, November 03, 2008. 
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responsibility to protect.”545 Similarly, Desmond Tutu highlights that 
the international community acted very promptly compared to the 
past cases in any part of the world. The engagement of state leaders 
from Africa through their services as mediators proved vital. In 
addition, the UN was involved “at the highest political levels, the 
Security Council has issued a statement deploring the violence, and 
the secretary general and the leadership of human rights offices have 
been mobilized.”546 
All in all, the case of Kenya became an example of a successful 
application of the RtoP norm at the level of Pillar Two. In general 
terms, the international community’s rapid response is acknowledged 
as “a model of diplomatic action under the Responsibility to 
Protect.”547 Concerning the current state of affairs, the Global Centre 
underlines that the “international community, in keeping with the 
responsibility to protect, must work with the government of Kenya to 
take the necessary measures today to avert crimes tomorrow.”548 
 
 
                                                
545 UN General Assembly, 63rd Session, Follow-up to the Outcome of the 
Millennium Summit: Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the 
Secretary-General, 12 January 2009, para. 51, p. 23. 
546 Desmond Tutu, “Taking the Responsibility to Protect,” The New York Times, 
Published 9 November 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/opinion/ 
19iht-edtutu.1.10186157.html (accessed August 20, 2010). 
547 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Kenya,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/crisis-in-kenya (accessed September 24, 2010).  
548 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Kenya,” http://globalr2p. 
org/countrywork/country.php?country=157 (accessed September 24, 2010).  
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b. Guinea 
The international response to the situation in Guinea is 
considered a rapid and successful one conducted in line with the 
RtoP norm. The Global Centre, regarding the conflict that escalated 
with the events on 28 September 2009 notes: “at the time, the 
potential for a rapid deterioration in Guinea that could result in mass 
atrocities and conflict was real.”549 “Camara and his cabinet, the 
National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), failed to 
uphold this responsibility. […] Whether the junta was unable (as 
Camara asserts) or unwilling (as the evidence suggests) to act, the 
junta failed to uphold its responsibility to protect the protestors.”550 
Different from other cases, the international community quickly 
responded to the case in an organised and decisive manner.551  
Much of this response has focused on placing pressure 
on the junta to adhere to its prior commitment—initially 
welcomed by the Guinean public—to serve as a 
temporary caretaker of the Guinean state before 
handing over power to a civilian government following 
democratic elections. The impact of the response has 
benefited from strong regional leadership, 
harmonization between regional and international 
efforts, attention from the Security Council, and the use 
                                                
549 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Guinea,” 
http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php?country=368 (accessed September 
23, 2010). 
550   The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 1. 
551 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief: The 
International Response to 28 September 2009 Massacre in Guinea and the 
Responsibility to Protect,” 1, http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php? 
country=368 (accessed September 20, 2010). 
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of targeted sanctions, embargos, and threats of more 
coercive measures.552 
The most active regional actor was the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). It immediately reacted to the 
situation and urged for the establishment of an international 
committee of inquiry while “enacting an arms embargo against 
Conakry, and appointing a regionally recognized arbitrator to mediate 
disputes between the junta and its opposition.”553 The AU played a 
less prominent role, and mainly imposed sanctions as a reaction.554 
Responses from different international bodies have been 
similar in character.555  
On the day of the massacre, United Nation’s Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement of 
condemnation, and urged Guinean security forces to 
apply maximum restraint in upholding the rule of law. 
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary-General exercised his 
Charter powers to create an International Commission 
                                                
552 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 2. 
553 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 2-3. 
554 “Nearly a month after the violence of 28 September, the AU’s Peace and 
Security Council implemented targeted sanctions against individual members of 
the regime, freezing assets, denying travel visas, and restricting freedom of 
movement within the union” (The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 
“Policy Brief,” 3). 
555 “French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner called for the junta to relinquish 
power, the establishment of a commission of inquiry and the deployment of 
international peacekeepers. United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed 
the position of her French counterpart. […] The United States also implemented 
targeted travel sanctions, suspended assistance with the exception of 
humanitarian aid, endorsed the ECOWAS arms embargo and announced plans to 
collaborate with the AU in developing a targeted sanctions regime against the 
junta. For its part, the European Union (EU) has rejected an economic investment 
proposal for Guinea, adopted an arms embargo against the country [on 27 October 
2009], and targeted its own economic and travel sanctions against individual junta 
members” (The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 3). 
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of Inquiry, [to which the] junta agreed to participate […] 
while also carrying out their own investigation.556  
It should be noted that Libya (which was the then AU President) 
issued a statement declaring its opposition to a UN investigation of 
the mass atrocities in Guinea considering this a breach of state 
sovereignty.557 Following the 20 December report to the Secretary-
General about the referral of the case to ICC558 and her visit to 
Conakry in February 2010, the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
Fatou Bensouda “reported that crimes against humanity had taken 
place and that either the ICC or the Guinean government must try 
those bearing the responsibility.”559 
In general terms, the swift response of the international 
community proved successful in halting the atrocities through the 
implementation of the RtoP norm at the level of Pillar Two. 
Nevertheless, the Global Centre notes that risk of future atrocities 
continues in case of the deterioration560 of the current situation.561 
Thus, monitoring and assessment of the root causes seems as a 
necessity to avoid future problems. 
                                                
556 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 3. 
557 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 3. 
558 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 3. 
559 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Guinea,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/crisis-in-guinea (accessed September 23, 2010). For the full text of the 
report, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C200208B-5375-41B2-8967-FFF 
C05528E34/281566/ FatousstatementGuinesENG.pdf.  
560 Currently, “the junta—which seized power in a 23 December 2008 coup 
following the death of President Lansa Conte—bears the responsibility to protect” 
(The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 1). 
561 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief,” 2. 
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6.2. Decidedness vs. Hesitation 
Timely response or action within the framework of the RtoP 
norm to humanitarian catastrophes has not always been the case in 
the aftermath of the World Summit Outcome Document. Aside from 
successful examples of invocation and implementation of the norm, 
there have also been situations where the international community 
has been hesitant to display decisive RtoP response. 
a. Democratic Republic of Congo 
Among the examples of a failure to timely implement the RtoP 
norm comes the situation in DRC. Drawing attention to the ongoing 
conflict since 1996, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect argues that the Government of the DRC as the sovereign of 
the state has been failing to uphold its responsibility to protect 
towards its citizens, and that the responsibility now lies with the 
international community.562 Furthermore, it is posited that “[h]uman 
rights violations currently committed by the parties in conflict in 
North Kivu have clearly crossed the thresholds laid out by the 
responsibility to protect norm,” and the ongoing situation bears the 
risk of becoming a threat to peace and security in the region.563 
                                                
562 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “DRC,” 
http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php?country=7 (accessed October 01, 
2010). 
563 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Open Letter to the UN 
Security Council Concerning the Situation in DRC,” http://globalr2p.org/media/ 
pdf/SCOpenLetDRC.pdf (accessed October 01, 2010). 
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There has been UN presence through the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) 
mainly in eastern Congo under a Chapter VII mandate between 30 
November 1999 and 30 June 2010.564 MONUC has in general proved 
inefficient in achieving its goals due to its small size, and thus, by the 
end of 2008 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had 
already asked for reinforcements.565 
The Global Centre underlines:  
It is essential that the Council use the full range of 
applicable measures at its disposal. The current crisis 
stems from the Security Council’s past political failures 
to tackle genocide in Rwanda and the ensuing conflicts 
in the eastern DRC and wider Great Lakes region. This 
includes a failure to ensure the implementation of the 
November 2007 Nairobi declaration between the 
governments of DRC and Rwanda, and the January 
2008 Goma agreement between the parties to the 
conflicts in North Kivu.566 
The 23 July 2007 Presidential Statement of the Security Council 
(S/PRST/2007/28)567 while indicating grave concern about the 
“deteriorating security situation in the east of the DRC” also called 
                                                
564 As of 30 April 2010, the strength of the force has grown up to 20,819 uniformed 
personnel, (18,884 troops; 712 military observers; 1,223 police). (United Nations 
Peacekeeping, “MONUC Facts and Figures,” http://157.150.195.10/en/ 
peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml (accessed October 05, 2010)). 
565 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Open Letter to the UN 
Security Council Concerning the Situation in DRC,” http://globalr2p.org/media/ 
pdf/SCOpenLetDRC.pdf (accessed October 01, 2010). 
566 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Open Letter to the UN 
Security Council Concerning the Situation in DRC,” http://globalr2p.org/media/ 
pdf/SCOpenLetDRC.pdf (accessed October 01, 2010). 
567 Security Council Report Organisation, “Statement by the President of the 
Security Council,” http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC SPRST2007 28.pdf (accessed October 
03, 2010). 
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for a resolution of the dispute through diplomatic and political 
measures.568 
In its resolutions 1756 (2007) and 1771 (2007), the Security 
Council invoked RtoP neither in a direct nor in an indirect manner. 
There was no reference to the RtoP norm by name or through 
mentioning paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document. Nevertheless, in both documents the Council considered 
the situation a continuing “threat to international peace and security 
in the region.” By December 2008, the Security Council enlarged the 
2004 sanctions on the DRC. Furthermore, the UN Human Rights 
Council in its resolution urged the Government to take all the 
necessary steps to ensure the security of its population towards 
which it had the primary responsibility, and to halt the breaches of 
human rights.569 
The ongoing violence attracted regional attention too. 
Nevertheless, RtoP was not explicitly invoked as a part of the 
international and/or regional response to the case.570 Moreover, civil 
                                                
568 Security Council Report, “Democratic Republic of the Congo Historical 
Chronology,” http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/ 
b.2880409/ (accessed September 29, 2010). 
569 “Amnesty International, concerned by the lack of action following the resolution 
passed by the Human Rights Council in December 2008, urged the UN to do more 
to protect the civilians and end impunity in the DRC.” (ICRtoP, “Crisis in DRC,” 
http://www.responsibility toprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc (accessed 
October 05, 2010)). 
570 “On 7 November 2008, in response to the surge in violence at that time, Great 
Lakes Regional leaders, the AU and UN met in Nairobi. They called for a ceasefire 
in North Kivu and the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to address the 
humanitarian crisis, called on the UN Secretary-General to strengthen the mandate 
of MONUC and provide adequate resources for the force. They also considered the 
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society groups have called for “a political solution to the conflict” and 
acknowledged that MONUC has been failing to secure the lives of 
civilians.571 Nevertheless, the Global Centre evaluates that the 
“international community has stepped up to fulfil their responsibility 
to react and rebuild; however, attempts at alleviating the 
humanitarian crisis and to implement a peace process in the DRC 
have been progressing slowly.”572 
b. Kyrgyzstan 
After the Government was overthrown in April, the south of the 
country faced the challenge of destabilisation as a conflict between 
the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks ignited in the region. In this vein, Kyrgyzstan 
has been a case, for which the Global Centre urges the UN Member 
States to take immediate action in response to the ongoing 
                                                                                                                                     
possibility of sending peacekeepers to North Kivu, and established a mediation 
process and mechanism that involves all the regional leaders and a team of 
facilitators. While the UN did strengthen and reinforce the mandate of the MONUC 
by UN resolution 1856 on 22 December 2008 to emphasize the focus on the 
protection of civilians, the calls for a ceasefire, humanitarian corridor and 
mediation process were unheeded. 
On 20 December 2008, the African Union Peace and Security Council condemned 
the atrocities and urged the UN Security Council to strengthen the mandate of 
MONUC. However, the AU, SADC or the leaders of the Great Lake regions have 
made little progress; humanitarian efforts decided upon are rarely translated into 
actual action; ceasefires had no lasting hold.” (Coalition for the Responsibility to 
Protect, “Crisis in DRC,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/ 
crisis-in-drc (accessed October 05, 2010). 
571 “Specifically addressing accountability issues within the DRC, 11 organizations 
including the International Rescue Committee, CARE and the Enough Project 
urged the Congolese government to fulfil its obligation to protect civilians from 
human rights abuses, particularly by holding its own commanders and troops 
accountable for human rights abuses, especially with regards to sexual attacks in 
eastern DRC” (ICRtoP, “Crisis in DRC,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc  (accessed October 05, 2010)). 
572 ICRtoP, “Crisis in DRC,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/crisis-in-drc (accessed October 05, 2010). 
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violence573 since 10 June 2010. As the current official authority of 
the Kyrgyz State, the Interim Government has recognised its failure 
to fulfil its responsibility to protect towards its population. 
Furthermore, it has asked for assistance from Russia and requested 
for deployment of troops to be able to take the violence under control. 
Nevertheless, Russia has not seemed inclined to take any decisive 
action.574 It simply 
has deployed just over 100 troops to protect a Russian 
airbase and its personnel, but has ruled out quelling the 
violence by leading a regional peacekeeping mission 
through the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) of former Soviet states. Instead, Russia has 
agreed to send helicopters and other transport vehicles 
to increase the capacity of the interim government in 
Kyrgyzstan to deal with the violence.”575 
Soon after the Interim Government withdrew its request for help from 
Russia claiming that the situation was normalising, on June 24 it 
                                                
573 “The attacks, carried out by groups of armed men, appear, as the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay noted, premeditated and targeted 
against ethnic Uzbeks. These armed groups continue to terrorize ethnic Uzbek 
communities unimpeded as there is no robust military or police presence to deter 
them” (The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Kyrgyzstan,” 
http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php?country=398 (accessed September 
26, 2010)). 
574 “Nor has the regional security organization, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), offered military assistance. The United States, the European 
Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN have similarly failed to offer 
the military or police assistance desperately needed to provide immediate 
protection to the people at risk” (The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 
“Kyrgyzstan,” http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php?country=398 (accessed 
September, 26 2010). 
575 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index. 
php/crises/crisis-in-kyrgyzstan (accessed September 26, 2010). 
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turned to the OSCE for the deployment of “an international policing 
force to help restore law and order in the south.”576 
Francis Deng as the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide and Edward Luck as the Special Adviser on the 
Responsibility to Protect of the UN Secretary-General in mid-June 
stated that the ongoing violence in Kyrgyzstan which so far has led to 
“mass displacement of Uzbeks from South Kyrgyzstan, could amount 
to ethnic cleansing.” In this regard, on the basis of Paragraph 138 of 
the Summit Outcome Document as well as the Interim Government’s 
call for assistance, Deng and Luck urged for the implementation of 
the RtoP norm for timely response to the situation before the crisis 
escalates further and also becomes a threat to the peace and security 
in the region.577 
During the conflict, Kyrgyzstan received international578 and 
humanitarian assistance to help control the situation. Moreover, two 
commissions, one by the Interim Government itself and the other by 
an international cooperation of the EU, OSCE and the UN, were 
                                                
576 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index. 
php/crises/crisis-in-kyrgyzstan (accessed September 26, 2010). 
577 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Statement of 
Special Advisers Deng and Luck on the situation in Kyrgyzstan 15 June 2010.pdf 
(accessed October 22, 2010). 
578 The UN had put in action the “Flash Appeal” in order to assist Kyrgyzstan. 
Additionally, the state has received help from friendly countries on a bilateral basis 
(Statement by His Excellency Mr. Ruslan Kazakbatev Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Kyrgyz Republic at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
September 27, 2010 New York, http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/ 
generaldebate/Portals/1/statements/634211913991250000KG_en.pdf (accessed 
October 01, 2010), p. 3). 
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established for purposes of investigation.579 Nevertheless, neither 
RtoP has been officially implemented, nor there has been 
international action falling within the confines of humanitarian 
intervention. In this regard, no decisive action was undertaken by the 
international community even after the Interim Government declared 
itself unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect.  
Kyrgyz Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 27 stated that 
the current concern of the Interim Government is “post-conflict 
reconstruction,” and that they are in need of the assistance promised 
in the donor conference in July.580 Thus, Kyrgyzstan is still in need of 
the international community to step up to uphold its responsibility, 
this time at the level of stage three: the responsibility to rebuild.  
c. Sudan 
The situation in Darfur has been in the forefront as a concern 
for the international community since 2003. On 7 November, “the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warn[ed] 
that Darfur is facing its worst humanitarian crisis since 1988.”581 In 
                                                
579 Statement by His Excellency Mr. Ruslan Kazakbatev Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Kyrgyz Republic at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
September 27, 2010 New York, http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/ 
generaldebate/Portals/1/statements/634211913991250000KG_en.pdf (accessed 
October 01, 2010). 
580 Statement by His Excellency Mr. Ruslan Kazakbatev Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Kyrgyz Republic at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
September 27, 2010 New York, http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/ 
generaldebate/Portals/1/statements/634211913991250000KG_en.pdf (accessed 
October 01, 2010), p. 3. 
581 United Nations website, UN News Centre, http://www.un.org/News/dh/dev/ 
scripts/darfur_formatted.htm (accessed January 10, 2011). 
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this regard, some have considered this a major “test case”582 for the 
implementation of the so-called RtoP norm. Accordingly, first as 
introduced by the ICISS and then, as established by the World 
Summit Outcome Document of 2005, the case in general has come to 
be accepted as an example of a failure of the international 
community to put RtoP in action.583 
The AU has been the leading regional actor active in seeking an 
end to the ongoing violence, most prominently through the 
deployment in 2004 of a peacekeeping force, namely the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In the aftermath of the 
establishment of RtoP within the UN framework, the Security Council 
in its Resolution 1706 (2006) regarding the situation in Darfur made 
direct references to paragraphs 138 and 139 by reaffirming their 
provisions. In the meanwhile, the Council considered the situation an 
ongoing “threat to peace and security” and repeated its 
condemnation of the ongoing breaches of human rights and 
international humanitarian law in Darfur. The Resolution also 
                                                
582 See, for example, Cristina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm, ‘‘Responsibility to 
Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down,’’ Security Dialogue 40(3) 
(2009): 287–309. 
583 “4.2 million Darfurians have been categorized as ‘war affected’ and entirely 
dependent on international assistance, 2.5 million civilians have been torn from 
their homes, hundreds of habitats and livelihoods have been destroyed, 240,000 
refugees have been hosted by Chad and the Central African Republic, and the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 
over 400,000 people have been killed. While the government of Sudan has 
orchestrated a campaign of ethnic cleansing through proxy militias, world leaders 
with the power to stop the atrocities have failed to react to protect Darfuris due to 
conflicting geopolitical interests and a lack of political will.” (ICRtoP, “Crisis in 
Darfur,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-darfur 
(accessed September 20, 2010)). 
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attempted at the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the UN Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS) in order to assist AMIS, but the Government of 
Sudan declined to give its consent584 to the mission.  
It was only by July 2007 that the Security Council authorised 
the UNMIS with Resolution 1769.585 Prior to this, on 30 April 2007, 
the Council in Resolution 1755 (2007) recalled “the relevant 
provisions of the World Summit Outcome Document” without making 
an explicit reference to the RtoP norm.586 The UN’s attempts to 
deploy forces were also supported by the decisions of the European 
Union (EU) Parliament on several occasions. For instance, in its 
resolution on 28 September 2006, the Parliament made a direct 
reference to the norm of the RtoP by using the phrase “the UN 
‘Responsibility to Protect,’” and asserted that due to Sudan’s failure 
to protect its population, it is “obliged to accept a UN force in line 
with UN Security Council Resolution 1706.” Furthermore, it urged 
the UN Security Council to bring pressure to bear on the 
Sudanese authorities to accept the deployment of the 
already authorised UN Mission to Darfur, with a clear 
                                                
584 As Mashood Issaka notes, legitimate interventions can take place upon the 
initiation or consent of the local state. In cases where there is state collapse or 
failure, consent is not sought (Mashood Issaka, interview by author, New York, NY, 
November 06, 2008). In line with this, Wafula Okumu notes that in the case of 
Darfur, the Sudanese state is still functional and not failed. Nevertheless, due to its 
failure to protect, it needed to ask for assistance. He further argues that AU’s “right 
to intervene” could not be invoked, since the very qualification of state failure was 
absent. In other words, the principle can be invoked when the state has failed and 
is no longer able to protect its civilian population, so that the AU steps in to protect 
the civilians from the catastrophic results of state failure (Wafula Okumu, phone 
interview by author, November 03, 2008). 
585 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Darfur,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/crisis-in-darfur (accessed September 20, 2010). 
586 Available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/SC1755.pdf (accessed 
November 01, 2010) 
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Chapter VII mandate and enhanced capacities given to 
such a mission through UN Security Council Resolution 
1706.587 
Similar points, alongside its call for the implementation of sanctions 
on the Government of Sudan by international actors, were raised588 
in the Resolution of 15 February 2007, in which the Parliament 
asked the UN to take action within the framework of RtoP due to the 
failure of the local government to uphold its “responsibility to 
protect.”589 The EU not only strongly encouraged the deployment of 
UNAMID throughout the processes but also physically assisted the 
mission at the border by the EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic 
(CAR) from the Chadian/CAR side.590 Okumu notes that peripheral 
factors have been effective in the involvement of external partners 
such as China and the EU.591  
                                                
587 European Parliament, The situation in Darfur, “European Parliament Resolution 
on the Situation in Darfur,” (P6_TA(2006)0387), 28 September 2006, Strasbourg,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-
TA-2006-0387+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed November 01, 
2010). 
588 On the basis of the RtoP norm, the European Parliament reiterated its concerns 
regarding the situation in Darfur in its resolutions P6_TA(2008)0238 on 22 May 
2008 and P6_TA(2009)0145 on 12 March 2009. The resolutions are available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-
TA-2008-0238+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN, and 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2009-
0145&format=XML&language=EN (accessed November 01, 2010). 
589 European Parliament, The situation in Darfur, “European Parliament Resolution 
on the Situation in Darfur,” (P6_TA(2007)0052), 15 February 2007, Strasbourg, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-
TA-2007-0052+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed November 01, 2010). 
590 Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York, “Chad/Central 
African Republic,” http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article3835 (accessed 
November 01, 2010). 
591 Wafula Okumu, phone interview by author, November 03, 2008. 
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Since 2003, there has been no forceful intervention in Darfur, 
and the Sudanese Government’s consent has been prioritised over 
intervention despite the ongoing discussions about whether genocide 
has been taking place or not.592 On 21 March 2005, the matter of 
Darfur was brought to the attention of the ICC, and currently four 
cases are being heard before the Court.593 Hurst Hannum considers 
the example of Darfur a one-sided war, and argues that limited 
intervention was justifiable since the early days of the conflict. 
Nonetheless, he adds, Darfur is very hard to intervene due to its 
size.594  
Additionally, Okumu argues: “not many countries in Africa are 
willing to take action on the grounds of genocide taking place, and 
the main reasons are incapability (e.g. financial burden as well as 
lack of right equipment and trained personnel), lack of political will, 
and the high risk factor.”595 In this regard, concerning the 
implementation of RtoP as adopted by the UN, the issue has not 
necessarily been lack of interest per se, but there was still the given 
concern about the situation due to the political dynamics, and the 
                                                
592 Wafula Okumu notes that the AU at the time had not had the information to 
prove that genocide, or war crimes, or crimes against humanity have been taking 
place. This requires fact-finding, and the AU does not have the means for that 
(Wafula Okumu, phone interview by author, November 03, 2008). 
593 These are: (1) The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) 
and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”); (2) The Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir; (3) The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda; and (4) The 
Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus 
(http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/). 
594 Hurst Hannum, interview by the author, March 06, 2009. 
595 Wafula Okumu, phone interview by author, November 03, 2008. 
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implementation of the tools of RtoP has been (too) slow to have an 
effective solution to the prolonged crisis. 
d. Zimbabwe 
The ongoing violence in Zimbabwe since 2000 by the hand of 
state’s security forces has attracted international attention, especially 
in the form of condemnation from civil society groups.596 The EU has 
not been silent about the crisis either. In April 2008, through the 
declaration of the President of the Union, it conveyed its concern, 
and nine months later it “extend[ed] sanctions on Mugabe and his 
top aides for their ongoing failure to address the most basic economic 
and social needs of its people.”597 The EU did not invoke the RtoP 
norm as it did in the case of Darfur. 
The International Coalition observes that the “AU has 
condemned the post-election violence, albeit not in a timely way, and 
deferred the situation to the South African Development Community 
(SADC),” which opted for quiet diplomacy (including mediation) as its 
measures of involvement, and failed to achieve a positive/effective 
                                                
596 “On 21 April 2008, a coalition of 105 representatives from civil society, 
including human rights activists, faith groups, and students in Africa wrote a 
communiqué, which included a discussion of the applicability of RtoP, and called 
for a concerned and effective response by the international community to 
guarantee effective aid delivery and livelihoods to the Zimbabwean people.” ICRtoP, 
“Crisis in Zimbabwe,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect. org/index.php/crises/ 
crisis-in-zimbabwe (accessed September, 30, 2010). 
597 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Zimbabwe,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php 
/crises/crisis-in-zimbabwe, (accessed September, 30, 2010). 
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result.598 The Coalition also criticises the UN for not implementing 
decisive measures to stop the serious breaches of human rights in 
the country. Nevertheless, the status of the situation as an RtoP 
crisis is disputed, and there does not seem to be a consensus on 
whether the crimes committed qualify for the implementation of 
measures within the RtoP framework. In this vein, while the Global 
Centre does not mention the situation in Zimbabwe as a focus, the 
International Coalition argues that it “requires further monitoring.”599 
e. Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka has been the stage of a civil war between the 
Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since 
1984, which has intensified by the beginning of 2009 creating a 
humanitarian catastrophe and came to an end by mid-2009. 
According to the proponents of RtoP, the mass number of deaths 
signalled at the failure of the Government of Sri Lanka to protect its 
population, and led to a call for the international community to step 
in. 
On 22 April 2009, […] a joint letter by NGOs including 
Global Action to Prevent War, Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, International Crisis Group, 
MEDACT, Minority Rights Group, Operation USA, 
Tearfund and World Federalist Movement - Institute for 
                                                
598 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Zimbabwe,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php 
/crises/crisis-in-zimbabwe (accessed September, 30, 2010). 
599 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Zimbabwe,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php 
/crises/crisis-in-zimbabwe (accessed September, 30, 2010). 
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Global Policy, urged UN action to “protect civilians and 
prevent mass atrocities.”600 
Nevertheless, throughout the course of the clashes, there has been 
no forceful intervention on the territory of Sri Lanka. May 19, 2009 
marked the end of the civil war, and three days later Ban Ki-Moon 
paid a visit to the country. His focus has been on three key areas: 
“immediate humanitarian relief, reintegration and reconstruction, 
and an equitable political solution.”601 During the post-conflict 
period, also with the support of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 
the government of Sri Lanka rejected an international inquiry by a 
UN-led commission on the basis that this would constitute 
interference in the internal affairs of the State.602 
All in all, in the case of Sri Lanka, forceful action within the 
framework of Pillar 3 of the RtoP norm would have been possible in 
order to halt the mass violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law. Nevertheless, no action was undertaken, and as the Global 
Centre notes, “key states —including members of the Security 
Council— argued that the situation was an internal matter.”603 At the 
                                                
600 www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-sri-lanka (accessed 
September, 29, 2010). 
601 UN News Centre, “Durable political solution key to development in post-conflict 
Sri Lanka – Ban,” http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30904&Cr= 
sri+lanka&Cr1= (accessed November 23, 2010). 
602 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Sri Lanka,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php 
/crises/crisis-in-sri-lanka (accessed September, 29, 2010). 
603 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Sri Lanka,” 
http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php?country=107 (accessed September 
29, 2010). 
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current state of affairs, the case is eligible for consideration within 
the confines of the “responsibility to rebuild.” 
f. Nigeria 
Nigeria has been a scene of humanitarian atrocities since 1999 
due to the clashes between its communities. The ongoing violence is 
accepted to reach its peak with the 7 March 2010 events, which are 
seen to be indications of the potential for the perpetration of crimes 
against humanity.604 Nigerian NGOs  
endorsed a communiqué, which denounced the crimes 
and the failure of the government to protect its 
population, and called for an investigation of the crimes 
and for humanitarian assistance. The NGO signatories 
denounced the government for failing to prevent and 
punish those responsible for hate communication after 
it was reported that much of January 2010 violence was 
directed and encouraged via text messages.605 
Thus, although legitimate authorities of the State responded to the 
situation, they are considered to have failed to prevent the atrocities 
despite the early signs. 
Regarding the regional/international response, the AU and 
ECOWAS were criticised for not reacting to the crisis in a decisive 
manner. The Economist, in an article, considers Nigeria as 
ECOWAS’s “Achilles heel.” “Africa’s most populous country[’s …] 
                                                
604 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Nigeria,” 
http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php?country=378 (accessed September 
28, 2010). 
605 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Nigeria,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/crisis-in-nigeria (accessed September, 29, 2010). 
  219 
economy is twice as big as the other members’ combined. The club’s 
headquarters is in Nigeria, which, on some counts, provides a third 
of the cash for ECOWAS and a big chunk of its peacekeeping 
troops.”606 In this regard, it becomes problematic for the members of 
the Organisation to disapprove of what is going on within the 
territory of the Nigerian State.607 The International Coalition argues 
that “[w]ithout preventive action and rapid response from the 
regional community, the national government is less likely to be held 
accountable for failing to uphold its responsibility to protect and the 
ongoing violence will continue.”608 
6.3. Cases of RtoP? Misapplication vs. inaction 
Myanmar is a case that both the ICRtoP and  the Global Centre 
focus on. The International Coalition additionally focuses on three 
situations noting that the events in Gaza, Georgia and Somalia have 
attracted attention from different milieus regarding whether or not 
these are cases requiring international response on the basis of the 
RtoP norm. Gaza, a crisis that resulted from a “breakdown of the 
                                                
606 The Economist, “West Africa’s Regional Club: Quietly Impressive,” 
http://www.economist.com/node/15772983?story_id=15772983, March 25, 2010, 
Lagos (accessed: 23 November 2010). 
607 The Economist, “West Africa’s Regional Club: Quietly Impressive,” 
http://www.economist.com/node/15772983?story_id=15772983, March 25, 2010, 
Lagos (accessed: 23 November 2010). 
608 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Nigeria,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/crisis-in-nigeria (accessed September 28, 2010). 
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cease-fire and a military offensive between Israel and Hamas,”609 
mainly relates to violations of International Humanitarian Law.610 
The International Coalition while focusing on the events from 27 
December 2008 on, identifies Israel as an “occupying power with the 
responsibility on the population of the territory.” Nevertheless, the 
disputed status of the territory makes this case a complicated one in 
terms of considering it a case of RtoP concern. For this reason, the 
case of Gaza is not included within the scope of this dissertation. 
a. Myanmar  
The Global Centre argues that the “Burmese military 
government and armed forces, the Tatmadaw, are perpetrating gross 
human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities 
across Burma.” The crimes targeting ethnic groups of the Karen, 
Shan, Karenni, Rohingya and Chin are elevating to the threshold of 
                                                
609 ICRtoP,  “The Crisis in Gaza: An RtoP situation?  (December 2008-January 
2009),” http://www.responsibilityto protect.org/index.php/crises/178-other-rtop-
concerns/2750-the-crisis-in-gaza (accessed September, 27, 2010). 
610 Human Rights Watch reporting on the case of Gaza in “Deprived and 
Endangered: Humanitarian Crisis in the Gaza Strip” notes: “The Israeli government 
has repeatedly denied that a humanitarian crisis exists. Information from 
international humanitarian organizations, United Nations agencies and Gaza's 
residents themselves starkly refute that claim. Hundreds of civilians have been 
killed in the fighting, a large percentage of them children. Many wounded and sick 
have been trapped in their homes, unable to get medical care. Corpses have been 
left among rubble and in destroyed homes because Israeli forces have at times 
denied access to medical crews. Increasing numbers are displaced or are trapped 
in their homes. They have nowhere to flee, caught in a warzone where no place is 
truly safe” (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/12/deprived-and-endangered-
humanitarian-crisis-gaza-strip (accessed September 27, 2010). 
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“crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.”611 
Therefore, the Global Centre evaluates this as an RtoP case and 
urges for action. Likewise, the International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect notes that the acts by the hand of the 
military junta has reached a level requiring a response on the basis 
of the RtoP norm.612  
In the course of the ongoing events, China has been an actor 
behind the curtain attempting “to mediate conversations between the 
Burmese government and major ceasefire groups operating along the 
Chinese border.”613 In the meantime, the international community 
within the framework of the General Assembly clearly indicated its 
serious concern about the “ongoing systematic violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Myanmar.”614 In 
line with this, the Secretary-General has been providing good offices, 
and his efforts have found continued support from the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although the Security Council has 
not taken direct measures regarding the situation in Burma, its 
                                                
611 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Myanmar,” 
http://globalr2p.org/countrywork/country.php?country=17 (accessed September 
27, 2010). 
612 “Human rights abuses by the military junta include: the pervasive use of forced 
labor, forced recruitment of tens of thousands of child soldiers, rampant sexual 
violence, extrajudicial killings, torture and the displacement of over a million 
Burmese people” (ICRtoP, “Crisis in Burma,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect. 
org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-burma (accessed September 25, 2010)). 
613 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Policy Brief: Upholding the 
Responsibility to Protect in Burma/Myanmar,” 16 August 2010, http://global 
r2p.org/media/pdf/Upholding_the_Responsibility_to_Protect_in_Burma-Myanmar 
.pdf (accessed September, 25, 2010). 
614 General Assembly resolution 61/232. 
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serious concern was reflected in two of the statements615 by the 
President of the Council. Nevertheless, in none of its resolutions 
and/or statements, the UN has evaluated the issue from the lens of 
the RtoP norm. 
The International Coalition points that proponents of RtoP 
argue for UN action on the grounds of the following argument: 
If it can be shown that the government of Burma's 
actions are or will lead to crimes against humanity, the 
international community therefore will bear the 
responsibility to prevent these crimes against humanity 
from occurring, first through peaceful means 
(diplomatic, economic, political) and through the use of 
force only a as a last resort.616 
Nevertheless, an action motivated under such spirit has not yet 
taken place. Diverging from this line of reasoning, Bernard Kouchner 
has invoked RtoP and urged for action on the grounds that the 
Burmese Government has been blocking humanitarian aid that was 
sent in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis which primarily 
affected Irrawady delta region.617 He stated: “We are seeing at the 
United Nations if we can’t implement the ‘responsibility to protect,’ 
given that food, boats and relief teams are there, and obtain a U.N. 
resolution which authorizes the delivery (of aid) and imposes this on 
                                                
615 These are S/PRST/2007/37 and S/PRST/2008/13. 
616 ICRtoP, “Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society,” http://www. 
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/1689 (accessed 
September 27, 2010). 
617 Claudia Parsons, “France urges U.N. council to act on Myanmar cyclone,” 
Reuters, May 07, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL07810481 (accessed 
October 22, 2010). 
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the Burmese government.”618 Kouchner’s claims have created 
controversy and not gained much support. At the level of states, 
Russia and China were among those who strongly objected to the 
idea of forceful action against the Burmese Government.619 
Kouchner’s argument received criticisms from prominent RtoP 
figures too. For instance, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General 
Edward Luck clearly stated that “linking the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
to the situation in Burma is a misapplication of the doctrine.”620 
In this regard, the case of Burma constitutes a focus in terms 
of RtoP implementation from two different aspects. Although 
prevention of aid cannot be considered as a justification for 
employing forceful measures within the confines of the RtoP 
framework, since the breaches of human rights are perpetrated by 
the government forces, it is possible to talk about a state failure to 
protect its population. Thus, the responsibility can be accepted to be 
borne with the international community. At this stage, the scale of 
the atrocities is of importance concerning the undertaking of action 
grounded on the RtoP framework, and the situation requires 
monitoring. Hence, the case of Myanmar can be seen as an example 
                                                
618 Claudia Parsons, “France urges U.N. council to act on Myanmar cyclone,” 
Reuters, May 07, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL07810481 (accessed 
October 22, 2010). 
619 Jonathan Marcus, “World Wrestles with the Burma Aid Issue,” BBC News, May 
09, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7392662.stm (accessed 
October 22, 2010). 
620 Jonathan Marcus, “World Wrestles with the Burma Aid Issue,” BBC News, May 
09, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7392662.stm (accessed 
October 22, 2010). 
  224 
first of a misapplication of the RtoP norm, and second, of an RtoP 
case where the international community is failing to act timely and 
has been hesitant to implement the necessary measures in a decisive 
manner. 
b. Georgia 
In the August 2008 crisis between Georgia and Russia, Sergey 
Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, listed RtoP among 
Russia’s justifications for forceful action in South Ossetia. As 
asserted by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Permanent 
Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Vitaly Churkin, 
the norm was invoked based on the argument of the protection of 
Russian citizens residing in South Ossetia, who were claimed to be 
subjected to genocidal acts conducted by Georgia.621 
The Russian invocation of RtoP constitutes a misapplication of 
the norm due to a number of reasons. First, protection of a state’s 
own citizens residing outside the motherland is more likely to be 
considered within the confines of the right to self-defence rather than 
a responsibility to protect. Second, in terms of the state sovereignty 
as responsibility understanding, the RtoP doctrine is applicable 
within the borders of the state itself where it has a responsibility to 
protect the population within its own territory. As reiterated in Para. 
                                                
621 ICRtoP, “Georgia-Russia Crisis and RtoP (August 2008),” http://www. 
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/178-other-rtop-concerns/2749-the-
crisis-in-georgia-russia (accessed September 27, 2010). 
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139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, when and if the state 
fails to uphold its responsibility either due to inability or 
unwillingness, then the responsibility turns into the responsibility of 
the international community to act collectively. In this regard, the 
RtoP understanding established by the UN, concerning the 
realisation of RtoP outside the borders of a state’s own territory, does 
not lead to an assumption that unilateral action without the consent 
of the UN organs is to be condoned. Finally, “[i]t is unclear whether 
the degree of threat to Russians in Georgia represented actual or 
imminent mass atrocities to the scale pertinent to the RtoP norm and 
also whether military force was the appropriate response.”622 In this 
vein, Russia’s invocation of the RtoP norm stands out as an example 
of an abusive state application for justification purposes. 
c. Somalia 
The International Coalition highlights that the case of Somalia 
has potential to qualify as an RtoP concern and thus, it calls for 
continued monitoring of the situation by the international 
community. The conflict between the Ethiopian/Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) forces and anti-government elements has 
escalated to the level of severe humanitarian law breaches, “in some 
                                                
622 ICRtoP, “Georgia-Russia Crisis and RtoP (August 2008),” http://www. 
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/178-other-rtop-concerns/2749-the-
crisis-in-georgia-russia (accessed September 27, 2010). 
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cases, amounting to war crimes.”623 The threats to human security 
have escalated in 2007 and as of 2008 resulted in deaths and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Nevertheless, “Gareth Evans 
suggested that Somalia was not a ‘classic [RtoP] situation’ but that 
the imminent threat of mass atrocities warranted its placing on a 
watch list of countries of RtoP concern.”624 
Alex J. Bellamy notes: “In relation to Somalia, there has been 
little RtoP talk, the UN and AU have proven reluctant to act 
decisively, and the West tends to focus more on the situation’s 
external symptoms (piracy and links to Islamist terrorism) than its 
civilian protection dimension.”625 Such attitude is observable in the 
resolutions626 of the UN Security Council too. Despite the fact that 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Somalia have 
been condemned in a number of resolutions, and concerns about the 
humanitarian situation were mentioned (in terms of raising the issue 
of the continuation of the humanitarian assistance and the necessity 
                                                
623 ICRtoP, “Crisis in Somalia,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
crises/178-other-rtop-concerns/ 2751-crisis-in-somalia (accessed September 18, 
2010). 
624 Matthew Russell Lee, ‘‘Re-Branding Responsibility to Protect, Gareth Evans 
Says Somalia’s Not Covered,’’ Inner City Press, September 17, 2009; available at 
www.innercitypress.com/r2p1evans091708.html (accessed February 19, 2010); 
and Evans, ‘‘The Responsibility to Protect,’’ p. 76. 
625 Alex J. Bellamy. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 24(2) (2010): 165. 
626 UN Security Council resolutions on Somalia after the adoption of the World 
Summit Outcome Document are as follows: S/RES/1724 (2006), S/RES/1725 
(2006), S/RES/1744 (2007), S/RES/1766 (2007), S/RES/1772 (2007), 
S/RES/1811 (2008), S/RES/1814 (2008), S/RES/1816 (2008), S/RES/1831 
(2008), S/RES/1838 (2008), S/RES/1844 (2008), S/RES/1846 (2008), 
S/RES/1851 (2008), S/RES/1853 (2008), S/RES/1863 (2009), S/RES/1872 
(2009), S/RES/1897 (2009), S/RES/1910 (2010), S/RES/1916 (2010), 
S/RES/1918 (2010). 
  227 
for protecting the civilians), no reference, direct or indirect, was made 
either to paragraphs 138 and 139, or the RtoP norm itself. 
Although the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is a 
“peace support operation,” in its mission statement talks about 
transition to a UN peace-keeping force,627 this has not yet taken 
place. There has been reluctance in the UN as also backed by the 
view of 
the United Kingdom, France, and Russia […] that the 
conditions were not right for the deployment of 
peacekeepers, that peacekeepers would face significant 
threats, that the UN would not be able to generate a 
sufficiently robust force, and that in the absence of a 
viable political process there was no clear end state.628  
Furthermore, the Security Council in the wording of its related 
resolutions stresses the importance of the integrity and sovereignty of 
the Somali State, while describing the situation in Somalia as a 
threat to international peace and security. In the resolutions after 
2006, the emphasis has generally been on the concerns arising from 
piracy issues rather than the humanitarian impact.629 In sum, RtoP 
has not been implemented as a part of the international response. As 
                                                
627 African Union Mission in Somalia, “AMISOM Mission Statement” 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/amisom.htm 
(accessed November 22, 2010). 
628 Alex J. Bellamy. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 24(2) (2010): 157. 
629 For instance, Resolution 1744 (2007) “Expresses its deep concern over the 
humanitarian situation in Somalia.” The issue of piracy is openly stated in 
Resolution 1772 (2007). Moreover, the Security Council in this document “stresses 
the responsibility of all parties and armed groups in Somalia to take appropriate 
steps to protect the civilian population in the country, consistent with international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, in particular by avoiding any 
indiscriminate attacks on populated areas.” 
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Matthew Russell Lee observes, the “international community has 
responded to events as they have unfolded and has tended to 
prioritize the interests of external actors over those of Somali 
civilians.”630 
6.4. Evaluation 
Of the cases mentioned in this chapter,631 two out of eleven are 
examples of invocation and subsequent successful implementation of 
the RtoP norm at an early stage. Two of them constitute examples of 
misapplication whereas the remaining cases hint at hesitance to take 
action within the framework of RtoP. In one genuine case of RtoP, 
namely Myanmar, RtoP was invoked on false grounds since the 
reasoning for forceful intervention was based on the necessity to 
deliver humanitarian aid. 
As revealed by the overview, with the exception of the 
misapplication of the norm on Georgia, RtoP was implemented at the 
level of Pillar 3 in none of the instances since late 2005. The means 
adopted in the “responsibility to react”s application were limited to 
the imposition of sanctions. RtoP was not invoked while undertaking 
forceful action. 
 
                                                
630 Matthew Russell Lee, ‘‘Re-Branding Responsibility to Protect, Gareth Evans 
Says Somalia’s Not Covered,’’ Inner City Press, September 17, 2009; available at 
www.innercitypress.com/r2p1evans091708.html (accessed February 19, 2010); 
and Evans, ‘‘The Responsibility to Protect,’’ p. 76. 
631 For an evaluative summary of the cases, see Table 2. 
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Table 2. Evaluative summary of RtoP implementations 
 
  
Pillar 
1 
 
RtoP 
invoked by 
the UN? 
 
Pillar 
2 
 
Pillar 
3 
 
International 
Action 
amounting to 
HI 
 
Adopted 
RtoP 
stage 
       
DRC 
Cold Case 
Failed No — — No None 
 
Guinea 
Cold Case 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
— 
 
No: just P2 
level peaceful 
measures 
 
S2 –
success  
 
Kenya 
Cold Case 
 
Failed 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
— 
 
No: just P2 
level peaceful 
measures 
 
S2 –
success 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
Ongoing Case 
 
Failed 
+AA 
 
Not 
officially 
 
Yes 
 
Failed 
 
No: just 
policing 
activity 
 
S1 - 
failure 
 
Myanmar 
 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
No 
 
— 
 
No 
 
None 
 
Nigeria 
Ongoing Case 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
Failed 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
None 
 
Sri Lanka 
Ongoing Case 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
Failed 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
S3 ? 
 
Sudan 
 
 
Failed 
+RA 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
None 
 
Zimbabwe 
Requires 
monitoring 
 
Failed 
 
No 
 
Failed 
 
— 
 
No: adopted 
peaceful 
measures 
proved 
ineffective 
 
None 
       
 
P1: Pillar 1 - state responsibility S1: Responsibility to Prevent 
P2: Pillar 2 - international assistance 
and capacity building 
S2: Responsibility to React 
P3: Pillar 3 - timely and decisive 
response 
S3: Responsibility to Rebuild 
AA: The Government itself asked for 
assistance. 
RA: The Government rejected outside 
involvement despite the calls. 
Not officially: invocation of the concept 
was by the Secretary-General’s Special 
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. 
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In certain situations (as in Darfur), the UN has acknowledged severe 
violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law, 
and urged the responsible states/bodies to end these violations while 
reminding them of their responsibility to protect their populations. 
Nevertheless, also troubled with capacity/capability issues, the 
Security Council did not take measures to forcefully intervene or to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of these states in the absence of state 
consent. Thus, implementation of RtoP at the level humanitarian 
intervention is not observed in any of the genuine RtoP cases. 
In general terms, it can be observed that the international 
community has not been eager to take forceful action even in cases 
that necessitated so. Thus, the classical understanding of state 
sovereignty still seems to prevail in the practices of the international 
community (although states have been frequently reminded of their 
individual responsibility as a part of their sovereignty). Darfur has 
been the example of prevalence of state sovereignty since the UN 
sought for Sudan’s consent for deploying a peace-keeping force 
despite the severity of the atrocities being committed.  
On the other hand, Russia’s intervention in Georgia through 
the invocation of RtoP on wrongful grounds is a demonstration of 
national interests in play as well as an example approving the 
concerns regarding the misuse of the norm as raised during the 2009 
debates in the General Assembly. 
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Last but not least, most recently, the international 
community’s ability and/or willingness to uphold its responsibility 
has been put to test with the cases of Libya and Syria. While the 
latter constitutes a test regarding the willingness of the international 
community to undertake the necessary forceful measures, the former 
became an example of action. Nevertheless, it is yet too early to make 
assertions about the final implications of these cases regarding the 
implementation of RtoP, especially in the case of Libya where a 
change of regime and the toppling of a dictator is in question. In this 
vein, as the efforts to implement RtoP in an effective and decisive 
manner continue within the UN, challenging cases continue to break 
out. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Shaw observes that “[i]n the twentieth century, war was not 
just a fact of life. It became a huge problem. Mass killing as a key 
means of resolving political issues became ever more widespread 
and, simultaneously, increasingly unacceptable.”632 So far, the 
twenty-first century has not been exempt from similar scenes in 
various parts of the world. Nevertheless, parallel to the increasing 
concerns about human security, the international political arena has 
been subject to a transformation where the community of states 
under the auspices of the UN has been evolving into an international 
community which places human rights as a higher value. 
Taking such evolution as an inspiration, this dissertation has 
attempted to understand what the general approach of states and the 
international community (specifically within the framework of the 
UN) towards humanitarian interventions are within the context of the 
current developments taking place regarding RtoP. As humanitarian 
intervention is a moral question in essence (although its political 
aspects seem to outweigh any other aspect when it comes to 
practice), this study has queried whether or not ethical motives play 
a role in the behaviour of the international community. In line with 
                                                
632 Shaw 2003, 52. 
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these considerations, this final chapter concludes with a recap of the 
discussions and presents its overall evaluation. 
Under the framework of RtoP, to the classical understanding of 
state sovereignty, which inherently prioritised non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of the state, a new component was added. 
Accordingly, sovereignty has started to be considered also as a 
responsibility, where the State is to protect the population living 
within its borders from mass violations of human rights. In the 
embracement of the RtoP norm, the complementary role of the UN as 
an organisational platform turned into a crucial one with the reports 
and resolutions adopted. The watershed has been the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document, which within the confines of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 revised and delimited the conceptualisation 
of the ICISS. The Report of the ICISS presented the concept of the 
responsibility to protect in detail, including the just cause criteria for 
undertaking action. Such detailed consideration of RtoP continued 
with the High-Level Panel in 2004. However, starting with the “Report 
on the UN Reform,” several documents by the UN that followed 
narrowed down the concept of RtoP. The World Summit Outcome 
Document introduced a very limited conceptualisation. The 
conditions qualifying for an invocation of RtoP was kept limited to the 
four grave crimes against humanity, and the just cause criteria were 
dismissed. Thus, State Members of the General Assembly accepted 
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their intersubjective understanding of the RtoP norm, and took the 
first preparatory step towards implementation. Since then, the 
institutionalisation of RtoP has been taking place under the roof of 
the General Assembly. With the intersubjective meaning of RtoP 
embraced in the UN General Assembly, states also established an 
international document of consensus on the responsibility of the 
international community to respond collectively in case of states’ 
failure to fulfil their responsibility to protect. Taking this 
intersubjective meaning as the starting point, regarding its 
implementation, the necessity of the validation of RtoP as an 
unambiguous norm has been emphasised by states in the General 
Assembly debates, since RtoP is considered to be, above all, of moral 
importance. In contrast to the realist proposition that states are 
amoral units, the discourse prevalent in the debates of 2009 follow-
up meetings to the Report of the Secretary-General reveal that moral 
concerns are not absent in states’ decision-making processes. 
Nonetheless, this discourse by itself does not suggest how influential 
moral considerations are in determining state behaviour. 
The analysis of the cases studied in the previous chapter 
support this finding. Two successful examples of prevention, in 
which political will and moral considerations were in play, are not 
sufficient to talk about a well-established (and practiced) norm. It 
can be observed that there has been hesitation to take a coercive 
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and/or decisive action in severe cases where the international 
community would be expected to respond by assuming the 
responsibility to react (stage two of RtoP), including military means. 
In these cases moral concerns regarding human life were prominent, 
yet the severest response of the international community, if there 
was any, had been limited to implementation of sanctions, which 
proved ineffective.  
An issue that requires further exploration in this regard, which 
has potential as a separate topic of study, is the reasons for inaction. 
As a starting argument for future research, based on its analysis, 
this dissertation posits that the capacity and capability to intervene 
are the qualifiers as the most influential determining elements in 
making the decision to undertake (humanitarian) military 
interventions. Bearing in mind the moral argument that intervention 
should be avoided unless there are reasonable prospects to improve 
the situation, the cases of inaction that were mentioned in Chapter 6 
as genuine examples of RtoP situations can be analysed further from 
this perspective. Although inaction may imply lack of state interest or 
political will, it may also be a result of insufficient capacity and/or 
incapability to bear the costs of intervention. This from an ethical 
point of view requires non-intervention in military terms since it is 
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more likely to produce more harm than benefit on the part of the 
suffering people.633 
Area specialist Lawrence Woocher argues that the criteria of 
RtoP have gone nowhere, and there are institutional and political 
problems.634 In institutional terms, as the debates have pointed out, 
the UN Security Council is the first reference point for the 
implementation of the RtoP norm. Nevertheless, the political 
structure of this main body of the UN which empowers the five 
permanent members with a right to veto, as in any issue, is likely to 
produce political decisions/results rather than moral and/or legal 
ones.635 In the plenary meetings regarding the implementation of 
RtoP several states raised such concern and argued for the UN 
reform, especially for the urgent reform of the Security Council for 
effective and objective implementation of the norm.636 
                                                
633 For instance, as argued in Chapter 5, in one of the most controversial cases of 
the decade, namely Darfur, issues of capacity and capability have been influential 
in the decision to take coercive action against the will of the Sudanese government. 
Despite the acknowledgement of the gravity of the situation and the failed attempts 
to achieve a political solution, the international community has not been able 
display a timely and decisive response regarding the case. 
634 Lawrence Woocher, interview by author, Washington D.C., October 17, 2008. 
635 This also means that a potential veto by one or more permanent members of the 
Security Council whose national interests are at stake may prevent the 
authorisation of an RtoP action. Regarding the Security Council, the ICISS in its 
Report while noting that it “is in absolutely no doubt that there is no better or more 
appropriate body than the Security Council to deal with military intervention 
issues for human protection purposes”, also raises several questions such as the 
Security Council’s “legal capacity to authorize military intervention operations; its 
political will to do so, and generally uneven performance; its unrepresentative 
membership; and its inherent institutional double standards with the Permanent 
Five veto power. There are many reasons for being dissatisfied with the role that 
the Security Council has played so far” (ICISS, 2001a, 49). 
636 For instance, in his speech on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Wolfe 
asked: “How can we guarantee that the Security Council will refrain from the use of 
the veto and will not be stymied into inaction in future cases where crimes of 
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Furthermore, taking the UN as the prevalent representation of 
the international community, an example of an institutional problem 
concerning response through military means is UN’s military 
capacity/capability. Since it does not have a standing independent 
army, the UN is likely to remain incapable of responding to RtoP 
cases in a timely and effective manner in general. Aside from the 
political complications inherent in its system, the institutional 
capacities of the UN impact RtoP’s implementation also in evaluating 
the international community’s fulfilment of its responsibility to 
protect through an analysis of state practice.  
As indicated previously, many states have indicated that RtoP 
has moral value as it aims at the protection of populations, and thus 
its proper implementation is of vital importance but the practice has 
not revealed strong evidence to support such discourse. Nevertheless, 
in order to be able to claim that moral values are ineffectual 
alongside other considerations, one has to assure that the material 
conditions that would enable action were present, yet the society of 
states had opted for indifference. In this regard, not only in the 
implementation of the RtoP norm, but also in the assessment of the 
weight of moral considerations in influencing state behaviour, 
capacity and/or capability plays a prominent role. 
                                                                                                                                     
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity have 
occurred, are occurring or are on the brink of occurring? This is one area where 
urgent reform of the Security Council is required and around which virtual 
unanimity exists” (A/63/PV.100, p. 6). 
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Even though Member States of the General Assembly 
unanimously accepted the responsibility to protect first of states 
individually and then of the international community, also affirming 
a possibility of collective action under Chapter VII, a considerable 
number of them indicated their strong opposition against the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention too.637 As can be observed 
from the case studies, whatever the prevailing reasons were, in the 
implementation of RtoP the international community has refrained 
from adopting military measures whereas it has been much eager to 
respond within the framework of Pillar Two through the assumption 
of the responsibility to prevent. 
In the light of these observations, this dissertation reiterates its 
argument that moral elements/considerations are influential in the 
behaviour of the international community. Furthermore, it observes 
that in the aftermath of the Cold War reaffirmed by the experiences of 
the 1990s, the international community has considerably evolved in 
terms of the assumption of a moral responsibility to react to cases of 
grave violations of human rights. In this vein, as can be inferred from 
the current efforts in the UN, the international community continues 
its progress on the improvement of the mechanisms for timely and 
decisive action. 
                                                
637 It should be reminded that RtoP doctrine does not encourage unilateral 
acts/interventions of states. 
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ANNEX 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
Name Institution 
 
Prof. Jose Alvarez 
 
NYU Law School (Visiting Scholar) 
 
Assoc. Prof. Paolo Carozza Harvard Law School (Visiting Scholar) 
 
Prof. Lori F. Damrosch Harvard Law School (Visiting Scholar) 
 
Prof. Hurst Hannum Tufts University 
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
 
Aiyaz Husain U.S. Department of State 
Policy and Analysis Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs 
 
Mashood Issaka International Peace Institute 
Africa Program 
 
Dr. Wafula Okumu Institute for Security Studies 
African Security Analysis Program 
 
Margaret McKelvey U.S. Department of State 
Office of Refugee Assistance for Africa 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration  
 
n/a U.S. Department of State 
Office of Refugee Assistance for Africa 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration  
 
Prof. Guiseppe Nesi Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN 
 
Prof. Thomas G. Weiss The City University of New York 
The Graduate Center 
 
Lawrence Woocher United States Institute of Peace 
Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention  
 
Prof. Salvatore Zappala Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN 
 
  240 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abiew, Francis Kofi. The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1998). 
 
Acharya, Amitav. “Human Security: East versus West” International 
Journal 56 (2000-2001): 442-460. 
  
Amer, Ramses. “The UN's Reactions to Foreign Military Interventions” 
Journal of Peace Research 31(4) (1994): 425-44. 
 
Annan, Kofi. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report 
of the Secretary General's Report High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change. 2004 available at 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf (10 October 2007). 
 
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, II-II, (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
 
Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective 
Engagement” International Security 23(3) (1998-1999): 79-113. 
 
Augustine, Saint. “City of God”, Vol. VI, Book xix, translated by W. C. 
Greene. (Great Britain: William Heinemann Ltd., 1969). 
 
Aziakou, Gerard. UN debates responsibility to protect threatened 
populations. July 23, 2009. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/ 
hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jU BFUN A723tsQokBAIMj-KcEYYug 
(accessed May 8, 2010). 
 
Badescu, Christina G. “Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention: Hard 
Choices in Saving Strangers” Canadian Journal of Political Science 
40(1) (March 2007): 51-78. 
 
Bain, William. “The Tyranny of Benevolence: National Security, 
Human Security, and the Practice of Statecraft” Global Society 15(3) 
(2001): 277-94. 
 
Bannon, Alicia L. “The Responsibility To Protect: The U.N. World 
Summit and the Question of Unilateralism” The Yale Law Journal 
115 (2006): 1157-1165. 
 
Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and 
Rwanda (USA: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
  241 
 
Barnhart, Robert K. ed., The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology 
(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995). 
 
Bellamy, Alex J. “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? 
Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit” Ethics & 
International Affairs 20(2) (Summer 2006): 143-169. 
 
Bellamy, Alex J. “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The 
Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq” Ethics & 
International Affairs 19(2) (Summer 2005): 31-53. 
 
Bellamy, Alex J. “Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist 
Claims in International Society” Review of International Studies 29 
(2003): 321–340. 
 
Bernhardt, Rudolf (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
vols. II-III, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992). 
  
Bilgin, Pınar. “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security” 
International Studies Review 5 (2003): 203–222. 
 
Bilgin, Pınar, and Adam David Morton. “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ 
States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24(3) (2004): 169-80. 
 
Bledsoe, Robert L., and Boleslaw A. Boczek, International Law 
Dictionary (Oxford: ABC Clio Incorporation, 1987), 371-4. 
 
Boekle, Henning, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner. “Norms 
and Foreign Policy: Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory” Center for 
International Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies, 34A (1999). 
 
Boniface, Pascal. “The Changing Attitude towards Military 
Intervention” International Spectator 32 (1997): 53-63. 
 
Booth, Ken. “Human Wrongs and International Relations” 
International Affairs 71(1) (1995): 103-126. 
 
Booth, Ken (ed.). New Thinking about Strategy and International 
Security (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991). 
 
Bouchard, Edwin M. The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (New 
York: The Banks Law Publishing Co., 1922) 
 
Brands, H.W. “The Idea of the National Interest” Diplomatic History 
23(2) (1999): 239-61. 
  242 
 
Breau, Susan C. “The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on 
Peacekeeping” Journal of Conflict & Security Law 11(3) (2006): 429-
64. 
 
Brinkerhoff, Derick W. Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: 
Rebuilding Fragile States (London: Routledge, 2006). 
 
Brock, Gillian. “Humanitarian Intervention: Closing the Gap between 
Theory and Practice” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23(3) (2006): 277-
91. 
 
Brownlie, Ian. “Humanitarian Intervention” in Law and Civil War in 
the Modern World. John Moore (ed.) (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1974), 217-228. 
 
Bull, Hedley (ed.). Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984). 
 
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 
(London: Macmillan, 1977). 
 
Bull, Hedley. “Strategic Studies and Its Critics” World Politics 20(4) 
(July 1968): 593-605. 
 
Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International 
Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
 
Carment, David. “Assessing state failure: implications for theory and 
policy” Third World Quarterly 24(3) (2003): 407–27. 
 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Preventing 
Deadly Conflict – Final Report; Report of the Independent Inquiry into 
the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
UN Document S/1999/1257, December 15, 1999. 
 
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations. Second Edition. 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). 
 
Cassese, Antonio. “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards 
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the World Community?” European Journal of 
International Law 10 (1999): 23-30. 
 
  243 
Chandler, David. “The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the 
‘Liberal Peace’” International Peacekeeping 11(1) (2004): 59-81.  
 
Chesterman, Simon. Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
 
Chomsky, Noam. Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault 
on Democracy (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). 
 
Chopra, Jarat, and Thomas G. Weiss. “Sovereignty Is No Longer 
Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention” Ethics and 
International Affairs 6 (1992): 95-117. 
 
Clarke, John H. “A Pragmatic Approach to Humanitarian 
Intervention” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (September 2001): 
1-9. 
 
Clinton, W. David. “The National Interest: Normative Foundations” 
The Review of Politics 48(4) (1986): 495-519. 
 
Commission on Human Security. Human Security Now (New York: 
2003). 
 
Coppieters, Bruno and Fotion, Nick (eds.). Moral Constraints on War: 
Principles and Cases. Second Edition (USA: Lexington Books, 2008). 
 
Corten, Olivier. The Law Against War: The Prohibition of Use of Force 
in Contemporary International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
 
Coyne, Christopher J. “Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: 
Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy” Foreign Policy Analysis 
2 (2006): 343-60. 
 
Crocker, Chester A. “Engaging Failing States.” Foreign Affairs 82(5) 
(September/October 2003): 32-44. 
 
Cushman, Thomas, and Stjepan G. Mestrovic (eds.). This Time We 
Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York 
University Press, 1996). 
 
Damrosch, Lori Fisler. “Changing conceptions of intervention in 
international law” in Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, L. 
Reed, and C. Kaysen (eds.). (Cambridge Mass.: American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, 1993), 91-110. 
 
  244 
Debiel, Tobias, and Klein, Axel. Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence 
and Development in Crisis Regions (London: Zedbooks, 2002). 
 
Deng, Francis Mading. In Collapsed States: The disintegration and 
restoration of legitimate authority, Zartman, I. William (ed.) (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1995), 207-219. 
 
Department of State, Counterterrorism Office. Patterns of Global 
Terrorism. 2002 available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/20177.pdf (20 November 2007). 
 
Dorman, Andrew M., and Thomas G. Otte (eds.). Military Intervention: 
From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention (Great Britain: 
Dartmouth, 1995). 
 
Duke, Simon. “The State and Human Rights: Sovereignty versus 
Humanitarian Intervention” International Relations 12 (1994): 25-48. 
 
Edel, Abraham; Elizabeth Flower, and Finbarr W. O’ Connor (eds.). 
Morality, Philosophy, and Practice: historical and contemporary 
readings and studies (New York: Random House, 1989). 
 
Elfstrom, Gerard. International Ethics: A reference handbook 
(California: ABC-Clio, 1998). 
 
Etzioni, Amitai. “Genocide Prevention in the New Global Architecture” 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7 (2005): 469-84. 
 
European Commission Humanitarian Organization (ed.). Ethics in 
Humanitarian Aid (Brussels: ECHO, 1996). 
 
Evans, Gareth. From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to 
Protect, Keynote Address to Symposium on Humanitarian 
Intervention, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 31 March 2006 
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=406 
0&l=1 (28 October 2007). 
 
Feinstein, Lee and Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “A Duty to Prevent” 
Foreign Affairs 83(1) (January-February 2004): 136-150. 
 
Fierke, Karin M. Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical 
Investigations in Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1998). 
 
Finnemore, Martha. “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian 
Intervention” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
  245 
World Politics, Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 153-85. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. “Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention” 
Symposium on Norms and Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention at the 
Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California at 
Irvine, April 14, 2000 (revised in September 2000). Available at 
http://www.cgpacs.uci.edu/files/cgpacs/docs/2010/working_paper
s/martha_finnemore_humanitarian_intervention.pdf (accessed 
November 28, 2010). 
 
Finnemore, Martha. The Purpose of Intervention: Chancing Beliefs 
about the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
 
Finnemore, Martha. “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian 
Intervention” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics. Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 153-85. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996). 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change” International Organization 52(4) 
(1998): 887-917. 
 
Fixdal, Mona, and Dan Smith. “Humanitarian Intervention and Just 
War” Mershon International Studies Review 42 (1998): 283-312. 
 
Fonteyne, Jean-Pierre L. “The Customary International Law Doctrine 
of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. 
Charter” California Western International Law Journal 4 (1973-1974): 
203-270. 
 
Franck, Thomas and Nigel Rodley. “After Bangladesh: the law of 
humanitarian intervention by military force” American Journal of 
International Law 67 (1973): 275-305. 
 
Frankel, Joseph. National Interest (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970). 
 
Freedman, Lawrence (ed.). Military Intervention in European Conflicts 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994). 
 
Frost, Mervyn. “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: protecting 
civilians to make democratic citizenship possible” in Ethics and 
  246 
Foreign Policy. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 34-54. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. State Building: Governance and World Order in 
the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd., 2004). 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. “The Ambiguity of National Interest” in 
Rethinking Russia's National Interests, Stephen Sestanovich (ed.) 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
1994), 10-23. 
 
Garrett, Stephen A. Doing Good and Doing Well: an examination of 
humanitarian intervention (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999). 
 
Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. “Intervention and Intransitivity: Public 
Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad” World 
Politics 47(4) (1995): 534-54. 
Gazzini, Tarcisio. “NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav 
Crisis (1992-1999)” European Journal of International Law 12(3) 
(2001): 391-435.  
 
Girardet, Edward, Andrea Bartol, and Jeffrey Carmel (eds.) Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Beyond: The Role of the International Media in Wars and 
Humanitarian Crises (Geneva: Crosslines Communications, 1995). 
 
Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. “International Norms and Power 
Politics” in Reconstructing Realpolitik, Frank W. Wayman, and Paul F. 
Diehl (eds.) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 101-22. 
 
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign 
Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993). 
 
Goodby, James E. “Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War” 
Journal of International Affairs 46(2) (1993): 299–321. 
 
Goodman, Ryan. “Humanitarian Intervention and Pretext for War” 
The American Journal of International Law 100 (2006): 107-141. 
 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. and Stefan Talmon (eds.). The Reality of 
International Law: essays in honour of Ian Brownlie. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999). 
 
Gowing, Nik. Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict 
Prevention? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict, 1997). 
  247 
 
Griffiths, Martin, and Terry O’Callaghan. International Relations: The 
Key Concepts, (NewYork: Routledge, 2002), 145-8. 
 
Gros, Jean-Germain. “Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the 
New World Order” Third World Quarterly 17(3) (1996): 455-71. 
 
Grotius, Hugo. Savas ve Baris Hukuku (De Iure Belli Ac Pacis): 
Secmeler. Translated by Seha L. Meray. (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi 
Basimevi, 1967). 
 
Group of 77 South Summit, Havana, Cuba, 10-14 April 2000, 
available at 
http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm, 
accessed June 18, 2010. 
 
Handel, Michael I. Weak States in the International System (London: 
Cass, 1990). 
 
Harhoff, Frederik. “Unauthorised Humanitarian Interventions–Armed 
Violences in the Name of Humanity?” Nordic Journal of International 
Law 70 (2001): 65-119.  
 
Harris, John (ed.) The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: 
Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1995). 
 
Hawkins, Virgil. “The Price of Inaction: The Media and Humanitarian 
Intervention” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (May 2001): 
http://www.jha.ac/articles/a066.htm. 
 
Helman, Gerald B., and Steven R. Ratner. “Saving failed states” 
Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-1993): 3-20. 
 
Heriberto, Cairo. “The Duty of the Benevolent Master: From 
Sovereignty to Suzerainty and the Biopolitics of Intervention” 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31(3) (2006): 285-311. 
 
Hilaire, Max. International Law and the United States Military 
Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997). 
 
Hironaka, Ann. Neverending Wars. The International Community, 
Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 2005). 
 
  248 
Holm, Hans-Henrik. “A Disaggregated World Order in the Making: 
Policy towards Failed States as an Example” International Politics 38 
(September 2001): 357-374. 
 
Holt, Victoria K., and Tobias C. Berkman. The Impossible Mandate? 
Military preparedness, the responsibility to protect and modern peace 
operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006). 
 
Holzgrefe, J.L., and Robert O. Keohane (eds.). Humanitarian 
Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report, 
Session 1999-2000, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm (accessed August 20, 
2011). 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The 
Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development 
Research Center, 2001). 
 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The 
Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Center, 2001). 
 
Jackson, Robert. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations 
and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
 
Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: 
What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” Journal of 
Peace Research 33(2) (1996): 205-15. 
 
Jentleson, Bruce W. “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam 
American Opinion on the Use of Military Force” International Studies 
Quarterly 36(1) (1992): 49-74. 
 
Jentleson, Bruce W., and Rebecca Britton. “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-
Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(4) (1998): 395-417. 
 
Johansen, Robert C. The National Interest and the Human Interest 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
 
Kaldor, Mary. Human Security: reflections on globalization and 
intervention (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 
  249 
 
Katz, Marisa. “Bush Channels N. Chamberlain. A Very Long 
Engagement” The New Republic (15 May 2006): 20-5. 
 
Kaul, Inge. “Peace Needs No Weapons: From Military Security to 
Human Security” Ecumenical Review 47(3) (July 1995): 313–9. 
 
Kersbergen, Kees Van, and Bertjan Verbeek. “The Politics of 
International Norms: Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence 
Regime of the European Union” European Journal of International 
Relations 13(2) (2007): 217-238. 
 
King, Gary, and Christopher J. L. Murray. “Rethinking Human 
Security” Political Science Quarterly 116(4) (2001-02): 585-610. 
 
Klein, Bradley S. Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 1994). 
 
Knudsen, Tonny Brems. “The History of Humanitarian Intervention. 
The Rule or the Exception?” Paper for the 50th ISA Annual Convention, 
New York, February 15-18, 2009. 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich. “On the Notion of ‘Interest’ in International 
Relations” International Organization 36(1) (1982): 1-30. 
 
Krause, Keith, and Michael Williams (eds). Critical Security Studies: 
Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1998). 
 
Kritsiotis, Dino. “Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian 
Intervention” Michigan Journal of International Law 19(4) (1998): 
1005-1050. 
 
Kusano, Hiroki. “Humanitarian Intervention: the interplay of norms 
and politics” in International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: 
moral responsibility and power politics, Michael C. Davis, Wolfgang 
Dietrich, and Bettina Scholdan (eds.), 2003. 
 
Kuznetsova, Ekaterina. “Limit Sovereignty if the State Abuses It” 
International Affairs: A Russian Journal 5 (2004): 94-105. 
 
Lang, Jr. Anthony F. (ed.). Just Intervention (USA: Georgetown 
University Press, 2003). 
 
Lauterpacht, Hersch. “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” 
British Yearbook of International Law 23 (1946): 1-53. 
 
  250 
Lillich, Richard B. “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian 
Brownlie and Plea for Constructive Alternatives” in Law and Civil War 
in the Modern World. John Moore (ed.) (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1974), 229-251. 
 
Lingelbach, William F. “The Doctrine and Practice of Intervention in 
Europe” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 16(1) (1900): 1–32. 
 
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.). On Security (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995). 
 
Luck, Edward C. “The United Nations, Multilateralism, and US 
Interests” US Foreign Policy and the United Nations System, Charles 
W. Maynes, and Richard S. Williamson (eds.) (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Co., 1996), 27-53. 
 
Lyons, Gene M. “International Organizations and National Interests” 
International Social Sciences Journal 144 (1995): 261-76. 
 
Macalister-Smith, Peter (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (The Netherlands: Elsevier Science B.V., 1995). 
 
 
MacFarlane, S. Neil. Politics and Humanitarian Action (Providence: 
Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 2000). 
 
Mandelbaum, Michael. “The Reluctance to Intervene” Foreign Policy 
95 (1994): 3-18. 
 
Maninger, Stephan. “The West, the Rest, and the Will to Project 
Power” African Security Review 6(6) (1997): 34-45. 
 
Mason, Andrew, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. “Realist Objections to 
Humanitarian Intervention” in The Ethical Dimensions of Global 
Change, Barry Holden (ed.) (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 94-110. 
 
Meron, Theodor. “Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and 
Suarez” American Journal of International Law 85(1) (January 1991): 
110-116. 
 
Meurant, Jacques. “Inter Arma Caritas: Evolution and Nature of 
International Humanitarian Law” Journal of Peace Research 24(3) 
(1987): 237-49. 
 
  251 
Mill, John Stuart. “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” Foreign Policy 
Perspectives 8 (1859): 1-6. 
 
Milliken, Jennifer. State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction 
(Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). 
 
Mills, Kurt. “Neo-Humanitarianism: the Role of International 
Humanitarian Norms and Organisations in Contemporary Conflict” 
Global Governance 11 (2005): 161-83. 
 
Minear, Larry, and Thomas G. Weiss. Humanitarian Politics (New 
York: Foreign Policy Association, 1995). 
 
Moreillon, Jacques. “Focus on Contemporary Challenges to 
Humanitarian Law” Journal of Peace Research 24(3) (1987): 215-8. 
 
Murphy, Sean D. Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an 
Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1996). 
 
Nardin, Terry, Melissa S. Williams (eds.). Humanitarian Intervention 
(New York: New York University Press, 2006). 
 
Neack, Laura. “UN Peace-Keeping: Community or Self?” Journal of 
Peace Research 32(2) (1994): 181-96. 
 
Oberleitner, Gerd. “Human Security: A Challenge to International 
Law” Global Governance 11 (2005): 185-203. 
 
O’Hanlon, Michael. Saving Lives with Force: Military Criteria for 
Humanitarian Intervention (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1997). 
 
Olsen, Gorm Rye. “Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post 
Cold War Africa: How Serious Is Europe and for What Reason?” 
African Affairs 97(388) (1998): 343-67. 
 
Onions, C.T., G.W. Friedrichsen, S. and R.W Burchfield (eds.). The 
Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1985). 
 
Oppenheim, L.F. Lawrence. International Law: a treatise. Vol. 1 Peace, 
Lauterpacht (ed.) (Great Britain: Longmans, 1955). 
 
  252 
Oppenheim, L.F. Lawrence. Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 
Peace, Sir Robert Jennings, and Sir Arthur Watts (eds.) (Harlow: 
Longman, 1992). 
 
Orford, Anne. Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and 
the Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
 
Orford, Anne. “Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of 
the New Interventionism” European Journal of International Law 10(4) 
(1999): 679-711. 
 
Paris, Roland. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 
International Security 26(2) (Autumn, 2001): 87-102. 
 
Pattison, James. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Who Should Intervene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
Pearson, Frederic S., Robert A. Baumann, and Jeffrey J. Pickering. 
“Military Intervention and Realpolitik” in Reconstructing Realpolitik, 
Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl (eds.) (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1994), 205-25. 
 
Perault, Matthew. “Moving Beyond Kosovo: Envisioning a Coherent 
Theory of Humanitarian Intervention” Journal of Public and 
International Affairs 16 (2005): 1-25. 
 
Popper, Karl. “Aestheticisim, perfectionism, Utopianism” The 
Philosophy of Society. Rodger Beehler and Alan R. Drengson (eds.) 
(London: Methuen, 1978), 212-234. 
 
Procter, Paul (ed.). Cambridge International Dictionary of English 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2005). 
 
Quinn, Warren S. “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The 
Doctrine of Double Effect” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989), 
334-351. 
 
Ramsbotham, Oliver. “Humanitarian Intervention 1990–5: A Need to 
Reconceptualize?” Review of International Studies 23 (1997): 445–68. 
 
Ramsbotham, Oliver, and Tom Woodhouse. Humanitarian Intervention 
in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1996). 
 
  253 
Ramsbotham, Oliver, and Tom Woodhouse. “Forcible Self-Help” in 
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A 
Reconceptualization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 
 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 
Reiss, H.S. (ed.) “Perpetual Peace” in Kant: Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 93-130. 
 
Rieff, David. “The Crusaders: Moral Principles, Strategic Interests, 
and Military Force” World Policy Journal 17(2) (2000): 39-47. 
 
Rieff, David. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). 
 
Roberts, Adam. “Humanitarian War: military intervention and 
human rights” International Affairs 69(3) (July 1993): 429-49. 
 
Robertson, David. A Dictionary of Human Rights, Second Edition 
(London: Europa Publications, 2004), 119. 
 
Robinson, Piers. “The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign 
Policy?” Review of International Studies 25(2) (1999): 301-9. 
 
Rotberg, Robert I. When States Fail. Causes and Consequences 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
 
Rotberg, Robert I. “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure” The 
Washington Quarterly 25(3) (2002): 85–96. 
 
Rotberg, Robert I., and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.). From Massacres to 
Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996). 
 
Ruggie, John Gerard. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge” International 
Organization 52(4) (Autumn 1998): 855–885. 
 
Rytter, Jens Elo. “Humanitarian Intervention without the Security 
Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond” Nordic Journal 
of International Law 70 (2001): 121-160. 
 
Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2007). 
 
  254 
Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention: the conditions for 
success and failure (Norfolk: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. Fifth Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Shaw, Martin. War and Genocide: organized killing in modern society 
(Great Britain: Polity, 2003). 
 
Suhrke, Astri. “Human Security and the Interests of States” Security 
Dialogue 30(3) (1999): 265-276. 
 
Simma, Bruno. “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” 
The European Journal of International Law 10(1) (1999): 1-22. 
 
Simons, Walter. The Evolution of International Public Law in Europe 
since Grotius (United States of America: Yale University Press, 1931). 
 
Slater, Jerome, and Nardin, Terry. “Nonintervention and Human 
Rights” The Journal of Politics 48 (1986): 86-96. 
 
Smith, Karen E., and Margot Light (eds.).  Ethics and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
Sonderman, Fred A. “The Concept of the National Interest” Orbis 
21(1) (1977): 121-38. 
 
Sorensen, Georg. “Individual Security and National Security: The 
State Remains the Principal Problem” Security Dialogue 27 (1996): 
371–86. 
 
Stahn, Carsten. “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?” in The American Journal of International Law 
101(1) (Jan. 2007): 990-1020.  
 
Steiner, Henry J. and Alston, Philip. International Human Rights in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals. Second Edition (Great Britain: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
 
Suhrke, Astri. “Human Security and the Interests of States” Security 
Dialogue 30(3) (1999): 265-76. 
 
Terrif, Terry, and James F. Keeley. “The United Nations, Conflict 
Management and Spheres of Interest” International Peacekeeping 2(4) 
(1995): 510-35. 
 
  255 
The White House. The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America. September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ 
nss.pdf (November 20, 2007). 
 
Thomas, Nicholas and William T. Tow. “The Utility of Human 
Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention” Security 
Dialogue 33(2) (2002): 177-192. 
 
Thussu, D.K. “Legitimizing ‘Humanitarian Intervention’? CNN, NATO 
and the Kosovo Crisis” European Journal of Communication 15(3) 
(2000): 345-61. 
 
United Nations, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping,” A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 
1992, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (accessed 
December 04, 2010). 
 
United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-
Keeping (New York: The United Nations, 1996). 
 
United Nations doc., UN Summit Outcome Document, A/Res./60, 24 
October 2005. 
 
United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 
Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 2005. 
 
Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I. Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign 
Military Intervention Decisions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
 
Von Hippel, Karin, and Michael Clarke. “Something Must Be Done” 
World Today 55(3) (1999): 4-7. 
 
Waal, Alex de, and Rakiya Omaar. “Can Military Intervention Be 
‘Humanitarian’?” Middle East Report (March-June 1994): 3-8. 
 
Walt, Stephen M. “The Renaissance of Security Studies” International 
Studies Quarterly 35(2) (June 1991): 211-39. 
 
Wedgwood, Ruth. “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in 
Kosovo” The American Journal of International Law 93 (1999): 834-
841. 
 
  256 
Weil, Carola. “The Protection-Neutrality Dilemma in Humanitarian 
Emergencies” International Migration Review 35(1) (Spring 2001): 79-
116. 
 
Weisburd, A. Mark. The Use of Force: The Practice of States since 
World War II (USA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 
 
Weiss, Thomas G.  “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The 
Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era” Security Dialogue 35 
(2004): 137. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. “Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some 
Lessons” Journal of Peace Research 38(4) (2001): 419-28. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. “The Politics of Humanitarian Ideas” Security 
Dialogue 31(1) (2000): 11-23. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. “Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome: ‘Operation 
Rekindle Hope?’” Global Governance 1(2) (1995): 171-87. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G., and Cindy Collins. Humanitarian Challenges and 
the Dilemmas of Help (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996). 
 
Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing National Interests” European Journal of 
International Relations 2(3) (1996): 275-318. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: the social 
construction of power politics” International Organisation 46(2) 
(Spring 1992): 391-425. 
 
Wesley, Michael. “Towards a Realist Ethics of Intervention” Ethics 
and International Affairs 19(2) (2005): 55-72. 
 
Western, John. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention. Beliefs, 
Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and 
Bosnia” International Security 26(4) (Spring 2002): 112-142. 
 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. “Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: 
Emergent Norm, Moral Duty or the Coming Anarchy?” International 
Affairs 77(1) (2001): 113–128. 
 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
  257 
Wheeler, Nicholas J., and Tim Dunne. “East Timor and the New 
Humanitarian Interventionism” International Affairs 7(4) (2001): 805-
827. 
 
Wheeler, Nicholas J., and Justin Morris. “Humanitarian Intervention 
and State Practice at the End of the Cold War” in International Society 
after the Cold War, Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.) (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 135-71. 
 
Wicclair, Mark R. “Human Rights and Intervention” in Human Rights 
and U.S. Foreign Policy. Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean (eds.) 
(USA: Lexington Books, 1979). 
 
Wiener, Antje. “Contested Meanings of Norms: A Research 
Framework” Comparative European Politics 5 (2007): 1-17. 
 
Williams, John. “The Ethical Basis of Humanitarian Intervention, the 
Security Council and Yugoslavia” International Peacekeeping 6(2) 
(1999): 1-23. 
 
Williamson, Roger (ed.). Some Corner of a Foreign Field (Great Britain: 
MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998). 
 
Wohlforth, William. “Superpowers, Interventions and the Third 
World” Cold War History 6(3) (August 2006): 365-71. 
  258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
  259 
APPENDIX A 
Establishment of Peace-keeping Operations 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, (S/Prst/1994/22) 
 
3 May 1994 
The Security Council recalls that the statement made by its President on 28 
May 1993 (S/25859) stated, inter alia, that United Nations peace- keeping 
operations should be conducted in accordance with a number of 
operational principles, consistent with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations. In that context, the Security Council is conscious of the 
need for the political goals, mandate, costs, and, where possible, the 
estimated time-frame of United Nations peace-keeping operations to be 
clear and precise, and of the requirement for the mandates of peace-
keeping operations to be subject to periodic review. The Council will 
respond to situations on a case-by-case basis. Without prejudice to its 
ability to do so and to respond rapidly and flexibly as circumstances 
require, the Council considers that the following factors, among others, 
should be taken into account when the establishment of new peace-keeping 
operations is under consideration: 
- whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger 
or constitute a threat to international peace and security; 
- whether regional or subregional organizations and arrangements exist 
and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation; 
- whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed 
themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement; 
- whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the 
mandate; 
- whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be 
formulated; 
- whether the safety and security of United Nations personnel can be 
reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable 
guarantees can be obtained from the principal parties or factions 
regarding the safety and security of United Nations personnel; in this 
regard it reaffirms its statement of 31 March 1993 (S/25493) and its 
resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993. 
The Security Council should also be provided with an estimate of projected 
costs for the start-up phase (initial 90 days) of the operation and the first 
six months, as well as for the resulting increase in total projected 
annualized United Nations peace-keeping expenditures, and should be 
informed of the likely availability of resources for the new operation.  
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APPENDIX B 
Resolution/ 
Meeting no.;  
Date 
Session/ 
Meeting No.; 
Agenda Item 
No. (AI#) 
On RtoP 
   
A/64/864 
14 July 2010 
64th session; 
AI#: 48 and 114 
Report of the Secretary-General regarding 
“early warning, assessment and the 
responsibility to protect” 
 
S/RES/1894 
11 November 2009 
6216th meeting 
 
“Reaffirming the relevant provisions of the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, including paragraphs 138 
and 139 thereof regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.” 
A/RES/63/308 
7 October 2009 
63rd session; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
“Decides to continue its consideration of 
the responsibility to protect.”  
A/63/PV.101 
28 July 2009 
Plenary meeting; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
continued 
States’ official statements in the General 
Assembly regarding the Report of the 
Secretary General, and the 
implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect as adopted in the World Summit 
Outcome Document. 
A/63/PV.100 
28 July 2009 
Plenary meeting; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
continued 
(also 7 continued) 
States’ official statements in the General 
Assembly regarding the Report of the 
Secretary General, and the 
implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect as adopted in the World Summit 
Outcome Document. 
A/63/PV.99 
24 July 2009 
Plenary meeting; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
continued 
States’ official statements in the General 
Assembly regarding the Report of the 
Secretary General, and the 
implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect as adopted in the World Summit 
Outcome Document. 
A/63/PV.98 
24 July 2009 
Plenary meeting; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
continued 
States’ official statements in the General 
Assembly regarding the Report of the 
Secretary General, and the 
implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect as adopted in the World Summit 
Outcome Document. 
A/RES/63/304 
23 July 2009 
Plenary meeting; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
continued 
(also 57 
continued) 
Implementation of the recommendations 
contained in the report of the Secretary-
General on the causes of conflict and the 
promotion of durable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa 
A/63/PV.96 
21 July 2009 
Plenary meeting; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
continued 
Secretary General’s introduction of his 
report (A/63/677) on the Implementation 
of the Responsibility to Protect  
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Resolution/ 
Meeting no.;  
Date 
Session/ 
Meeting No.; 
Agenda Item No. 
(AI#) 
On RtoP 
   
A/63/677 
12 January 2009 
63rd session; 
AI#: 44 and 107 
Implementation of the responsibility to 
protect (report of the secretary general) 
S/RES/1755 
30 April 2007 
5670th meeting Concerning the situation in Sudan recalls 
Security Council Resolutions 1706 (2006) 
and 1674 (2006) 
S/RES/1706 
31 August 2006 
5519th meeting “Reaffirms inter alia the provisions of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 
United Nations World Summit outcome 
document.” 
S/RES/1674 
28 April 2006 
5430th meeting Paragraph 4 reaffirms “the provisions of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document.” 
A/RES/60/1 
24 October 2005 
World Summit Outcome 
Document 
 
60th session; 
AI#: 46 and 120 
Paragraphs 138 and 139 
A/59/2005 
21 March 2005 
In Larger Freedom: 
towards development, 
security and human 
rights for all 
 
59th session; 
AI#: 45 and 55 
In this Report of the Secretary-General, 
the responsibility to protect is considered 
under the chapter on “Freedom to Live in 
Dignity.’ 
Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) 
7-8 March 2005  
The Common African 
Position on the Proposed 
Reform of the United 
Nations: Ezulwini 
Consensus 
 
7th extra-ordinary 
session of the 
African Union 
Under Part B entitled “collective security 
and the use of force”, the Union dealt with 
the concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect. 
A/59/565 
2 December 2004 
High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and 
Change 
59th session; 
AI#: 55 
In the Report of the Secretary-General, 
the responsibility to protect is covered 
under the heading of “Collective Security 
and Use of Force.” 
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APPENDIX C 
A/63/PV.97 
 
1. Sweden on behalf of the EU, Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, countries of the Stabilization and Association Process as well as Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and 
Georgia. 
+ 
States that “[f]ocus should be on operationalization and implementation.” (p. 4) 
Welcomes the approach that keeps “the scope of the principle narrow and the range 
of possible responses deep.” (p. 4) 
Notes that when peaceful methods fail, “enforcement measures in accordance with 
the United Nations Charter, through the Security Council or approved by the Security 
Council, should be possible, if needed.” (p. 4) 
  
 
2. Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement 
+ ! 
Points that “[t]here are concerns about the possible abuse of RtoP by expanding its 
application to situations that fall beyond the four areas defined in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, and by misusing it to legitimize unilateral coercive measures or 
intervention in the internal affairs of States.” (p. 5) 
Highlights that there is need for the clarity of the concept. 
  
 
3. United Kingdom 
+ 
States that “[e]very situation is different, and we must guard against an overly 
prescriptive and, I would say, overly simplistic checklist approach to action.” (p. 7) 
Highlights the role of regional organisations and enhancement of collective prevention 
efforts. 
Supports the narrow but deep conception of RtoP. 
 
4. Indonesia 
+ 
States that implementation is the task ahead. 
Considers prevention as the key aspect of RtoP. 
 
5. France 
+ 
Consider RtoP “[b]y virtue of both its preventive dimension and its operational aspect, 
which can, if necessary, result in a collective action under Chapter VII, […] a key 
element in the fight against mass atrocities on a par with international humanitarian 
law, international human rights law and the international criminal justice.” (p. 9) 
Argues that “the responsibility to protect […] already largely exists,” thus, the task is 
to “debate the means to strengthen its implementation and its respect.” (p. 9) 
Considers the third pillar as the one that gives the concept its full meaning. 
Notes that “France will also remain vigilant to ensure that natural disasters, when 
combined with deliberate inaction on the part of a Government that refuses to provide 
assistance to its population in distress or to ask the international community for aid, 
do not lead to human tragedies in which the international community can only look 
on helplessly.” (p. 9) 
 
6. Philippines 
+ ! 
Emphasises that RtoP “should be limited to those four crimes and applied only to 
them. Any attempt to enlarge its coverage even before RtoP is effectively implemented 
will only delay, if not derail, such implementation; or worse yet, diminish its value or 
devalue its original intent and scope.” (p. 11) 
Underlines that the “concept of RtoP should be universal, that is, applied equally and 
fairly to all States, although the manner of implementation would be on a case to-
case basis.” 
Urges that “[d]eliberations should lead to more clarity with respect the use of force in 
enforcing RtoP.” (p. 12) 
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7. Brazil 
+ 
Notes its adherence to the current form of RtoP as outlined by the World Summit 
Outcome Document. 
Puts emphasis on the understanding of the use of force as a last resort. 
States that “the third pillar is subsidiary to the first one and a truly exceptional 
course of action, a measure of last resort.” 
“Advocates the concept of non-indifference.” 
 
8. Guatemala 
+ ! 
Has many concerns: 
The representative notes: “For countries like mine that greatly value the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign States, there is a lingering 
suspicion that the responsibility to protect can, in specific moments or situations, be 
invoked as a pretext for improper intervention. […] There are divergences with regard 
to the character of the crimes that the responsibility to protect is designed to 
address.” (p. 15) 
Draws attention to the issue of reforming the Security Council. 
 
9. Bosnia-Herzegovina (endorses EU’s statement) 
+ 
Approaches military intervention much more positively in comparison to the member 
states of the NAM. 
 
10. United States 
+ 
Notes that measures to be adopted in cases of RtoP “[r]arely and in extremis would 
[…] include use of force” (p. 18) 
Draws attention to lack of political will in the international community. 
 
11. Belgium 
+ Draws attention to the issue of implementation regarding all of the three pillars. 
 
12. Republic of Korea 
+ 
Puts emphasis on the collective character of RtoP in accordance with the UN Charter. 
Distinguishes RtoP from unilateral humanitarian interventions (p. 19).  
Places importance on pillar two. 
Underlines that coercive measures are to be implemented in accordance with the UN 
Charter. 
Urges the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from employing or 
threaten to employ veto. 
 
13. Australia 
+ 
Considers humanitarian intervention discredited. 
Considers implementation as the task ahead.   
Welcomes the narrow understanding of RtoP. 
 
14. Liechtenstein 
+ 
Considers all three pillars as integral parts.  
Calls for implementation of RtoP in strict conformity with the World Summit Outcome 
Document. 
 
15. Costa Rica and Denmark 
+ 
Calls for consideration of legitimacy of the concept on the basis of the World Summit 
Outcome Document. 
Puts more emphasis on peace-building compared to other statements. 
Notes that RtoP is “far from authorising unilateral interventions.” 
Refers to crimes that pose a threat to international peace and security as well as 
refraining from the employment of veto in cases of RtoP. 
 
16. New Zealand 
+ 
Notes that the task is implementation of RtoP. 
Praises the limited scope of the World Summit Outcome Document. 
Commends the emphasis on prevention instead of intervention. 
Is not necessarily against the structural reformation of the Security Council, 
nevertheless is concerned that such change is “a prior condition for implementing the 
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responsibility to protect.” 
Supports the restrained employment of the veto in the Security Council. 
 
17. Netherlands (presented complementary remarks to the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Underlines that the current task of translating their “moral commitment into political 
and operational readiness […] is not a legal discussion, nor should it be” (p. 26). 
Notes that the four crimes basis is a solid ground for the operationalization of RtoP. 
 
18. Italy 
+ 
Argues that implementation is the task to focus on. 
Makes reference to the use or threat of veto by the permanent members of the 
Security Council. 
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19. Austria (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Notes that the primary responsibility lies with the State. 
Considers international community’s assistance of “supplementary nature.” 
Argues that all three pillars are of equal importance. 
 
20. Pakistan 
+ ! 
Has indicated many concerns and presented reminders. 
Asks for clarity regarding the limited scope of RtoP, that is, it should not be open to 
discussion in the future. 
Urges that RtoP should not be a tool to constrain the national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states, and its misuse should be prevented. 
Argues that the international community’s responsibility in “the event of a situation 
involving RtoP should be to provide “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter.” 
Draws attention to the issue of “consistency of language and expression” to improve 
the concept of the RtoP. 
Notes that RtoP should be an exception to the case. 
Considers pillar three as a reappearance of “the right to intervene.” 
 
21. Switzerland 
+ 
Indicates that the distinction between RtoP and humanitarian intervention needs to 
be made clear. 
Notes that measures of the third pillar should be the last resort. 
Points to the lack of political will to react in a timely fashion.  
Underlines the importance of refraining from the use of veto in cases of RtoP. 
 
22. Algeria (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Is supportive of the Secretary-General’s Report while endorsing African Union’s non-
indifference principle. 
Considers prevention “a fundamental element of the responsibility to protect,” and 
indicates its support for what was recommended in the report. 
Notes that decision-making in the Security Council is affected by political factors. 
 
23. Singapore 
+ 
Indicates its full commitment to the responsibility to protect doctrine. 
Notes that “[i]t is clear that fears and doubts about RtoP still persists.” 
Indicates a concern about misuse of RtoP. 
Considers it necessary to “define clear parameters for when a situation is or is not an 
RtoP issue.” 
 
24. Ecuador (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
! 
Indicates its concerns. 
Places importance on having a balanced approach towards all three pillars. 
Reiterates the limitations of RtoP as determined by the World Summit Outcome. 
Questions the impartiality and effectiveness of the Security Council as the primary 
authority to implement RtoP. Accordingly, raises the issue of the reform of the 
Council. 
Notes: “so long as there is no clarity on the conceptual scope, normative parameters 
or the actors involved, we cannot take any decision committing our States with regard 
to the application of this concept.” 
 
25. Chile 
+ 
Considers use of force as a last resort. 
Is in favour of more involvement by regional organisations while undertaking action 
under pillar three. 
Suggests that “a prevention strategy could include the promotion of democracy.” 
Argues that morality should be reintroduced into the debate. 
 
26. Morocco (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ ! 
Raises its concerns about “a mismanaged operationalization” of RtoP. 
Asks for a clear distinction between RtoP and the right to humanitarian intervention. 
Does not consider RtoP as an international legal norm. 
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Commits itself to “moving [the] discussion forward.” 
 
27. Colombia 
+ 
Stats that the scope of the World Summit should not be open to discussion, and 
reaffirms its commitment to the terms of the Document. 
Embraces the view that RtoP “should be an ally, not an adversary, of national 
sovereignty.” 
 
28. Israel 
+ 
Argues that the “responsibility to protect lies primarily in enhancing existing tools 
and mechanisms, rather than creating them anew” (p. 15). 
Refers to “the need to reach agreement on relevant guidelines and the appropriate 
threshold for response.” 
Concerning the concept of RtoP, notes that there is a need to “ensure that it does not 
become a political tool for exploitation or abuse.” 
 
29. South Africa 
+ 
Agrees that a possible development of the concept can only take place under the 
auspices of the UN, and considered the General Assembly as the most appropriate 
milieu for further discussion of the issue to “ensure the maximum transparency and 
participation.” 
Favours the limited approach of the Summit Outcome Document.  
Argues against a possible extension of the RtoP concept to include natural disasters 
and other issues. 
Agrees with the Secretary-General’s presentation of pillars one and two.  
Refers to pillar three and various measures that are to be employed under this pillar 
but does not consider use of force under Chapter VII. 
Asks for increased cooperation with regional organisations, especially the African 
Union. 
Points to the problems within the Security Council such as clashes of national 
interest and use of the veto power in a way to block passing resolutions. 
 
30. Uruguay 
+ 
Favours the limited scope of RtoP. 
Agrees that the responsibility lies first with the states. 
Raises the issue of national and regional capacity building for prevention and early 
warning. 
Argues that in cases where use of force is a measure to be applied, “the General 
Assembly should not be underestimated or marginalized in the debate on the 
development of this pillar.” 
 
31. Ghana 
+ 
Argues that the focus should be “on how to garner the needed collective political will 
to act and take concrete measures at the national, regional and international levels 
towards the prevention of those four crimes.” 
Asks for support for the continuing efforts of the African Union. 
Prioritises prevention. 
 
32. Japan 
+ 
Favours the limited scope of the RtoP concept. 
Considers first pillar the most important one. 
Argues that use of force should be implemented as a last resort and in accordance 
with the UN Charter. 
Makes reference to collective action by the international community, and indicates 
that consent of the host state makes this action more effective.  
Also talks about collective forceful action when necessary under the framework of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
 
33. Czech Republic (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Favours the limited/narrow scope of the RtoP. 
“Supports the way forward suggested in the report of the Secretary-General, and 
particularly his emphasis on the responsibility of the States themselves and the 
importance of early prevention.” 
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34. China 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
Points that there is need for clarity concerning the meaning and implementation of 
the RtoP. 
Favours the limited scope of the concept.  
Underlines that “[n]o state should expand the concept or interpret it in an arbitrary 
manner. It is imperative to avoid abuse of the concept and to prevent it from 
becoming a kind of humanitarian intervention.” 
Is against any unilateral implementation of RtoP when undertaking action. 
Argues that the “Security Council must view the responsibility to protect in the 
broader context of maintaining international peace and security and must take care 
not to abuse the concept.” 
Points that there is need for the General Assembly and the Security Council to 
establish a mechanism to avoid double standards and politicization. 
 
35. Mali (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Agrees that responsibility lies first and foremost with the individual states. 
Refers to establishing mechanisms of early warning, and capacity building. 
Given that forceful measures are also an option in responding to cases of RtoP, states 
that “discussion on the third pillar must continue in the General Assembly.” 
 
36. Canada 
+ 
Strongly supports the report of the Secretary-General. 
Argues that focus should be on operationalisation of prevention. 
Argues that it is in the case of failure to prevent that collective action must be taken. 
 
37. Nigeria 
+ 
Argues that “[e]mphasis should be placed on prevention rather than on intervention.” 
Calls for focusing on developing and improving regional mechanisms. 
 
38. Viet Nam (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Favours the narrow scope of the World Summit Outcome Document. 
Agrees that the responsibility first and foremost lies with the state itself. 
Puts emphasis on five qualifiers: “the voluntary engagement of States; the taking of 
timely and decisive collective action; the taking of decisions on a case-by-case basis; 
conformity with the Charter, including Chapter VII; and cooperation with relevant 
regional organisations, as appropriate.” 
Opts for a careful consideration on a “case-by-case basis, free from politicization, 
selectivity, and double standards, before a decision is made.” 
 
39. Guinea-Bissau 
+ 
Finds that RtoP is rooted in the UN Charter. 
Agrees that responsibility lies first and foremost with the individual states. 
Notes that the task ahead is implementation. 
Argues that Security Council has not been effective enough in acting. 
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40. Ireland (fully aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Argues that “[p]rimary responsibility rests with the State,” and the “[i]nternational 
community has a responsibility to assist States” (pp. 1-2) 
Talks about development assistance (p. 2). 
Suggests to “approach, with similar imagination and openness, the third pillar”, 
including “peace enforcement measures under Chapter VII” by the UN in accordance 
with its Charter (p. 2). 
Reiterates “the very real fears that RtoP could be misused for ulterior motives.” (p. 2) 
Agrees with the limited scope of the RtoP (p. 2). 
Raises the issue of “selective application of the responsibility to protect or its misuse 
with a view to furthering a State’s own strategic national interests.”  
Argues that “military intervention that is not in line with the Charter of the United 
Nations and does not have prior Security Council approval when such approval would 
be required is not in line with, nor it can be regarded as having been authorized by, 
the responsibility to protect.” (p. 3) 
Points that there is lack of trust in the Security Council. 
Notes that the implementation of the concept can be a question of the responsibility 
to protect vs. national interests of states. 
 
41. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
? 
Has a very suspicious and cautious approach towards the implementation of RtoP. 
Makes reference to “imperial Powers” determining the course of international politics 
according to their own interests. 
Asks for an extensive revision of the UN Charter, and a reform of the Security 
Council. 
Argues that it is “necessary to build a legal basis for the potential implementation of 
the responsibility to protect. 
Argues that RtoP as a “multilateral mechanism for collective action” should be 
“through the General Assembly”. 
Raises many potential problematic aspects of intervention, and rejects Security 
Council as the authority to take such decision since it is concerned about a selective 
implementation of the concept. Suggest that the General Assembly should be the 
main body taking the decisions regarding the implementation of the RtoP. 
Criticises the report of the Secretary-General for being selective in giving examples of 
grave atrocities against humanity, and argues that there were many unmentioned 
cases in the Report. 
Considers the third pillar as “a challenge to the basic principles of international law, 
such as the territorial integrity of States, non-interference in internal affairs and, of 
course the indivisible sovereignty of States.” 
States: “We live in a world dominated by the Great Powers of the West.” 
 
42. Norway 
+ 
Argues that when a state fails to fulfil its responsibility to protect, “the responsibility 
should and must be taken up by the wider international community.” “This 
responsibility should weigh heavily on the members of the Security Council, and 
especially on those that exercise the veto power.” 
Argues that the UN has “the moral authority.” 
 
43. Germany (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Welcomes the Report, “especially the practical measures for implementation proposed 
in the report.” 
Argues that “[i]ndividual States and the international community have a common 
responsibility to help prevent genocide situation from occurring the first place.” 
Notes that third pillar comes to question when prevention fails, and thus is only of 
complementary nature. 
 
44. Plurinational State of Bolivia 
+ 
Is sceptical about the impartiality of the Security Council, and argues that it should 
not be the authority to take the decision for the implementation of RtoP in a specific 
case. 
Suggests a reform of the Council. 
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Like some other states which have indicated likewise, “expressed concern that the 
responsibility to protect will be used as a guise for military interventions that violate 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and whose intentions are quite other than 
preventing mass crimes.”  
 
45. Romania (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Is highly supportive of the report. 
Favours the narrow scope of the concept. 
Agrees that prevention comes first. 
 
46. Slovenia (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Argues that with the events in Rwanda and Srebrenica “the credibility of the United 
Nations was damaged, and it still has not fully recovered.” 
Argues: “The responsibility to protect is our common responsibility.” 
Notes that RtoP is not an equivalent for military intervention. 
Considers prevention as “the key element.” 
Notes that “[a]ssistance to States and capacity-building” are also vital for the 
implementation of RtoP. 
Agrees that responsibility lies first and foremost with the state itself. 
Talks about collective action by the international community under Chapters VI, VII 
and VII of the UN Charter. 
Urges the permanent members to refrain from using their veto power. 
Notes that “[a]ddressing RtoP and potential RtoP situations ultimately remains a 
matter of political will. Indifference is not an option.” 
 
47. Monaco 
+ 
“Positively welcomes” the Report. 
Notes that “it is time to start to ‘work constructively to ensure that the emerging 
concept of responsibility to protect becomes positive law as soon as possible.’” 
 
48. Qatar (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Argues that the “implementation of the responsibility to protect must be subject to 
regulation in line with international law, must not affect or undermine the territorial 
sovereignty of States, and must prioritize the protection of populations under 
occupation and States and populations subject to foreign invasion in violation of their 
sovereignty.” 
Refers to the General Assembly as the “principal political forum of the world.” 
Argues that the concept needs to be clarified further, and that conditions for 
implementation need to be determined. 
Points to the need to reform the Security Council. 
Refers to a recent and some former examples: “The recent events in Gaza and, before 
that, in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted that the international community’s 
reluctance to implement the responsibility to protect principle fairly, justly and 
politicization. 
Notes that there are misuses of the concept as well as double standards in 
implementation. 
Argues that “preventive peaceful solutions are more effective and legitimate than the 
use of force.” 
 
49. Solomon Islands 
+ 
Talks about reform of the Security Council, specifically the issue of the use of veto. 
Urges that abuse of the concept must not to be allowed. 
Argues: “We must broaden the implementation of the responsibility to protect to 
include non-State actors or other mechanisms not provided for under the Charter of 
the United Nations.” 
Argues: “We need to increase the legitimacy of the General Assembly.” 
Notes that further discussion concerning pillar three is necessary (for effective 
implementation). 
 
50. Croatia (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Considers prevention as the key aspect. 
Notes that RtoP is not an equivalent for the right to intervene. 
Argues that the “Security Council […] has a special responsibility.” 
Posits that political will is necessary to be able to implement the RtoP. 
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51. Jordan (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
 
 
+ 
Argues that Paragraphs 138 and 139 “form a firm political and moral foundation for” 
RtoP to be implemented through the UN. 
Favours the narrow interpretation of the scope of the RtoP. 
Posits that “[f]irmly established criteria” is needed for credible implementation. 
Points that there is lack of political will in the international community. 
Notes that special focus on the second pillar, specifically on international assistance 
and capacity building, is of importance. 
 
52. Luxembourg (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Reiterates the narrow scope of the RtoP. 
Considers prevention as the key aspect. 
Agrees that responsibility, first and foremost, lies with individual states. 
Argues that collective action by the international community can be taken on a case-
by-case basis. 
Considers rapid response vital. 
Notes that the task ahead is implementation. 
Argues that political will is needed. 
 
53. Mexico 
+ 
Indicates its full support for the Report. 
Has a more normative approach towards the concept compared to other states. 
Points that RtoP as a concept “arose as a response to the historical indifference of the 
international community when faced with massive violations of human rights and 
humanitarian atrocities because interests other than the protection of persons came 
first.” 
Argues that “the concept draws upon and is based on existing international law, in 
particular human rights and international humanitarian law.” 
On the basis of the World Summit, considers RtoP “an obligation that […] falls 
primarily to each individual State.” 
Believes “that developing the concept’s normative nature is of great importance.” 
Argues that pillar three requires more specifics in order to prevent abuse. 
Is against unilateral action no matter what the immediacy of the case is. 
Posits that states should “refrain from the use of force.” 
Considers prevention as the key aspect.  
 
54. Rwanda 
+ 
Argues that the three pillars “offer an unambiguous framework for the 
implementation of RtoP.” 
Notes that there is need for further clarity concerning issues such as the threshold 
for intervention, the use of the veto power in the Security Council, and “the role of the 
General Assembly and the Security Council” concerning the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect. 
Urges that the “objective of RtoP should be to eliminate the need for intervention.” 
 
55. Turkey 
+ 
Favours the narrow scope of RtoP as established by the 2005 World Summit. 
Notes that further clarity is needed to “avoid misperceptions.” 
Agrees that the responsibility rests first and foremost with individual states. 
Argues that collective action should be a last resort. 
Believes that “RtoP […] also covers post-conflict rehabilitation.” 
 
56. Cuba (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM” 
+ 
Posits that RtoP is not a legal obligation that has its place in international law. 
Points that there are the issues of double standards, lack of political will, selective 
application, and “dysfunction of the Security Council.” 
Argues that the General Assembly functions more effectively than the Security 
Council. 
Supports the idea of the reform of the Security Council. 
“Reaffirms that international humanitarian law does not provide for the right of 
humanitarian intervention as an exception to the principle of non-use of force.” 
States that further clarity regarding the implementation of the concept is needed. 
Favours the narrow scope of the RtoP. Argues that “[a]ny attempt to expand the term 
  271 
to cover other calamities —such as AIDS, climate change or natural disasters— would 
undermine the language of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.” 
Finds that “the ambiguous reference to regional mechanisms or agreements and the 
extraregional aspect is highly controversial.” 
Notes that the Report “fails to duly delineate the principles of voluntary acceptance 
and of the prior request and consent of each State for assistance and capacity-
building, including that of a military nature.” 
Argues that extensive analysis is needed under the roof of the General Assembly. 
 
57.  Hungary (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Argues that the “three pillars […] together constitute a complete implementation of 
the concept.” 
Agrees that the responsibility first and foremost lies with the individual states. 
Posits that the “international community has the moral obligation to give a timely and 
decisive response.” 
Notes that when prevention is concerned there is “lack of institutional capacity.” 
 
58. India 
+ 
Considers the 2005 World Summit Outcome a “cautious go-ahead” for the 
responsibility to protect. 
Argues that measures to be undertaken under Chapter VII should be adopted on a 
case-by-case basis as a last resort. 
Emphasises that the “responsibility to protect should in no way provide a pretext for 
humanitarian intervention or unilateral action.” 
Favours the narrow scope of the RtoP. 
Notes that there is need for willingness of the international community to act as well 
as a need to reform of the UN, specifically the Security Council. 
 
59. Andorra 
+ 
Agrees that the responsibility lies first and foremost with the state itself. 
Points that the “need to protect applies to all continents.” 
 
60. San Marino 
+ 
Strongly welcomes the Report. 
Notes that strict guidelines are required to avoid misuse and misinterpretation. 
Argues that the “General Assembly must develop a final and effective implementation 
policy.” 
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61. Sri Lanka 
+ 
Shares the concerns raised in the statement of the NAM. 
Argues that “[a]ny simplistic or loosely selective application of the RtoP notion” has to 
be “avoided and discouraged.” 
Notes that further clarification is needed, and there are many questions to be 
answered. 
Highlights that “many Member States are particularly sensitive to the way in which 
this new intervention is to be operationalized.” 
Agrees that the responsibility lies first and foremost with the state itself. 
Argues that “responsible sovereignty must also apply to key issues such as the 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, 
nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, global warming, biological 
security and economic prosperity.” 
Posits that the “mechanisms for implementing RtoP also need to be agreed upon,” 
and the General Assembly is the place for discussion. 
 
62. Sierra Leone 
+ 
Is highly supportive of the Report. 
Notes that early response at the national and international levels is necessary. 
Believes that concerns related to the third pillar can be overcome “by putting proper 
guidance and modalities in place, buttressed by the institutional reform. 
 
63. Jamaica on behalf of the 14 States Members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
(Associates itself with the statement of the NAM.) 
+ 
Favours the narrow scope of RtoP. 
Considers prevention as the key aspect. 
Concerning pillar three, takes use of force as a measure of last resort. 
Notes that “[u]rgent reform of the Security Council is required.” 
 
64. Myanmar 
+ 
Supports the narrow scope of RtoP. 
Notes that the task ahead is to develop a strategy to implement the concept, and the 
General Assembly is the milieu for this. 
Argues that the text of the 2005 World Summit should not be open to renegotiation. 
 
65. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (associates itself with the statement of 
the EU) 
+ 
“Supports the three-pillar approach as outlined.” 
Notes that the tasks ahead are operationalization and implementation. 
Considers prevention a key element. 
In case of a failure to prevent, “the international community should ensure an early 
and flexible response, not through graduated measures, but through collective action 
to be taken by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII.” 
Considers this the adoption of “the right to protect.” 
 
66. Slovakia (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
Embraces all the three pillars equally. 
Agrees that the primary responsibility lies with individual states. 
Argues that the international community should act when necessary. 
Notes that prevention and early warning as well as timely and effective crisis 
management are of vital importance. 
 
67. Islamic Republic of Iran (supports the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Points that further clarification regarding the RtoP is required. 
Agrees that the primary responsibility lies with individual states. 
Notes that international response should be on a case-by-case basis. “This by no 
means whatsoever may imply permission to use of force against another State under 
any pretext, such as humanitarian intervention.” 
States that misuse of the concept as well as double standards and selective 
application in implementation should be avoided. 
Points to lack of political will. 
Urges for the acceleration of “the reform process.” 
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Favours the narrow scope of RtoP.  
 
68. Russian Federation 
+ 
Agrees that the primary responsibility lies with individual states. 
Places emphasis on prevention. 
Considers intervention as a last resort under exceptional circumstances. 
Asks for caution in while implementing RtoP. 
Regarding the implementation of the concept argues that “conditions for turning 
those ideas into practical mechanisms and institutions have not yet been met.” 
 
69. Nicaragua (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Supports the report but favours a limited approach. 
Notes that careful consideration is required to avoid the turning of the concept into a 
right to intervene. 
Argues that the “concept cannot be placed above the sovereignty of States or the 
United Nations. 
 
70. Iceland 
+ 
Considers the conception of sovereignty as responsibility the basis of RtoP. 
Points to the importance of prevention. 
Argues that measures based on Chapter VII should be a last resort. 
“Fully supports giving the General Assembly a leading role in fashioning an effective 
international response to crimes and atrocities relevant to RtoP.” 
 
71. Armenia 
+ 
Notes that RtoP cases do not happen over night. 
Urges for “an early and strong reaction by the international community to systematic 
and egregious violations of human rights.” 
Is highly supportive of the responsibility to protect, and considers it “one of the 
cornerstones of the overall human security system.” 
 
72. Timor-Leste 
+ 
Strongly supports the three-pillar system, and takes these pillars as a part of the 
whole concept of the RtoP. 
Places considerable importance on the second pillar, especially given its individual 
experience in 2006. 
Notes that political will is required to obtain success through the second pillar.  
Underlines that peaceful measures to be undertaken on the basis of Chapters VI and 
VII of the UN Charter should take precedence over coercive ones of Chapter VII when 
responding to cases of RtoP. 
Supports “the Secretary-General’s appeal to the Security Council to refrain from 
employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations where there is clear failure 
to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect and to reach a mutual 
understanding to that effect.” 
 
73. Panama 
+ 
Agrees that the primary responsibility belongs to the state. 
Argues that the use of force should be a last resort. 
Emphasises that the “concepts of the responsibility to protect and humanitarian 
intervention are so dissimilar that they must not be confused.” 
States that the forceful act undertaken should comply with the international legal 
framework. 
 
74. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+! 
Notes that in the past, humanitarian intervention has been used as a pretext for 
military attacks. Currently, there is the justification of the “war on terror.” 
Posits that super-power politics is still a part of the conduct of international politics. 
Identifies 3 main concerns that are needed to be addressed in the debates: 
(1)“whether this theory is in conformity with the principles of respect for sovereignty, 
equality and non-interference in others’ internal affairs,”(2) “whether military 
intervention can be as effective as envisaged,” (3) “the concept of the responsibility to 
protect may be used to justify interference in the internal affairs of weak and small 
countries.” 
Believes that “it is all the more urgent to take steps towards the fundamental 
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resolution of wars and conflicts within the current framework rather than creating a 
new protection arrangement.” 
 
75. Botswana 
+ 
Agrees with the three-pillar approach. 
Notes that state sovereignty should not be undermined “under the pretext of 
providing support and assistance.” 
States: the “international community, for its part, must demonstrate political will and 
support by ensuring that all peaceful means of preventing or resolving a conflict are 
fully explored. That also means that we must all be prepared to take collective and 
appropriate action in a timely and decisive manner.” 
 
76. Kazakhstan 
+ 
Believes that “protecting populations from grave human rights violations […] is a 
moral imperative.” In this regard, the principle of non-indifference should be 
embraced. 
Opts for a case-by-case consideration in order to avoid the abusive use. 
“Fully supports the simultaneous implementation of the three pillars.” 
Notes that the use of force should be a last resort. 
 
77. Swaziland (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
“Is concerned that little or no reference is made in the report to the degree of 
responsibility of States when they occupy the land of others,” so asks for further 
clarification 
Suggests to reconsider the meaning and extent of ethnic cleansing. 
Questions whether the Security Council as an avenue to approve military intervention 
in cases of RtoP is an effective one. 
 
78. Bangladesh 
+ 
“Subscribes to the concept of RtoP as an emerging normative framework and believes 
that its implementation should conform to the principles of objectivity and non-
selectivity” while agreeing with the narrow scope of RtoP. 
Reiterates that primary responsibility rests with the state. 
Places emphasis on prevention. 
Notes that the use of force should be a last resort. 
Supports the idea of the reform of the Security Council. 
 
79. Papua New Guinea 
+ 
Notes that the task ahead is implementation. 
Favours the narrow scope of RtoP. 
Agrees with the statement of the NAM. 
Argues that further discussion is required to “give better definition to the 
implementation process of the RtoP concept.” 
Accepts that “the notion that the responsibility to protect is [the] primary obligation.” 
 
80.  Benin (aligns with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Takes the three pillars as an inseparable whole.  
Argues that the “kind of use of force provided for in Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the 
Charter is completely different from that undertaken by the United Nations or by 
regional organisations on behalf of the United Nations to resolve or to stop serious 
violations of the Organisation’s fundamental principles. […] The responsibility to 
protect is related to that second type of use of force. That interpretation arises from 
Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter.” 
Points to the “inconsistent practice of the Council.” 
States that there are the issues of national interests prevailing over other concerns as 
well as lack of political will in the international community. 
“Calls for a multinational rapid deployment force to be set up pursuant to Article 45 
of the Charter.” 
 
81. United Republic of Tanzania 
+ 
Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General. 
Notes that the task ahead is implementation. 
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82. Peru (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Notes that implementation without reinterpretation of the concept is the task ahead. 
Argues that the “crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity” need to be defined openly. 
Considers prevention as a key element. 
Highlights that there is need for the establishment of an early warning mechanism. 
 
83. Kenya 
+ 
Notes that implementation without reinterpretation of the concept is the task ahead. 
Argues that the “three pillars that are the basis of the strategy can withstand the test 
of time if implemented in a consistent manner and in good faith.” 
Reiterates that if use of force is necessary, “it must be consistent with the principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.” 
 
84. Malaysia (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Raises the problematic aspects of prevention: “it will be difficult to hold a State 
responsible for not acting against a crime that has yet to be committed.” Thus, argues 
that “the United Nations needs to sit down and iron out details of the principle of the 
RtoP.” Therefore, further clarification for purposes of implementation is required. 
Notes that “[v]eto use should be restrained.” 
 
85. Lesotho 
+ 
Argues that the task is not to redefine but to implement. 
States that prevention is vital. 
Favours the understanding that takes use of force as a last resort. 
Supports the Secretary-General’s “call for restraint in the use of the veto by the 
Security Council” in matters of RtoP. 
Posits that the “role of the General Assembly needs to be further strengthened.” 
 
86. Azerbaijan 
+ 
Points that the “General Assembly has an important role to play, especially when the 
Security Council fails to exercise its responsibility with regard to international peace 
and security.” 
Argues that both individual states and international institutions have proven to be 
inadequate in responding to cases of RtoP. 
 
87. Georgia (aligns itself with the statement of the EU) 
+ 
There is the potential for RtoP for misuse, and thus the question is its “proper 
implementation.”  
 
88. Argentina 
+ 
Supports pillar one. 
Considers prevention as a key element. 
Notes: “With regard to pillar three on mounting a timely and decisive response, 
Argentina believes that it would be very useful for the United Nations system to adopt 
measures to implement the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” 
 
89. Sudan (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+! 
Aggress that primary responsibility rests with the state itself. 
Notes that “[t] here is a tendency to misinterpret the notion of the responsibility to 
protect to mean the right of intervention in the affairs of a sovereign State.” 
Points that “[t]here is still no consensus as to the applicability of RtoP to our political 
realities.” 
Is sceptical about the implementation of RtoP as it can be abused by states driven 
with their national interests. 
Considers RtoP and humanitarian intervention to be “two sides of the same coin.” 
Urges for the reform of the Security Council. 
Argues that “[t]o give the Security Council the privilege of being executor of the 
concept of the responsibility to protect would be tantamount to giving a wolf the 
responsibility to adopt a lamb.” 
Notes regarding RtoP: “we know that it can be misused by some powerful countries to 
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achieve imperial hegemony over less powerful ones.” 
Posits that the “way forward should be the establishment of an effective early warning 
mechanism, as articulated in the report of the Secretary-General, and not the 
usurpation of the doctrine of State sovereignty.” 
 
90. Gambia (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM)  
+ 
Embraces the concept as presented in the 2005 World Summit. 
Argues: “We must anchor the implementation of RtoP in rule-of-law-based 
approaches that will prevent its abuse or misuse by the international community, 
while allowing flexibility for genuine action. We must find a cure for our collective 
inertia.” 
Points that capacity constraints need to be taken into consideration for effective 
implementation of pillar two. 
Agrees that primary responsibility rests with the state itself. 
Notes that there is the “likelihood of abuse of the principle of RtoP through 
politicization,” and that the Security Council is not the best option as the milieu for 
the implementation of RtoP. Thus, suggests a more neutral arbiter such as a 
representative committee. 
 
91. Serbia 
+ 
Considers RtoP a necessity but this does not imply that it has yet acquired a legal 
nature. 
Notes that there is a potential for the abuse of the concept. 
“Believe[s] in the mutual complementarity and interdependence of all three pillars.” 
Nevertheless, notes that there is the “greatest need for investing genuine effort and 
resolve in further elaborating the third pillar.” 
 
92. Cameroon 
+ 
Argues that RtoP “is not a legal concept but a political one.” 
Favours the limited scope of the concept. 
Believes that pillar one is clearly established. 
States that the implementation of pillar three should be on a case-by-case basis, and 
the primary focus should be prevention. 
Posits that the “United Nations must itself be strengthened and democratized.” 
Points that reform of the Security Council needs to be accelerated. 
 
93. Holy See (OBSERVER) 
+ 
Notes that the “international community has a moral responsibility to fulfil its various 
commitments.” 
Argues that “[t]imely intervention that places emphasis on mediation and dialogue 
has greater ability to promote the responsibility to protect than military action.” 
Posits that “[i]f the third pillar is to gain momentum and efficacy, further efforts must 
be made to ensure that action taken pursuant to the powers of the Security Council 
is carried out in an open and inclusive manner and that the needs of the affected 
populations, rather than the whims of those engaging in geopolitical power struggles, 
are placed in the forefront.” 
Points that “[i]n addition to national and international institutions, religious and 
community leaders have an important role in promoting the responsibility to protect.” 
 
94. Palestine (OBSERVER) (aligns itself with the statement of the NAM) 
+ 
Points that double standards need to be avoided. 
Reminds the right to self-determination. 
Argues that there is selectivity in focusing on situations around the world. 
Notes that the role of the Security Council in the implementation of RtoP is crucial. 
 
 
